The Qawasim and British control of the Arabian Gulf by Al-Otabi, M
The Qawasim and British Control
of the Arabian Gulf
Mubarak Al-Otabi
Thesis presented for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
University of Salford
International Studies Unit
1989

Author's Note
While every effort has been made to standardise proper and place
names, it will be appreciated that these have undergone variation
in transliteration since the middle of the eighteenth century;
where archaisms occur, as in contemporary writings, reports and
journals, these have been retained so as not to lose the period
flavour they lend to the narrative
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter	 Title	 Page
1	 The situation in the Gulf in the	 1
first half of the eighteenth
century
2	 The emergence of the Qawasim as 	 23
a new political power in the Gulf
3	 The Wahabi movement and its effect	 38
on the political history of the
area (1800-1818)
4	 Franco-British rivalry in the Gulf
	 58
(1798-1810)
5	 Qawasim activity in the Gulf
	
107
6	 The 1819 expedition and the pacifico‘lin	 127
of the Gulf
7	 Conclusions	 164
Appendices
A. The government of India	 168
B. Treaty concluded between the	 173
Honourable East India Company
and His Highness the Imaum of
Muskat, 12 October 1798
. C.	 Further treaty between the
	 176
Honourable East India Company
and His Highness the Imaum of
Muskat, 18 January 1800
D.	 General treaty with the Arab
	
178
tribes of the Persian Gulf,
1820
Bibliography	 182
SUMMARY
THE QAWASIM AND BRITISH CONTROL OF THE ARABIAN GULF 
For 150 years after 1820, Oman and the littoral sheikhdoms
of the Arabian Gulf were known respectively as Trucial Oman
and the Trucial States. 	 This reflected the series of
agreements beginning in 1820 progressively extending
British control of the external policies of the area, leaving
domestic and internal affairs in the hands of the traditional
rulers.	 The trucial system was imposed initially to put
down piracy by the Qawasim whose depredations on British
trade with India reached a climax at the beginning of the
nineteenth century.
For many years an accepted version, the allegations of
piracy have recently been challenged; this thesis seeks
to investigate the issue using archive material from the
Bombay Presidency and from the Cairo Citadel, material
not previously investigated.	 It is the writer's
contention that the traditional justification for British
intervention and control of the Gulf, namely piracy, does
not take into account the influence of Wahhabism or
Anglo-French rivalry dating from the Egyptian campaigns
of Napoleon.	 Thus, the trucial system rested on a more
varied and complex origin than has generally been
accepted and reflects more pervasive British interests
than a simple humanitarian motive.
1CHAPTER ONE
The situation in the Gulf in the first half 
of the eighteenth century 
Any discussion of the origins and development of the Al
'Qawasim and their maritime activities conducted on the eastern
side of the Arab Peninsula during the second half of the
eighteenth century, when they emerged as a naval force to be
reckoned with, requires a preliminary study of the politico-
economic situation obtaining in the area during the first half of
that century.
We know for instance that the Gulf area constituted a
location of strategic importance to countries with a strong
interest in East-West trade activity - the Portuguese, Dutch,
French and British. All these accordingly had dealings with the
rulers of Persia, the local sheiks of Oman, and the leaders of
the Qawasim, together with their Wahabi supporters, and notably
the Saudis. The local population and its political and social
systems were greatly affected by this attention focused on their
region.
The Arab Gulf lies between the latitudes of 24-30 degrees in
the north, and the longitudes of 48-58 degrees in the east. The
temperature during summer is high, with humidity up to 100%, but
in winter it can fall as low as 5 0 centigrade. There is very
little rainfall.	 Winds from the north are invariably cold,
2whereas southern winds are dusty and hot. The Gulf covers
97,000 square miles and is 500 miles long stretching from Shatt-
al-Arab in the north to the Hormuz straits in the south. It is
180 miles wide at its broadest, narrowing down to 29 miles in the
straits of Hormuz.
On the western borders of the Gulf from south to north runs
the Oman mountain ridge, followed by a chain of small winding
bays dotting the coastline between the Sultanate of Oman and the
State of Qatar. The area of Al-Hassa in the northwest is
characterized by plains rich in minerals and sulphur springs.
Thus, surrounded on one side by mountains and on the other by
desert, the coastal Arabs had little choice but to turn to the
sea to earn their living, which they did with considerable skill.
Due to its location, the Arab Gulf occupied a prominent
place as one of the major trade routes linking East with West
before the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope in August 1498.
Trade was conducted along two major routes, namely the Red Sea
and Egypt, and the Gulf and the north land route. (1) The Gulf
was the route along which products from India and China reached
the markets of Persia and the North, with exports from the Arab
Peninsula, Persia and Europe conveyed by this route to India and
the Far East. (2) Exports from India were shipped through the
Gulf and then conveyed by caravans via Iraq and the north to one
of the Mediterranean ports to Europe.
	 As for the Red Sea route,
(1) Lorimer, J G, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and 
Central Arabia, Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing,
1915, Vol 1, p 9.
(2) Kelly, J B, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880, Oxford,
The Clarendon Press, 1968, p 1.
3goods were transported by sea to Alexandria or Damietta, where
they were loaded on ships bound for Europe.
Amongst the various trading 'centres of the Gulf, Bahrain
benefited greatly from its favourable geographical position,
blessed as it was with safe anchorages and harbours, close to the
main ports situated in the Gulf. Pearl fishing was the main
industry and was conducted along the coast extending from Katif
to Dubai, with extensive pearl fisheries being located around
Bahrain Island itself. The representative of the East India
Company in Basra in 1750 estimated the value of pearl exports
from Bahrain to B gsra to be 500,000 Indian rupees (about £50,000)
per annum. In 1790, the annual value of the pearl trade remained
at 500,000 Bombay rupees (3) , whilst Captain John Malcom, ten
•
years later, estimated the annual export of pearls at 1,000,000
rupees. (  size of the Gulf pearling fleet was
considerable:- Captain Robert Taylor, an official of the East
India Company, estimated the number of vessels at 1400:
Hof which 700 were of larger burthen, 300 intermediate, and
400 of a small size. The larger were manned by one master,
fourteen divers, and fourteen assistants, in all twenty-nine
men; the intermediate with one master, nine divers, and nine
assistants, in all nineteen men; the least with one masec,
seven divers, and seven assistants, in all fifteen men."0)
Bahrain imported its foodstuffs and commodities - cotton, sugar,
spices, rice, metals, drugs and pine - mainly from India, with
grain, dried fruits, dates and coffee being obtained from Persia,
(3) India Office Library and Records (IOR), Factory Records, 
Persia and Persian Gulf G/29/21 - Manesty and Jones to Governor-
in-council; Bombay, 18/12/1790.
(4) Al-Qasimi, The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf, London,
Croom Helm, 1986, p 10.
(5) Selections from the records of the Bombay Government, new
series no XX IV, 1856 (henceforth Bombay Selections XXIV),
compiled and edited by R T Hughes, Cambridge, The Oleander Press,
1985, p 22.
4Oman, Basra and Yemen. Bahraini merchant vessels used
principally for trading with India numbered some 20 vessels with
a loading capacity which varied between 140 and 350 tons.
Bahrain had also 100 small trading vessels, the loading capacity
of which varied between 40 and 120 tons.(6)
Muscat (now Oman) for its part lies between latitudes 23-24
in the north and longitudes 58-60 in the east, and is coastal
territory, bordered inland by the Rub al Khali desert, separating
Muscat from the rest of the Arab Peninsula. A chain of
mountains, the Al Hajar (eastern and western) reaching a height
of 1,000-12,500 metres borders most of its coastline. Muscat
played a prominent role in the international trade conducted
between India and Arab states due to its position astride the
route linking India, the Arab states and Europe; because of its
location it was occupied more than once by countries anxious to
safeguard trade routes.
With its harbours and bays fit for the anchorage of all
types of ships, Muscat was developed by its rulers as a large
warehouse or trading zone whereby goods coming from the East and
the West could be stored as well as sold; a 5% tax was imposed on
goods imported and sold and 2% on goods imported but not sold.
No tax was imposed however on exports. (7) A land tax was also
levied. The annual revenues from customs and land taxes in 1780
were computed at 120,000 crowns, (8) with trade earnings of
Bombay Selections XXIV, p 566.
10R, Political and Secret Library, L/P and S/20/C 248 C.
Bombay Selections XXIV, p 288.
5Muscat annually amounting to £1,000,000. Most of the goods bound
for Muscat were re-exported after collecting custom duties. In
addition . a duty on slaves was collected at Muscat, amounting to
one dollar per head for Africans and Abyssinians, and two dollars
for Georgians or Armenians.()
The production of foodstuffs in Muscat was limited, with
only a few items being considered for export, namely: jute, the
principal item, barley, and some fish, salted and dried. The
foodstuffs and commodities imported by Muscat indicate its
commercial significance at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, the ports of despatch as goods as below:
Surat:	 coarse piece-goods, silk and cotton
fabrics
Bownahur:	 oil, cotton and grain
Bombay:	 iron, lead and other European goods
Malabar:	 rice, spars and timber
The Coromandal 
Coast:	 calicoes and chintz
Bengal:	 rice, muslin, sugar, silks and piece-
goods
Batavia:	 sugar and cloves
The Malay 
Islands:	 spices
Zanzibar:	 cowries,	 rice,	 wood,	 elephant's
teeth, hides, wax and gums
Qatar and
Bahrain:	 pearls and black camels
Basra:	 dates and copper
Persia:	 copper, hardware, brimstone, salt,
carpets, camalines and dried fruits
Makran:	 sheep, 'oaree (ie slave girls) and
grain
(9) Al-Qasimi, op cit, p 14.
The Imam's total revenue was said to amount to approximately
lakhs (100,000) German andcrowns. Muscat, Muttra, Zanzibar,
the slave trade constituted his 	 sources of revenue, estimated as
follows:
Muscat,	 external, by customs 	 180,000
Muttra,	 external, by customs 	 60,000
Muscat and Muttra, 	 internal	 .	 20,000
Zanzibar Island	 220,000
Slave trade	 80,000
Average annual receipts from
other places (approx),	 50,000
Total
German Crowns
(11)
610,000
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Sind: cotton, cloth,q4),5petre, tallow, grain, oil,
hides and indigok"
This wide-ranging trade activity enabled Muscat to build a
merchant fleet comprising 15 vessels with a loading capacity of
400-700 tons, 50 large merchant vessels and 50 smaller vessels.
The Island of Kharrack lies on the eastern side of the Gulf,
with an area of about 4-5 square miles. The island was
considered, by virtue of its location, the most important port on
the Persian Gulf coast, containing good anchorage for ships and
plentiful potable water springs.
There are no reports confirming a significant trading'
activity in Kharrack during the first half of the eighteenth
century; however a simple trade movement did take off around
(10) Bombay Archives, (henceforth BA), Secret and Political 
Department Diaries, (henceforth SPDD), No 129, Year 1802, p 4596.
(11) Bombay Selections XXIV, p 604.
71760. Kharrack Island was governed from the port of Bushire on
the Persian coast. The northwestern part of the island was good
for anchorage whereas in the southeastern part, the anchorage
was considered risky. Apart from its strategic position in the
middle of the Gulf, the attraction Kharrack island held for
foreign companies lay in the abundant sweet and potable water
springs and its wild fowl. Apart from serving as an excellent
port, the island must have been a pleasant place in which to
recuperate after a long voyage.
Bushire itself was a town of considerable importance, being
the centre of all British and foreign trade activity with Persia.
It gained in importance as a commercial market following the
economic decline of Bander Abbas, situated on the eastern side of
the Gulf, due to the transfer of the East India Company's
headquarters to Bushire in 1763. The inhabitants of Bushire were
both seafarers and skilful traders, plying their wares between
Bushire and both India and Africa. They had, however, to contend
with their ruler, a member of the Sunni Mataweesh tribe in Oman,
who owned four ships and several large buggalows (commercial
vessels), who tended to monopolize most of the freight, refusing
merchants to ship their goods on any other vessel until his were
loaded.(12)
Bushire's foreign trade was mainly conducted with India,
with very little trade with Basra. The total annual value of
trade amounted to 20 lakhs of rupees (approximately £200,000).
Bushire exported horses, copper, dried fruits, carpets, rose
water and wine, which amounted in value to one third of its
(12) Bombay Selections XXIV, p 585.
8imports.( 13 ) The administration of Bushire imported mainly from
India, Turkey and some Gulf sheikhdoms cotton and cotton yarn,
spices, chinaware, lead, sugar, silk, tobacco and woollen goods.
A duty averaging 5% was levied on imports which could be reduced
or increased depending on the nature of the imported item. In
addition to this a consular tax of 2% was imposed on the goods of
British merchants operating in Gulf waters. The revenue gained
from this latter tax was divided equally between the local
resident and the agent of Bushire; a 3% duty was levied on all
goods imported and exported by those trading under the East India
Company's protection .(14)
The port of Basra lies to the far north of the Arab Gulf,
providing an important market for the products of India and
Persia, in addition to serving as a warehouse for the products of
the Far East. Trade activity in the first half of the eighteenth
century generated some 4 million rupees: Basra's share amounted
to roughly 3 million rupees.(15)
All imports and exports from and to Basra were charged a
customs duty calculated according to nationality, which favoured
British merchants who paid 3% while other merchants such as
Arabs, Armenians, Indians', Persians and Jews paid 8.5%. Non-
Europeans suffered also in payment of tax on items which they
exported from Iraq, at 5% whilst British merchants paid 3%. The
customs duty at 3% was calculated at the actual selling price of
(13) Report on the Trade of India and Persia, December 1799 in.
Saldanha, J A, Selection from State Papers, Bombay, Regarding the 
East India Company's Connection with the Persian Gulf (1600- 
1800), Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing, 1908.
(14) BA, Bussorah Diary, no 193, pp 31-34.
(15) Saldanha, J A, op cit, p 398.
9the item in - Basra, whereas the higher rate was based on a tariff
laid down by local statute, while the duty of 7% paid by local
merchants was based upon a scale of values laid down in a dafter
(register), which for the most part set an old and arbitrary
valuation upon an article far below its real worth.(16)
Transport charges levied on boats using Iraqi waterways,
including the Tigris and the Euphrates were carculated per bale
(weighing 300-400 English pounds). The charges of shipping one
bale from Basra to Baghdad via the Tigris for example amounted to
12 Indian rupees, via the Euphrates to Al-Hulla 15 rupees, and to
Shushtar via the Karon river 4 rupees. As for transport from
Basra to Aleppo by caravans, which took 80 days, charges on a
camel carrying a weight of 700 English pounds were calculated
according to the type of goods. A consignment of cloth warranted
transport charges of 130 rupees, with 90 rupees being levied for
other consignments.(17)
Basra imported goods from India and the Gulf states: cotton
fabrics and shawls, rice, sugar, iron, lead and tin; and from
Muscat, slaves, African ivory, Arabian coffee, copper and wool.
Goods were imported also by land from the north, in particular
Aleppo, namely: textiles, silk, satin, gold and silver thread,
rose water, jewellery, glass vessels, tobacco, spices and dried
fruits. Goods reaching Basra from Persia included, horses,
silk, pearls, carpets, glass, cotton, tobacco, dried fruits,
iron, copper and wine.
(16) Kelly, J B, op cit, p 37.
(17) Saldanha, J A, op cit, p 445.
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Items imported by Basra from the north were often re-
exported to Persia, India and Arab countries, whilst goods
supplied to Basra from India, Muscat and Persia were re-exported
to the north, Aleppo, Baghdad and Turkey.
The port of Bander Abbas, or Gumberoon, an earlier
designation, formed one of the most important Persian ports
located on the eastern coast of the Gulf because it literally
guarded the exit and entry to the Gulf. Whoever had control of
it therefore, either for military or commercial purposes, wielded
a tremendous influence in the area. This was the logic of the
East India Company which established its first commercial agency
there. The Gimbroon diaries (Gimbroon being a variant of
Gumberoon) now located in the India Office Library indicate its
trade; thus in December 1736, about 392 shipments of Carman wool
were transported from Bander Abbas to Bombay; in 1744 Bander
Abbas sold 1,242 rupees worth of dates, and in early 1748 shipped
2,000 monds of copper for sale in Basra (one mond = 100 pounds
weight).
One ship that arrived at Bander Abbas from India on 17 July
1751 had on board 188 bales of broad cloth, 62 bales of carpets,
7 pieces of brocade, 6 of satin, 12 tons of iron, and 3 tons of
lead. (18) By late 1755 this trade showed a healthy increase;
1,200 monds of Carman wool were shipped to Bombay, with 3,240
monds
	 pending shipping, 750 monds of which were from
Isfahan.(19)
In addition to its substantial exports of Carman wool,
Bander Abbas exported carpets, tobacco, copper, rose water,
(18) IOR, Gimbroon Diaries, Vol 7, pp 160-170.
(19) 10R, G/29/7, Factory Records.
11
dried fruits, raw silk, cotton yarn, sulphur and rock salt
extracted from Hormuz Island. Its imports from India consisted
of various materials, including cotton thread and fabrics, sugar,
spices, perfumes, indigo and chinaware.(20)
Ra's Al-Khaimah is situated on a point of land projecting
into the sea, located in the north-east, and terminating in a
sandbank, parallel with the coast to the west, two and a half
miles offshore. The old name for Ra's Al-Khaimah was Julfar,and
it was known for its trading activity. The designation of Ra's
Al-Khaimah goes back to the practice of the founder of the
Qawasim settlements, Sheikh Qawasim, who had the habit of
pitching his tent on a point of land a little elevated above the
sea-shore, rendering it conspicuous to sailors passing by. For
this reason they called the place 'the cape on which stands the
tent', or Ra t s Al-Khaimah.
The inhabitants of Ra's Al-Khaimah, the Qawasim, were active
as merchants, palm owners, ship owners and divers. (21 ) Two types
of vessels, a dhow  or bagala, large in size, and a smaller
version - the batteel or bakala - were used by Ra's Al-Khaimah
for trade. Large ships plied their trade with Yemen, India and
journeyed to the coasts of Sind, Muscat and Basra. The small
ships often travelled to Bahrain, Katif and to the ports of the
eastern coast of the Gulf such as Kankun, Isliway, Lingah and
Jasm.
The pearl banks of Ra's Al-Khaimah, famous for the excellent
quality of their produce, lay a few miles offshore in 6-7 fathoms
C20) Lorimer, J G I op_cit, p 165.
(21) BA, SPDD, Vol 429, Year 1816, pp 985-987.
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of water. Approximately 400 boats of differing sizes, 200 large,
100 intermediate and 100 small, were annually involved in the
fishing, realizing sales of around 40,000 Persian Tomans, or
£2000 per year.(22)
The trade activity in Ra's Al-Khaimah on the import side
included horses and dates from Bahrain and Basra, gunpowder,
guns, swords, carpets and tobacco from Persia; metals, rice and
cotton textiles from Bombay; dates from Oman; coffee from Yemen;
slaves from Zanzibar; and wheat from Hormuz, with only pearls,
salt and amber available for exportation.(23)
The political manoeuvrings of certain European states were
certainly in evidence in the Gulf during the first half of the
eighteenth century, their activities often conducted through
trading companies - Portuguese, British, Dutch and French. A
characteristic feature of these manoeuvrings was the attempt to
check one another's ambitions in the area, either by offering
help and protection or by exploiting groupings or tribes
indigenous to the Gulf including Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, and
Persia and the Qawasim and Saudis. 	 The first half of the
eighteenth century witnessed two uncontested European trading
powers, Holland and Britain, operating in the Gulf area, which
offered a vital passage either to merchants wishing to trade
between India and Basra and beyond, or those who wished to
maintain a military presence in the area in order to protect
vital interests - as in the case of the British government with
its presence in India. The exploration of the Cape of Good Hope
(22) IOR, Persian Gulf Residency, R/15/1/20, p 13.
(23) Belgrave, C, The Pirate Coast, Beirut, Librairie du Liban,
1972, p 306.
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by Vasco de Gama in 1498 and his arrival in India had helped pave
the way for Portugal to monopolize trade in the East, a monopoly
that was to last up till the early seventeenth century.
Portugal, however, declined in power as a nation, after
falling under Spanish control in 1580; increasingly the
Portuguese found it difficult to safeguard their trade, as the
attacks from local forces became more frequent and as the back-up
support from Lisbon diminished. In 1602, the Portuguese were
defeated by the Bahrainis and were driven out of Bander Abbas in
1615 by the Shah, and out of several Gulf sheikhdoms on the coast•
by 1660. As the Portuguese declined so the British and Dutch
presence increased in the Gulf, the latter two powers combining
their forces to rid the Gulf of Portuguese influence by the first
half of the seventeenth century. (24)
Britain's naval power had increased dramatically with its
victory over the Spanish Armada in 1588, heralding an unprece-
dented era in the expansion of British trade. In September 1599
a petition was presented to Queen Elizabeth asking for permission
to deal in trade with the East, and on 31 December 1600 the
London Company of Traders was formed to trade with the East
Indies. The Queen's decree provided for the founding of the
English East India Company at a capital of £68,873, the original
share holders numbering 217. The decree stated that the company
had the right to a trade monopoly; the first voyage to the East
was undertaken in 1601, followed by a second voyage two years
later and a third in 1607.
(24) Abu Hakima, A M, Tarikh Sharq Al-Jazirah Al-Arabiyya
(History of Eastern Arabia 1750-1800), Beirut, Khayat, 1965,
pill.
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The East India Company began searching for bases on the Gulf
and other coasts as trading stepping stones leading to India
which it reached in 1608, setting up a wool factory in January
1613 in Surat from which trade missions laden made trips to
Persia and the Gulf in 1615 in pursuit of new markets. This
factory then became the administrative centre headed by a
chairman and a board serving other burgeoning factories. The
purpose of placing commercial agents in Persia and the Arab
states was two-fold; to ensure distribution of British goods
throughout the area and to safeguard British mail destined for
the East and vice versa. Hence the interest in the Basra agency
in particular, due to its location which ensured the rapid
arrival of mail by two routes: one via the Red Sea and the other,
via the Arab Gulf. Mail travelled by sea from India to England
via the Red Sea, Alexandria and the Mediterranean, then overland.
A second route passed from India via the Arab Gulf to Kuwait or
Basra, then went overland to Aleppo where it proceeded by land
via Asia Minor, to Europe, or by sea to Greece or Italy and
thence to England.
In 1618, the representatives of the company in Persia
managed to obtain concessions from the Shah (with whom they had
first established relations in 1616), granting them the right to
engage in the silk trade with Persia provided that it was not
sold to the Spanish or the Portuguese nor dispatched to Europe
via Turkey, this in return for British naval aid in expelling the
Portuguese from Hormuz. (25)
 This was the Shah Abbas' main
objective after having defeated Turkey in 1618 near Tabriz.
(25) Foster, W, The En lish Factories in India 1622-1623,
calendar of documents in t e n la 0 ice an ritis Museum,
Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1908, pp vii-xi.
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British naval forces accordingly invaded Hormuz achieving victory
on 21 April 1622, hardly any resistance having been offered by
the Portuguese, approximately 2,600 of whom were transferred to
Muscat under British protection. Thus Portuguese influence in
the Gulf came to an end and, along with it, for the time being,
the lucrative trade attracted to Hormuz which the Shah razed to
the ground.( 26 ) For this service the British obtained even more
concessions from the Shah, including the use of the port of
Gumberoon (Bander Abbas) to be used as a factory by the company.
Further concessions covered the possibility of taking one half of
customs duties collected in Bander Abbas, but this proved a bone
of contention between the company and the Shah, who was looking
once again to the British navy to help him, this time to expel
the Dutch from Muscat.
Having got rid of the Portuguese the Shah proceeded to play
off against each other those two great rivals in trade, the
Dutch and the British, each trying to establish a foothold in the
Gulf with a view to monopolizing trade in the East. The Dutch
for their part attempted to do this by bribery, by paying far
above the market price for Persian commodities.
The Dutch had begun to appear in the Gulf around 1623 when
their East India Company established a centre in Bander Abbas
where it sought a monopoly of the silk trade - a step which
prompted the British to transfer the East India Company from
Bander Abbas to Basra for interests of security. In 1649 Dutch
influence reached a new height with fleets arriving on a regular
basis. In 1650 for example, a shipment comprising ten vessels
r26rCragot—iTA-77—The Persian Gulf, Oxford, The Clarendon Press,
1928, pp 135-136.
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docked containing 1,500,000 pounds of pepper which was bartered
for a consignment of Persian silk. The following year another
Dutch fleet arrived consisting of 11 vessels laden with goods
valued at £100,000. In all the Dutch sent 15 vessels during
1652-3 to Bander • Abbas, unloading a total capacity reckoned at
£120,000, badly undermining British trade in the area. (27) In
addition to this the British-Dutch war in Europe in 1652 spilled
into the Gulf, occasioning several clashes between British and
Dutch vessels which resulted in more injury for the British than
the Dutch in terms of vessels lost, badly affecting the British
company's performance in the area.
This said, the British.East India Company had its earlier
concessions confirmed by a decree issued by the Shah through an
agreement dated 18 June 1697, similar to that concluded in
1616. The new agreement, however, contained several new clauses,
stating that the taxes paid by the company on its imports and
exports in Persia should be comparable to those collected by the
Turkish government in Aleppo and Constantinople. Another new
clause contained the promise of the Shah to settle his debts to
the company resulting from its share in the customs at Bander
Abbas.(28)
With the issue of the 1697 decree trade started to improve
for the British once again. The Persian ruler visited the
British agency in Isfahan on 23 July 1699 but rejected an
invitation to visit the Dutch agency; prospects improved even
further when negotiations for the merging of the new East India
Company with the old London Company got under way in 1709.
(27) Lorimer, J G, op cit, p 69.
(28) Bruce J, Annals of the Honourable East India Company,
London, Cox, Son and Bayliss, 1810, pp 229-230.
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Domestic events in Persia, notably the succession of a new
ruler, Nadir Shah determined to establish Persia as a naval
power, and to make Bushire a headquarters for the Persian fleet
conspired to check the progress hitherto made by the East India
Company in the field of trade, especially in Bander Abbas which
the British were ordered to leave by Nadir Shah's successor, Shah
Kareem Khan, ostensibly to avoid a civil war. However, the
company began exploring Bander Reek which was found to be a suit-
able place for the establishment of a factory. The Dutch agency
remained in Bander Abbas where it dealt in Carman wool and
continued to compete with the British by paying higher prices for
commodities; but the domestic Dutch economy was in decline and
their companies found it increasingly difficult to compete. They
were also dealt a severe blow when they failed to prevent Hormuz
falling into the hands of the British in 1760. In addition, a
new ruler, Nasser Khan, required the transfer of all foreign
agencies based on Bander Abbas to Kishm Island.
Bander Abbas had fallen into the hands of the French
1758, introducing new players on to the scene; the Dutch presence
in the Gulf finally ended under attack from the local rulers,
with Arab resistance encountered in Kharrack, (then under lease
to the Dutch against an annual tribute payable to the ruler of
Kharrack Island) and against a background of inability to compete
with the British in terms of trade. A French commercial agency
had been established in Bander Abbas as long ago as 1667 but
failed to expand French trade in the face of competition
presented by the British and the Dutch. As a result the agency
was closed down and it was not until 1705 that the French sent a
mission to re-establish relations with the Shah.	 In September
1708 this was followed up by a second treaty granting trade
18
facilities to the French, exempting them from paying taxes for
five years, after which time a tax of 3% would be levied on
imports and exports. France did not endorse the treaty until
1711 mainly because the prospects of trade seemed bleak, and
because of her involvement in the War of Spanish Succession
(1702-1712); as a consequence the only measure taken
	 was to
appoint a French consul in Isfahan.
The Seven-years War (1756-1763) between Britain and France
spilled into the Gulf. France ordered all British subjects to
leave French property and the seizure of British merchant
vessels, placing the British on alert in Bander Abbas. Conflict
in the Gulf began with a French attack on the British agency
there on the morning of 13 October 1759 with three warships.
Bombardment began a quarter of a mile off the coast, following by
the storming and the setting ablaze of the British agency'. At
3,50 pm on the same day the British surrendered. (29)
 Further
French attacks were launched against Bushire.
It is clear from the above that European states, as
represented by commercial companies operating in the Gulf during
the first half of the eighteenth century, contested with one
another mainly for the purpose of monopolizing trade and, apart
from Portugal, had no intention of colonizing the area. The Arab
sheikdoms themselves, like the European companies, conducted
their own trade wars that sometimes resulted in open conflict,
and led to the emergence and growth of Arab naval power.
The important geo-political location of Oman at the entrance
of the Gulf afforded it a key	 role in the political and
(29) (IOR), LA" and S/20/C-227, p 125.
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commercial activities peculiar to the region from the sixteenth
century onwards. The election of Imam Nasser Bin Murshid, a
member of the Al-Ya'aribah clan, to the leadership of the Omani
region of Rastak in 1624 marked a crucial stage in the history of
Oman.	 Under his guidance, civil war was brought to an end,
laying the foundation for a unified Oman. Thereafter, Omani
energies would be directed against foreign influence on its soil
in particular and the Gulf in general. Initial attacks against
the Persians and the Portuguese resulted in their expulsion from
Ra's Al-Khaimah, followed by successful raids on Sahar, Sor, and
Kurriat in 1633. The expulsion of the Portuguese from Muscat,
achieved under the leadership of Imam Sultan Bin Saif who
succeeded Bin Murshid in 1649, heralded the breakthrough for the
Omanis; (30) the ridding of foreign presence from Omani territory
led ultimately to a recovery of trade and the development of a
substantial and effective Omani fleet which frequently sallied
forth, attacking Persian, Indian and Portuguese targets. 	 The
response of the Persians to Omani attacks was to request the East
India Company to help them capture Muscat, offering concessions
by way of reward that matched those enjoyed by the Company at
Bander Abbas. The Company, however, declined, fearing that heavy
British losses might be sustained in the process.
The Imam intensified his attacks against Persia, inflicting
a substantial defeat when he launched a raid on the port of
Koong. Persia was by this time disposed to come to terms with
and seek an alliance with her long term foe, Portugal, in order
to check Omani progress, but the Omanis easily undermined this
pact by despatching a fleet to the African coast in 1699 where it
(30) Ibn Rziaq, H B M I Al-Fath Al Mubin fee sirat al saddat al-
Bu-saidiyyin, Oman, Ministry of Culture, 1983, p 283.
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successfully raided and destroyed	 Portuguese colonies in
Mombasa, Kilwa and Pemba. A second fleet made its way to
Mangalor on the Indian coast where it destroyed the Portuguese
agency.
In the latter instance the Portuguese accused the British of
supplying arms to the Omanis, a claim that was denied by the East
India Company. A more likely key to Omani success on this
particular campaign may have rested with the help received from
the ruler of Pagu in India who granted the Omani rights to build
ships in his country.	 The Omani fleet in 1715 comprised 6
vessels, the largest with 74 cannon and the smallest with 12,
together with some smaller boats of 4-8 cannon. (31) The
beginning of the eighteenth century saw the spread of Omani
political influence throughout the southern area of the Gulf, and
the East African coasts with a strong trade influence obtaining
in the Gulf, Iraq and the Arab peninsula. Tribal conflict and
civil war checked Omani ambitions during the years 1710-40,
forcing the Omani ruler, Saif Bin Sultan II to seek the support
of Nadir Shah in suppressibg the domestic conflict enveloping his
country. The Persian ruler, exploiting the Omani's straightened
circumstances, re-occupied part of Omani territory in 1738. As a
result, different factions in Oman threw aside their differences
and pledged their allegiance to Ahmad Bin Said as Imam in
1741. (32)
 He rid his country of Persian influence in 1744.
	 The
internal unrest and tribal rebellions against the ruling body in
(31) Miles, S B, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf,
London, Harrison, 1919, p 23/.
(32) There is some discrepancy on the date of Ahmed Bin Said's
accession as Imam; Lorimer says 1744, Wellested 1747, Niebuhr,
Miles and Kelly 1749 and Palgrave 1775! The correct date, 1741,
is given in Ibn Rziaq, op cit, p 386.
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Oman continued, however, with Bin Said forced to recruit African
slaves as mercenaries to quell the unrest.
Persia also, like Oman, suffered from internal unrest during
the first half of the eighteenth century and did not begin to
emerge as a power to be reckoned with in the Gulf until the
accession of Nadir Shah to the Persian throne in 1726. Earlier,
Persia had been subject to Afghan, Ottoman and Russian invasions,
keeping them preoccupied on their land borders and out of
mischief in the Gulf. Having consolidated his hold on Persia,.
Nadir Shah turned to building up a naval force, aimed at
protecting her against naval invasion inside Gulf waters, whilst
at the same time wishing to encourage foreign trade. The country
however lacked a naval tradition and Nadir Shah himself lacked
naval experience and expertise. He was compelled at first to use
Arab sailors and vessels, loaned by Sheikh Rashed, the Arab
Governor of Bassido, because the British and Dutch had refused to
sell Persia vessels. Later the British and Dutch relented,
leasing four vessels to the Shah's navy, under the command of
Latif Khan from 1733. Despite setbacks, the Shah proceeded with
his plans to build up a modern fleet, enlarging it with three new
vessels purchased from Europe in 1734. The ambitions which lay
behind his drive to create a modern navy soon became apparent
when it launched its first attack against Basra in 1735 from the
new naval headquarters of Bushire which the Shah had chosen both
for its strategic importance and its location out of the way of
commercial shipping.
The attack on Basra, launched to exploit the unstable
political situation obtaining there caused by Ottoman-Arab
conflict was checked by the British navy, honour bound to
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cooperate with the Ottomans ruling Basra. The Persian.' navy,
sufficiently recovered however to attack and occupy Bahrain in
1736 under the command of Latif Khan, the Shah installing Shaikh
Nasser - the ruler of Bushire - as nominal ruler of Bahrain. As
we saw earlier, Nadir Shah sought to occupy Muscat, the sentinel
of the Gulf. However, the Persian fleet, under the command of
Takie Khan who asdumed command following the death of Latif Khan,
was defeated, largely as a result of a mutiny instigated by Arab
sailors in reaction to ill-treatment. Further setbacks for the
Persian navy included two further mutinies in 1739 and 1740 which
seriously undermined the confidence of 'the navy; the political
situation worsened still further in 1748 when Nadir Shah was
assassinated, leaving the country in chaos. The commander of the
Persian fleet in Bander Abbas, the Arab Mala Ali Shah, and the
ruler of Bushire, Shaikh Nasser, exploited the unrest, tearing
Persia apart, each of them seeking to strengthen his influence in
the region. That the commander of the Persian fleet should have
chosen the Qawasim, a tribe based on the western coast of the
Gulf, to side with in a bid to consolidate his naval force in the
Gulf, entirely reflected the extent of the tribe's influence and
naval power in the area in the middle of the eighteenth century;
this will be examined in further detail in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO 
The emergence of the Qawasim as a new
political power in the Gulf 
We saw in the previous chapter how Omani political influence
during the first half of the eighteenth century expanded
throughout the Gulf region and beyond. But its development was
constantly checked by a series of local rebellions which created
divisions throughout the Sultanate. This pattern was repeated in
the second half of the century, as we shall see in the present
chapter, allowing the Qawasim to exploit Omani internal dissent,
intervening in Oman's internal affairs by establishing an
alliance with one or other of the Omani factions either through
inter-marriage or by the promise of military support. On a
national level, the Qawasim might back up the Omanis in a
conflict with the Persians where it suited their interest.
Undoubtedly Oman suffered because the strategic position of the
sheikhdom, as sentinel to the entrance of the Gulf, gave any
power in control of its territory an advantage over others in
trade and naval facilities.
The Persians for their part wanted to increase their power
in the Gulf but lacked the necessary navy, or rather naval
expertise, relying initially on Arab sailors to man ships
purchased from or leased out by British and Dutch companies.
Later the Persians were to turn to the Qawasim in a bid to
achieve their aim' of creating a powerful naval force, a move
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indicating both the Persians' weakness and the influence the
Qawasim wielded in the Gulf region both as a land force and a
naval power. The decline of Portuguese power in the Gulf, the
independence of Oman from the European trading companies, and the
assassination of Nadir Shah at the hands of his own officers in
1748, all constituted factors which gave a fillip to those Arab
tribes inhabiting the Western coast of the Gulf; the Qawasim
emerged from their midst to play a key role in the political
affairs of the Gulf in the eighteenth century.
The Qawasim's origin is said to be traceable to their
ancestor Qasim, from whom they derive their name, which is
widespread throughout the Gulf today. Others believe that the
origin of their name goes back to the island of Qashm or Jasm
situated on the Persian littoral, later to be called Qasimi or
Jasimi, hence the appellation Al-Qawasim or Al-Jawasim. The
tribe then moved on to places like Ra's Al-Khaimah and Al-
Sharjah, in which a distinction is made linguistically in the
pronunciation of the letter qaf, in Arabic and the letter J, where
the latter is substituted for the former. From this practice may
have arisen a misunderstanding as to the tribe's origin.
Writers like Miles, Niebuhr and Ibn Rziaq however are of the
opinion that the Qawasim descend from the Arab Al-Howlah tribe,
who emigrated from the sport of Siraf on the Persian side of the
Gulf and eventually settled down in Ra's Al-Khaimah.(1)
As to the political demarcation of the Gulf region, this
could hardly be said to exist during the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth century in any firm sense 	 simply
(1) . Niebuhr, C, Travels through Arabia and other Countries in
the East, (translated into English by Robert Heron), Edinburgh,
Morison & Son, 1792, p 144.
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because the concept of nationhood did not exist among the bedouin
Arabs. Rather ad hoc borders were established by a tribe,
determined by politico-social factors pertaining to the strength
of the tribe and its ability to fend off attack and defend its
livestock, raised on pasturage limited by the constant shortfall
in rain. The desert Arabs led a harsh existence, eking out a
livelihood with each tribe vying for what little food and water
existed. Settlements were based around artesian wells and oases;
the weather patterns determined the bedouin's way of life. The
social configuration of the tribe had the Sheikh as its head,
wielding theoretically absolute control over the tribe, itself
subdivided into clans, each clan led by an amir who pledged his
allegiance to the Sheikh. Government was effecteed by a
consultative meeting (ma*lis) headed by the Sheikh, and attended
by all the clan leaders, at which important issues affecting the
tribe's welfare would be discussed and important decisions put
into effect.
Ra's Al-Khaimah, a thriving port, formed the base of the
Qawasim power along with the port of Al-Sharjah located a few
miles up the coast. Other ports with a strategic importance
under Qawasim control included Umm Al-Qaiwain, Al-Hamra' Island,
Al-Rams, Buhabil, 'Ajman, Shanas, Khor Fakkan and Khor Kalba.(2)
The tribe's sphere of influence on the Persian side of the Gulf
extended from Karrack to Bander Abbas, taking in Linga, Luft,
Kunk and Ra's Al-Heti.(3)
The Qawasim thus commanded a strategic position on the Gulf
coast which enabled them to play an important role in the
(2) IOR, Bombay Political Proceedings, P/383/13.
(3) Niebuhr, C, op cit, p 144.
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region's affairs. They gained their livelihood from fishing and
pearl diving, the latter activity lasting four months per annum
and constituting the main occupation for the majority of those
inhabiting the area known as Hirat. The pearls were sold to
Indian traders, mostly from Bombay, for a lucrative price, with
the Qawasim monopolizing this and other trade in the area.
In the winter months the locals conducted trade with the
Gulf Sheikhdoms, India and the African Coast on a reciprocal
basis.	 Qawasim ships transported dates from Basra to these
places, returning with	 spices, wood, cloth and other
necessities. Their monopoly of the trade amongst the Gulf
trading partners can be attributed to the skilful manner in which
they conducted trade, to their persistence and above all to the
sincerity and integrity displayed in all their dealings with
local and foreign traders, thus outcompeting all rivals and
forging for themselves an excellent reputation. ()
 This is
confirmed by Aitchison who describes the Qawasim as pursuing
their profession successfully until 1805 9 (5) although Francis
Warden quotes the later date of 1807 in this respect. (6) The
Qawasim then were trading with the ports of Basra, Bushire and
with the Indian and African coasts, occupied the islands of Kishm
and Qais on the Persian coast, () and were in possession of a
formidable fleet amounting to 500 vessels with a complement of
20,000 men, some of whom were seconded from other tribes which
acknowledged the authority of the QaWasim chief in Ra's Al-
(4) Beckingham, J S, Travels in Assyria, Medina and Persia,
London, Henry Colburn, 1829, Vol II, p 120.
(5) Aitchison, C U, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and
Sanads Relatin to India and Neighbouring Countries, Delhi,
Manager of Publications, 1933.
(6) Bombay Selections XXIV, p 301.
(7) IOR, Bombay Political Proceedings, P/383/40.
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Khaimah. An indication of his domestic wealth may be gained from
British reports on the value of the palm crop, estimated at
80,000 rupees per annum, a tenth of which was collected by the
treasury as an alms tax.(8)
The assassination of Nadir Shah by his officers in 1748
precipitated general disorder among the population resident on
the Persian side of the Gulf, the fleet which he had built up
becoming ineffective. In an attempt to check this decline the
admiral of the Persian fleet, Mala Ali Shah, made an alliance
with the Qawasim in response to increased internal pressure
exerted against him by Nasser Khan, the Governor of Lar. This
alliance, which took the form of marriage between the Sheikh of
the Qawasim and one of Mala All Shah's daughters, benefited the
tribe more than the Persian leader, making them the strongest
naval power in the Gulf, although the alliance greatly aided Mala
All Shah against his Persian enemies, and Nasser Khan in
particular, reputed to be the then most powerful governor ruling
on the Persian coast.()
Nasser Khan in retaliation to this alliance, launched an
attack in 1752 against Mala Ali Shah's power base, Bander Abbas,
occupied it and placed him under arrest, to be immediately
replaced as governor by a new man, who was also appointed as
admiral to the fleet. The Persians however, as discussed in
Chapter One, had no tradition of seamanship, and showed little
ability to learn.	 The new admiral understandably could not
(8) BA, SPDD,	 No 208, Year 1807, (Letter from Captain David
Seton, the British Resident at Muscat to the Bombay Government).
(9) Bombay Selections XXIV, pp 300-311 (Warden on "the Joasmee
Tribe of Arabs").
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organize and run the fleet effectively given this point of
weakness, compelling Nasser Khan to free and re-appoint Mala Ali
Shah as both governor and admiral of the fleet, although not
before the latter had acknowledged Nasser Khan's leadership.
Mala Ali Shah was awarded at the same time an annual stipend of
1000 tomans, the equivalent of £500 sterling.(10)
Mala Ali Shah, however, reneged on this agreement with Khan
some two years later in 1754, declaring his independence and
instituting an attack with the help of the Qawasim to seize
Hormuz. (11) Again with the support of the Qawasim, Mala Ali
Shah, now revealing his expansionist leanings, provoked a quarrel
in 1755 with Abd Al-Sheikh, leader of Beni Mu'in tribe, and
governor of Kishm Island, strategically located at the entrance
to the Gulf, and occupied the island. From this vantage point
Shah, with Qawasim support, laid siege to the town of Luft for a
period of six months, succeeding in breaking down the resistance
of the town's inhabitants only after the death of its governor.
Thus, the alliance between Mala Ali Shah and the Qawasim
began to take on a new meaning as one conquest followed another,
securing for the two parties the shared control of the Persian
littoral states, including Bander Abbas, Hormuz, Kishm, Linga,
Shinas and ports located on the Arab side of the Gulf, including
Ra's Al-Khaimah, Al-Sharjah, Umm Al-Qaiwain, Al-Hamra' Island,
Ajman and Khor Fakkan. By virtue of these developments the
Qawasim began to emerge as a new power in the Gulf, establishing
their presence in Persian territory, consolidating their
authority in the tribal areas under their
	
control,	 and
(10) Saldhana, J A, op cit, p 114.
(11) Ibid, p 99.
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strengthening their naval capacity. 	 It was not long, however,
before this alliance was put to the test by local rebellions and
civil wars.	 In 1760 for example, the residents of Hormuz
rebelled against Mala Ali Shah, imprisoning him after seizing his
fleet which had anchored there. The Hormuz rebels however
refused to accede to a demand made by Nasser Khan to hand over
Mala Ali Shah to him, in order to avoid placing themselves under
his influence. (12)
 The next rebellion to undermine the Shah-
Qawasim alliance was undertaken by the people of Bander Abbas
under the leadership of Ja l fur, the brother of Nasser Khan, who
seized Mala Ali Shah's fort, forcing his followers to take refuge
in nearby islands. (13) The Qawasim, in fulfilment of their part
of the agreement, launched a number of attacks against Hormuz
from the sea, with the specific aim of freeing the Shah who lay
captive in his own fortress. After several failures the Qawasim,
strengthened by reinforcements from Ra's Al-Khaimah, freed him,
and returned him to Kishm island.
As for Bander Abbas, now occupied by Ja t fur Khan, this came
under a joint Qawasim-Shah attack in 1760 as Mala Ali Shah tried
to free his relatives still held captive in Hormuz. The attempt
failed. The conflict continued until an agreement was reached in
1763 between the Qawasim-Shah alliance and the Nasser Khan-Beni
Mu'in alliance (14)
 with Hormuz finally submitting to the rule of
Mala Ali Shah, a part of Kishm island placed under the rule of
the Qawasim, and the Naser Khan-Beni Mu'in alliance managing to
hold onto Bander Abbas.(15)
(12) Ibid, p 137.
(13) Ibid, p 138.
(14) Ibid, p 158.
(15) Ibid, p 141.
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The issues affecting the development of the Qawasim in
relation to the internal order of their state were manifold. The
leader of the tribe, Sheikh Rashid bin Mutter, renounced his
position in 1777 in favour of his son, Suggur, thereafter
withdrawing from public life. Suggur inherited several problems
affecting the security of his tribe, not the least the bad
relationship existing between his tribe and the Beni Mu l in, which
he quickly resolved by marrying one of the daughters of the
tribe's leader. Sheikh Suggur continued his diplomatic efforts
by attempting to mediate between the Persians and the Uttoobe
tribe who had seized Bahrain from them. He failed and ended up
supporting the Persians in an attack against the very tribe he
had been trying to pacify only a few days earlier, because the
latter had attacked and confiscated one of the Qawasim ships,
killing 18 of its sailors in the process. (16) This joint attack
however ended in failure, with the alliance having to withdraw,
having sustained many losses, amongst them the nephew of Sheikh
Rashid bin Mutter. (17) The Qawasim did not manage to win back
Bahrain until 1785 and, not having participated in the Turkish-
Arab war, remained inactive between the years 1793-6 when the
region enjoyed a period of comparative calm and peace.(18)
Paradoxically enough, it was the Omani trading rivals of the
Qawasim who had brought about the expulsion of the Portuguese
from Ra's Al-Khaimah early in the seventeenth century. Rivalry
was to turn into hostility at the beginning of the following
century after internal strife concerning the succession to the
Imamate considerably weakened the Omani sultanate. With the
16) Bombay Selections XXIV, pp 300 - 301.
17) Abu Hakima, A M, op cit, pp 113 - 114.
18) Bombay Selections XXIV, p 301.
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death of Imam Sultan bin Sayf II in 1718, a clear division
appeared between the traditional rivals, the Bani Ghafiri, Sunni
Arabs from the north who share a common ancestor in the legendary
figure of 'Adnan, and the Hinawiyah, Yemenite Arabs whose common
ancestor is Qahtan. The Qawasim were drawn into this conflict by
virtue of their kinship with the Bani Ghafiri. Under the command
of Hamad bin Nasir Al-Ghafiri in alliance with Sheikh Rahmah bin
Mutter, 5000 men and a large fleet moved against and laid siege
to the Hinawiyah strongholds, succeeding in imposing a joint
Ghafiri-Qawasim authority on Oman territory. Hamad set himself
up as Imam as a consequence of this victory; the Qawasim managed
further to increase their influence in the area without really
playing a political role. This quiescent attitude on their part
changed on the accession of Ahmad Bin Sa'id Al-Busaid to the
Imamate in 1741. Unlike his predecessor, he chose to support the
Hinawiyah, the traditional enemies of the Bani Ghafiri and, by
extension, the Qawasim, thus involving them more and more in
Oman's internal affairs. This conflict led to the battle of
Firq, near Nazwa, in 1745 9 (19)
 in which Bilarab Bin Hamid Al-
Ghafiri was killed, along with many members of his tribe. Their
allies the Qawasim were forced to-withdraw to Ra's Al-Khaimah,
leaving the ground clear for Ahmad bin Sa'id to confirm his rule
in Oman and hold on to the office of Imam. In an effort to teach
the Qawasim a lesson for interfering in the internal affairs of
his sultanate, the Imam launched an attack on Ra's Al-Khaimah
with 12,000 men, the two sides clashing at Al-Buraimi without
either side enjoying a clear cut victory.
Ahmad bin Sa'id's rule was to endure until 1771, and was
(19) Ibn Rziaq, op cit, p 348.
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marked by a series of developments involving the Qawasim.
Following the battle of Firq, the Imam laid siege to the town and
port of Khor Fakkan, located in the Batinah, with a fleet of
eight ships and forty of the larger native vessels. The garrison
of this port was composed of one thousand Qasimis who gave up the
fort and, entreating the clemency of their conqueror, were
permitted to return to Sir. The ambition and exertions of Ahmad
increased daily: by 1749 he pushed his conquests as far as
Khasab, the governor of which, Hassan bin Abdulla, formerly
subject to the Qawasim accepting his authority.
While in Khasab, Ahmad received news of the revolt of a
member of the house of Yarabi Jaalan; he directed his cousin
Khalfan bin Mirhamad to proceed to Ra's Al-Khaimah with the
greater part of his fleet, and returned himself to Muscat with
three ships, to suppress the revolt. Khalfan, however, found
he could make no impression on the Qawasim. Ahmad accordingly
sent 'Ali bin Suif with four ships and ten dhows to blockade the
_
ports of Sir until the Qawasim submitted to his authority. 'Ali
followed these orders so strictly in the case of Ra's Al-Khaimah,
Jazerat Al-Hamra, Fasht, and Sharjah, not even allowing any boat
to fish for pearls or undertake a commercial voyage, that the
inhabitants of all but Ra's Al-Khamiah were reduced to the last
extremity and obliged to acknowledge the supremacy of the Imam in
1753. Ra's Al-Khaimah bore the blockade for a year longer, at
the end of which time three of the local leaders, Suggur bin
Rashid, Mohamed bin 'Ali and Abdulla bin Maygr, proceeded to
Rustaq, to Imam Ahmad, begged that they might be relieved from
the attacks of 'Ali bin Suif, and proposed thatthe Imam have
complete possession of the other towns. In return for their
support, they would continue to enjoy the revenues of Ra's Al-
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Khaimah. The Imam granted their petition, and favoured them with
gifts, and robes of honour. Affairs remained in this state until
the Imam's death in 1771.(20)
Relations between the Qawasim and the Omanis began to
improve as they combined forces in 1772, under the dual
leadership of Sheikh Rashid of Ra's Al-Khaimah (who had succeeded
his father Sheikh Mutter) and the Imam of Muscat, to destroy
Persian gallivats at Bander Abbas, and a magazine which the
Persians had established at Linga. (21 ) But this new-found
friendship between the parties did not last long as each realized
the revenue to be gained ( by controlling Gulf waters and
monopolizing trade. In 1775, hostilities broke out again as the
Qawasim leader Sheikh Rashid seized Persian ships, claiming that
they were laden with goods bound for Muscat, when in fact they
were heading for Bushire. Relations between the two sides see-
sawed until the accession of Rashid's son, Sheikh Suggur, who
managed to build up a fleet and increase his armoury, purchased
with money secured through military service provided to leaders
of ports located on the Persian littoral. From this solid base
the Qawasim extended their sphere of influence over the region,
gained mastery over the remainder of the Arab tribes contiguous
to their area, and ventured further afield exploiting divisions
amongst tribes and parties to seize many towns located on the
Persian littoral. Such was 'their naval mastery of the Gulf
waters that they could with impunity impound any ship whose
captain refused to accept their authority.
(20) Bombay Selections XXIV, pp 7 - 8.
(21) Ibid, p 301.
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In retaliation for this belligerent naval activity on the
part of the Qawasim, the Imam Ahmad Bin Sa'id launched an attack
against their stronghold in Ra's Al-Khaymah with 12 large and 100
small ships, but failed in his attempt to capture the port due to
the treacherous approach to the cape from the sea. This forced
his big ships to remain two miles from the shore, rendering their
cannon fire ineffective.
In addition the Imam was faced with internal troubles; in
1781 two rebellious sons, Sultan and Sayf, instigated a coup 
d'etat in Muscat and overthrew their father whilst he was
resident in Rustaq. The Imam responded by bombarding the city,
calling for his sons' surrender, but the two men refused, instead
sending a messenger to the Qawasim leader Sheikh Suggur for help.
Suggur's response to this plea typifies the Qawasim mentality; he
began to march on Rustaq, rather than acceding to the two sons's
plea for help. Sultan and Sayf in desperation turned to their
father, fearing a further increase in Qawasim influence in Oman
should Suggur succeed; their father pardoned all connected with
the rebellion, and forced Suggur to retire to Ra's Al-
Khaimah.(22)
The Imamate then fell to Sa l id bin Ahmad bin Sa'id after the
death of his father in 1783, initially unopposed by leading Omani
notables, including his two brothers, Sultan and Sayf. However,
the Imam's maladministration of his sultanate's affairs led to
conflict between various parties, which resulted in general'
unrest sweeping throughout Oman. At this point Sultan and Sayf
tried to engineer the overthrow of their incompetent brother,
(22) Ibn Rziaq, op cit, p 350.
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significantly with the help of the Qawasim leader, Sheikh Suggur,
who declared war against the Imam in 1784, after mobilizing the
tribes. The Imam may have proved incompetent in matters of
administration, but when it came to the defence of his sultanate
and his office he displayed sufficient military skill to hold off
the Suggur challenge in the face of severe pressure, forcing his
two brothers to flee the country. Sultan took refuge in
Jawadir, located on Mikran Island, moving on afterwards to Qilat,
where he was warmly received by its governor, Nasser Khan, who
gave Jawadir to Sultan and awarded him a stipend equalling half
the amount of its annual income.( 23 ) As for Sultan's brother,
Sayf, he made his way to East Africa, disembarking dt Lamu, where
he attempted to establish an independent state, but died before
he could achieve his objective.
It is apparent from the above that the Qawasimi-Omani
relations were not on a good footing during the era of Imam Satid
bin Ahmad; they became even worse when the Imam handed down his
office to his son, Hamad, in 1786, with the political and
administrative power devolving on his shoulders at Rustaq. Hamad
assumed the title of "Sayyid" and transferred his political and
administrative base to Muscat, where he concentrated on building
up a naval fleet. It was not long before he had an opportunity
to test its capability, as the Qawasim increased their naval
activity in Gulf waters, provoking Hamad to retaliate by attack-
ing the tribe by both land and sea in 1787. Hamad's combined
army-navy was led by Muhammad bin Khulf an. This Omani campaign
resulted in their occupation of Qawasim territory, including the•
towns of Khor Fakkan, Al-Hamra' Island and Al Rams Fort.
C23) Lorimer, J G, opcit, Vol I, p 418.
(24) Miles, S B. op cit, p 186.
(24)
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Sayyid Hamad after a while was obliged to return to Muscat,
to quell a rebellion instigated in his absence by his paternal
uncle, Sultan bin Ahmad bin Sa'id. The conflict was resolved
amicably between both parties through an agreement on which the
Sultan, however, reneged when Sayyid died of smallpox in 1792.
Thereafter the Sultan, with the support of his tribes behind him,
occupied the political capital, Muscat, but was eventually
thwarted in his ambitions by the Imam's two brothers, Sa'id bin
Ahmad and Qis bin Ahmad. These developments led to the division
of Oman into three areas, each ruled by a different person, one
being allotted to the Sultan, the second to Qis and the final
section to the Imam.(25)
Peace thereafter reigned between the Qawasim and the Omanis,
with their respective leaders, Sheikh Suggur and Sultan bin
Ahmad, refraining from any hostile action by land or sea. This
balance in the relationship between the two sides remained until
the appearance of the Wahabi threat, and later took a new twist
following the killing of Sultan bin Ahmad in November 1804 by the
Qawasim, during an attack. on three ships belonging to the Ra's
Al-Khaimah fleet.
The 'origins of the conflict between the Qawasim and the
Omanis then go back to their respective lineage groups, the
Qawasim hailing from the Bani Ghafiri tribe, and the Omanis on•
the Al Bu Sa t id line from the Al-Hinawiyah tribes, both of which
were engaged in constant skirmishes and raids with each other,
aspects of socio-political behaviour which the Qawasim and the
Omanis inherited. But the essence of their rivalrylay with the
Qawasim's ambitious plans to monopolize trade in the Gulf area
(25) Miles, S B 9 op cit 9
 p 286.
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through superior naval power, and to maintain their authority
over the tribes on land. In wielding this authority they proved
to be more politically adept than their rivals, who weakened
themselves by internal dissension. The naval power of the
Qawasim was utilized to extend their political influence in those
states located on the Persian side of the Gulf, whilst their
tendency to interfere increasing as they became more powerful.
Thus the Qawasim forged ahead to become the predominant power in
the Gulf, their policy based on a two-pronged strategy, to
exploit the divisions appearing in the Arab tribes and 	 to
exploit the Persians' inadequate naval power.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Wahabi Movement and its effect on the political 
history of the Gulf (1800 - 1818) 
Political development in the Arabian peninsula reflects the
religious reforms of the second half of the eighteenth century,
the Wahabi movement being generally considered to be the first
religious reform movement to have had a significant impact on the
social and political life of the peninsula and indeed the entire
Islamic world. Its effect on the Qawasim was especially great
because, whilst it started as a religious movement in the Nejd
area in Saudi Arabia, it later acquired political aims because of
the special political situation existing at the beginning of the
nineteenth century.
If we consider social and political structures in the Gulf
area or the Arabian peninsula before the Wahabi movement came
into being we find a situation where the amir, head of the clan,
or sheikh head of the tribe, was considered the highest
authority who was to be obeyed by all the clan or tribe members.
Each tribe was an independent political institution, each handled
its own affairs with little reference to others and each tribe
was subject to internal rivalries. Such was life before the rise
of the Wahabi movement; after, especially in the second half of
the eighteenth century, all the.tribal units were unified under
one banner, something the Arabian peninsula had not seen since
the end of the Caliphate. ' The first Saudi state, which the
Wahabi movement is responsible for creating, included the areas
from the Arabian Gulf in the east to the Red Sea in the west and
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from Iraq and Syria in the north to Yemen and Muscat in the
south; the peoples of this area started to lead lives in an
organized systematic way where all were answerable to a
centralised authority.(1)
The Wahabi movement was started in the middle of the
eighteenth century by Mohamad Bin Abdul Wahab, who was born in
1713 in Al-Ainena, a small town in Nejd, Saudi Arabia. He came
of a religious family; his father and grandfather worked as
lawyers.	 Mohamad Bin Abdul Wahab started his studies in
Al-Ainena and later visited Medina, Basra and Al-Hassa. He
studied theology and deplored the low religious standards in his
own country and the places he visited, seeing urgent need for
national reform. He believed that religious unity was worth
struggling for, and that true religion rested on five principles.
The first of these was worship of the one God alone; all else was
idolatry, the only sin which disqualifies those who profess Islam
from being Muslims. The second was the reassertion of the tenets
of Islam purified of false beliefs and corrupt practices. The
third principle rested on the return to the idea of the Muslim
state; the fourth conferred authority in the state on a leader to
be obeyed by all, while the fifth proclaimed the duty of the
faithful to spread their message.if necessary by force, those
rejecting it to be in peril of their lives.
In 1744 a pact was made between Mohamad Bin Abdul Wahab and
the Saudi Governor of Daraeia, Mohamad Bin Saud, to proclaim
Wahabism and to defend each other. (2) Mohamad Bin Saud married
(1) Abdul Rahlm, A A, TArikh Al-Arab Al-Hadith, (The New Arab 
History), Cairo University Book Office, n.d., p 84.
Bishr, Unwan Al-Majd Fi Tarrikh Neid (The History of
Neid), Mecca, Al-Salafia Press, 1930, p 42.
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one of Mohamad Bin Wahab's daughters, greatly strengthening the
alliance. The movement spread rapidly and by 1773 Riyadh and the
Nejd province had become fully converted to Wahabism.(3)
At the beginning of the 1790s and especially between 1792 -
1795, the Wahabis began military campaigns with an attack on
their enemies, the Bani Khalid tribe of Al-Hassa. They defeated
the latter in 1795 and were thus able to turn to the eastern
littoral of the Arabian Peninsula and to threaten the centre of
the Ottoman Sultanate. Their motives were three-fold: first,
religious, to destroy enemies and opponents of Wahabism,
especially the Shia' who inhabited Al-Hassa province. Second,
economic: to capture the fertile oases and the important cities
of Al-Hassa, located on the Arabian Gulf, such as Al-Qateef and
Ojeer. Their capture would help the Wahabis to increase their
revenues and
	
increase their area of hegemony further. 	 And
third, political: to teach a lesson to those Nejdi tribes, most
of whom were Shias, who had rejected Wahabism and moved to
Al-Hassa where they were supported by the Bani Khalid.(4)
Between 1795 and 1801 the Wahabis made further attacks, the
most important of which was their attack on Iraq which was held
by the Ottomans. In 1810 they attacked southern Syria and
threatened Damascus so that south and north Syria came under
their authority.() In September 1810 around 20,000 Wahabi
warriors, helped by their Yemeni supporters, attacked Yemen,
taking advantage of the current political situation in that
(3) Kazal, H, Tarikh Al-Jazirah Al-Arabiyyah Fi Ahd Mohammad Bin 
Abdal-Wahhab (The History of the Arab Peninsula in the Time of 
Mohamed Bin Abdul Wahab), Beirut, Dar Al-Khootob, 1968, p 265.
(4) Tarbeen, A, Al-wandah Al-Arabiyyah Fl Al-Tarikh Al-Arabi Al-
Muasir, (Arab Unity in Arab Contemporary History (1800-1958),
Damascus, Al- Edrissi Library, 1970, p 117-.
(5) Ibn Bishr, op cit, p 310.
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country. When they reached the port of Al-Hodaida they found the
residents of the town aboard their boats, many taking their money
"and goods with them. After the spoils had been divided, those
prisoners who were considered nonbelievers were killed.(6)
The Wahabis then started to look to the countries on the
Arabian coast of the Gulf; if these countries were taken over
they would be the major power in the area and they could
translate their dreams of re-establishing a large muslim state
into reality. Furthermore, the commercial activity between the
coasts of these countries and the coasts of India and Eastern
Africa produced revenues which the Wahabi could use to further
their aims, and the naval expertise of the inhabitants and their
fleets would allow the Wahabis to spread their beliefs not only
in the Arab countries but also to the coasts of India and Africa.
Thus - and this is fundamental to the present study - their
motives were partly economic, partly political and partly
religious.
Writers differed on the exact year the Wahabis headed to the
Arabian coast of the Gulf. Miles(7) says that the Wahabis
reached Oman and the Gulf coast in 1797, while Wilson, Kelly,
and Lorimer think it was in 1800. (8)
 The Saudi Government
Memorandum( 9 ) concerning the Wahabi capture of the Al Buraimi
specifies the date to be in 1795, a date confirmed by Philby. (10)
However, the writings of Ibn Bishr, who lived at the time and
7 lAill 's,1 2111:3313cit, p 228.
8	 Kelly, J B, op cit, p 102; Wilson, A T, op cit, p 192; and
Lorimer, J G, op cit, p 635.
(9) Mudhakkirat Al Hukumah Al-Su'udiyyah (Memorandum of the 
Government of Saudi Arabia: Arbitration for the Settlement of the 
Territorial Dispute between Muscat and Abu Dhabi on one side and 
Saudi Arabia on the Other), Cairo, 1955 1 Vol 1, p 110.
(10) Philby, H J B, Arabia, London, Ernest Benn, 1930, p 79.
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wrote in detail about the progress of the movement shows that the
first Wahabi sally into the Gulf area was in 1787 when their
leader, Sulaiman Ibn Ofaisan, attacked Qatar. (11) He attacked
Kuwait in 1793 killing many people, and taking horses and
weapons. In 1795, it was he who captured Buraimi to the north
west of Muscat, seen as a permanent base from which to attack
Oman and the coast to the north from Ra's Musandam to Qatar.
Buraimi was made the centre of administrative authority, the
Wahabis leaving the local amirs to handle their own affairs
provided they were loyal and paid alms to the Wahabi leader in
Daraeia.
The Noaiem tribe were at that time the largest in the
Buraimi Oasis. The Wahabi leader thought that the Qawasim could
be pressurised to become Wahabis; accordingly he asked the
Noaiem leader to try to convert the Qawasim Sheikh, Sagar Bin
Rashid Al Qasimi. The attempt failed, which provoked the Wahabi
amir in Daraeia to send a force consisting of about 1000 Wahabis
under the leadership of Muttlaq Al Mutairi to fight the Qawasim.
When Al Mutairi reached Buraimi he first sent a platoon
consisting of 200 cavalry accompanied by 500 men from the Noaiem
tribe to Ra's Al-Khaimah. They did not attack but instead
surrounded it for ten days. The Qawasim, with a force of about
1000 men, counter-attacked and succeeded in breaking the siege,
forcing the Wahabis to retreat. Al Mutairi then prepared a force
consisting of about 4000 men from tribes under his dominion and
led them personally; reaching Ra's Al-Khaimah they surrounded it
for 17 days.	 The Qawasim leader, Sagar. Bin Rashid, had no
alternative but to offer a settlement whereby he became a Wahabi
(11) Ibn Bishr, op cit, pp 161-209.
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and his tribe with him.(12)
The Qawasim conversion to Wahabism directly affected the
other tribes under Qawasim leadership in Ra's Al-Khaimah; each
under its own leader, not necessarily a nominee of the Qawasim,
subsequently embraced Wahabism and acknowledged its allegiance to
the Wahabi amir. But the Qawasim retained significant autonomy,
as is clear from the treaty signed in Muscat in 1806 without
prior consultation with the Wahabi between the British resident,
Seton and the Qawasim leader, Sheikh Sultan Bin Sagar.
Salem Al Harq, the local Wahabi amir in Buraimi had first
written to Oman's governors in 1800 asking them to convert; they
refused. As a result Salem Al Harq, supported by a large force
from loyal tribes, surrounded Sahar, one of Oman's coastal
cities. The Governor, Qais Bin Ahmad, promptly contacted his
brother Sultan Bin Ahmad, Governor of Muscat, and asked for help;
he in turn mustered a force of about 12,000 men. Just before
they departed for Sahar to break the siege, he was informed that
the Wahabi leader had withdrawn his forces by night to Buraimi;
the Omani forces followed whereupon the Wahabi leader executed
his second withdrawal to Ra's Al-Khaimah asking for help from the
Qawasim.(13)
The Qawasim agreed to attack the Omani forces but changed
their minds after a withdrawal by other Wahabi forces and
concluded a truce with the Governor of Muscat. However the
Omanis then pursued the Wahabis to Buraimi; here they were
(12) British Museum Library (BM), Mss Add 23,346, L'am Al Shihab
Fi Serat Mohamed Bin Abdul Wahhab, (The History of Mohamed bin
Anbdul-Wahab).
(13) Kelly, J B, op cit, p 102.
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decisively defeated and the Governor was left with no choice but
to settle with the Wahabi leader and acquiesce in their takeover
of a place of great strategic importance.
Three years later Sultan Bin Ahmad, made the pilgrimage to
Mecca accompanied by a number of conservative Omanis. His
journey was made for two reasons: piety and to try to help the
Sherief of Mecca in his resistance to Wahabi efforts to capture
the city. ( 14 ) Just after he left Muscat his nephew, Badir Bin
Saif Bin Ahmad, attempted a coup dqtat but failed, and escaped
to Ajman on the Arabian coast of the Gulf, before leaving for
Daraeia the capital of the Wahabis, where he made an alliance
with the Amir, Abdul Aziz Bin Mohamad.(15)
Meanwhile, the Wahabi leader in Buraimi succeeded in
crossing the Al Hajar Al Gharbi mountains in Oman and captured
Batinah. At the end of the summer Sultan Bin Ahmad struck a
truce with him, this to last for three years during which he
would pay alms, allow the Wahabis to promulgate their ideas and
beliefs and finally, permit the appointment in Muscat of a
lieutenant of the Wahabi amir. (16) In the autumn however the
Wahabi from Buraimi attacked Al Soaiq, thus violating the treaty;
the Omani forces suffered another defeat, and Sultan Bin Ahmad
returned to Muscat to muster fresh forces. While he was making
final preparations he learnt that the Wahabis were surrounding
Sahar; he decided to break the siege 	 and started there in
November 1803. The Wahabi leader thereupon fell back to his camp
r14) Ibn Bishr, op cit, p 435.15) Ibn Bishr, op cit, p 435.6) Lorimer, J G, op cit, Vol 1, p 425.
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in Buraimi after learning that Abdul Aziz Bin Mohamad, had been
killed at his prayers. (17) Kelly thought that the Qawasim,
headed by Sultan Bin Sager, took advantage of Wahabi weakness
after the death of their Amir to make a peace treaty with Sultan
Bin Ahmed, despite the fact that the Qawasim had had no role in
the battles. They did so because they feared losing their pearl
diving industry. (18) In fact, the Governor of Muscat took the
chance of revenge offered by the confusion amongst the Wahabis
and the Arab tribes helping them, the Qawasim, in particular. He
sought allies from outside the Arab tribes, not finding any
except the Bombay government, and the Ottoman state, worried by
Wahabi expansionism in the Arabian peninsula and Oman. The
Bombay government however did not want to be involved in fighting
between Arab tribes in order to protect its postal route between
Basra and Aleppo from possible Saudi attacks. Sultan Bin Ahmad
therefore took advantage of a military expedition the Ottomans
were preparing against the Wahabis and in September 1804 mustered
a fleet of 14 ships	 to participate in the attack under his
leadership. He ordered the naval force to head for Basra, but on
reaching there, discovered that no Ottoman expedition had been
despatched against the Wahabis.( 19 ) Ibn Rziaq, an Omani eye-
witness, said that the voyage was made because Sultan Bin Ahmad
wanted to obtain ammunition from the Ottoman governor of Basra;
when he reached there he was welcomed and given the ammunition he
wanted.( 20 )	 Sayabi, on the other hand, maintains that when
Sultan Bin Ahmad reached Basra he was not welcomed and was
17) Ibn Bishr, op cit, p 264.
18) Kelly, J B, op cit., p 114.
19) Lorimer, J G, o? cit, Vol 1, p 434.
20) Ibn Rziaq, op cat, p 438.
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treated badly by the governor. (21) What is certain is that in
the middle of November 1804, he set sail for Oman; on the way he
changed his flagship near Basido, an island in the Gulf, for a
small boat. Separated from the main fleet he found himself
engaged by three ships which opened fire; he was hit in the head
and killed. According to Kelly, the attacking ships were
probably of the Shohooh tribe from Masandam, simply seeking
plunder; ( 22 )Arab writers, however, assert that the ships were of
the Qawasim, from Ra's Al-Khaimah.( 23 ) The evidence however does
not justify concluding that they knew the governor was on board,
but the attackers could hardly have not noticed that the boat in
question was flying a British flag.
The following year, the Qawasim of Ra's Al-Khaimah joined
forces with their kinsmen in Linja on the Persian coast of the
Arabian Gulf, attacked Kishm island and took it; then they took
Hormuz, and continued to Bander Abbas which had been leased by
the Persian government to Muscat for many years. They
then besieged Menab, a few miles away from Bander Abbas; the
upshot was that the narrdw straits of the Gulf virtually passed
under Qawasim control.
Meanwhile Oman went through a period of instability; Sultan
Bin Ahmad had young sons and before he left for Basra he had
handed over the stewardship to Mohammad Bin Nasir Al Jabri,
instructing him to take care of his children and to handle the
country's affairs for them. When the Sultan died, Qais Bin
(21) Sayabl, S H, Iydah Al-Maalim Fl Tarikh Al-Qwasm, (The 
History of Al-Qawasim), Damascus, Damascus Cooperative Press,
1967, pp 183-184.
(22) Kelly, J B, op cit, p 110.
(23) Salmi, N A, Tu-hfat Al-Alyan Fl Sirat Ahl Uman, (History of 
the People of Oman, Cairo, np, 1928, p 48; Ibn Rziaq, op cit, p
439.
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Ahmad, Governor of Sahar, protested against his young nephews
governing Muscat and besieged the palace; however Bader Bin
Saif, who, as previously mentioned, was supported by the Wahabis
returned to Muscat in response to a request from Mohammad Bin
Nasir Al Jabri to safeguard both the sons of Sultan Bin Ahmad and
Muscat; he considered the invitation a good pretext to become
Governor of Muscat himself, When, however, he arrived, he found
it quite impossible to break the siege alone, so he called on the
Wahabis for help; forces from the Buraimi oasis invested Sahar
and at the same time Wahabi ammunition arrived at Muscat by sea,
along with fifteen ships from Bahrain on instructions from the
Wahabi leader in Daraeia. (24) After a skirmish the siege was
broken and Qais Bin Ahmad retreated to Sahar by sea after signing
an agreement with Bader Bin Saif. (25) After taking Muscat, this
latter depended on the support of the Wahabi in maintaining
internal security. The dissident tribes accordingly began to
perceive their opposition to his authority as religious as well
as political and to fight not only Bader Bin Saif but the Wahabis
in general.
Said, the son of Sultan Bin Ahmad,
	 was the first to
recognise this; he killed Bader Bin Saif in 1806 and seized
power. The Wahabis promptly laid siege to his fortress; the
siege did not last long, however, because the number of Wahabis
was very small in comparison with the number of Omanis from
different tribes supporting the ruler because he had circulated
the news that Bader Bin Saif had been killed by the Wahabis: as a
result, some of the Omani tribes left the Wahabi force and joined
(24) Badger, G P, History of the Imams and Seyyids of Oman,
London, Hakluyt Society, 1871, pp 13 - 14, 262 and 269.
(25) Ibn Rziaq, op cit, p 481.
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the supporters of the new ruler. (26 ) Incensed by the loss of
Muscat to such a young opponent - Said was only 17 - in autumn
1807 the Wahabi amir in Daraeia sent a large force under the
leadership of Muttlaq Al Mutairi, who first attacked Shanas, a
city situated on the coast north of Sahar and expelled its ruler,
Quais Bin Ahmad, who was the uncle of Said bin Sultan. Early the
following year they joined forces and engaged the Wahabi force
consisting of Muttlaq's men and those of Sultan Bin Saqar, ruler
of Ra's Al-Khaimah and, of course, Qawasim. The two armies met
in Al Khwair between Oman and Ra's Al-Khaimah and fought
fiercely; the Omanis were defeated and their leader killed
together with many of his people. By the end of 1808 most of
the Omani ports on the Shomaila coast, notably Khor Fakkan and
Fujairah, were in the possession of Muttlaq Al Mutairi; Said Bin
Sultan was obliged to sign a peace treaty according to which the
whole of Oman came under the authority of the Wahabis.(27)
Kelly believes that Muttlaq Al Mutairi united with the most
powerful leaders of the northern area tribes of Oman, like Ahmad
Bin Nasir, the Sheikh of Bani Jaber, and Azan Bin Qais, the
Governor of Sahar after his father died in 1808, making each of
them responsible for a certain area, though still under the
authority of Daraiea.( 28 ) This is contradicted by Ibn Rziaq,
writing at the time, he makes it clear that Azan was sick with
smallpox, and Said still opposed to Wahabism and was still
bearing the historic Omani grudge against the Qawasim.(29)
i
26) Ibid, p 490.
27 Igi—Bishr, op cit., p 306; Ibn Rziaq, op cit., p 521.
28 Kelly, J B, op c, p 497.
29 Ibn Rziaq, op cit. , p 497.
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The tortuous nature of tribal politics in the Gulf at this
time may be deduced from the fact that the Wahabi leader
notwithstanding Sultan bin Sagar's collaboration with Muttlaq Al
Mutairi, withdrew his support from the ruler of Ra's Al-Khaimah.
Kelly believes that Sultan Bin Sagar did not show enough loyalty
to Wahabism,( 30 ) while Ibn Rziaq held that the reason was that
Sultan Bin Sagar had been corresponding in secret with Said Bin
Sultan, asking him for peace between Ra's Al-Khaimah and
Muscat. (31)	When Hasan Bin Ali, Sultan Bin Sagar's 	 uncle
learned of this, he informed the Wahabi amir in Daraiea, who
summoned Sultan Bin Sagar to appear before him. This he did, but
not before conceding Daba and Khor Fakkan on the Arabian Gulf
to the Governor of Muscat. When he reached Daraiea the amir held
him in custody for a few days before detailing him deputy
commander of a force to attack Syria and Iraq.
Emboldened by the concessions of the Qawasim leader, the
ruler of Muscat sent a delegation to the amir in Daraiea asking
him to return the port of Shanas and the fortresses seized by
Muttlaq Al Mutairi and the Qawasim; but the Wahabi Amir broke
faith with the delegation and kept them as hostages, meanwhile
ordering his vessels to attack Basra. (32)
 Seeing no.other way to
recover his territory, Said Bin Sultan then took what for him
must have been a difficult decision even for such a young man: to
appeal to the British in Bombay to put an end to the Wahabi
occupation of his forts.
This was an important new development; the British, however,
(30) Kelly, J B, op cit, p 110.
(31) Ibn Rziaq, pp eat, pp 517-518.
(32) BA, SDD 312, Year 1819, Historical Sketches (Warden), p 432.
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recalling Said Bin Sultan's overtures to the French, culminating
in 1807 with his signing a treaty of friendship, declined to
intervene, advising him to reach a settlement with the
Wahabis (33)
 Unwilling to do this, he sought help from Persia,
whose people were Shi'ites and thus the enemies of the Wahabi.
The Shah agreed, and sent a force which reached Muscat by sea in
January 1811. It was to no avail; some Omanis had embraced
Wahabism, and the augmented forces defeated the attackers, in
consequence of which the whole of Oman submitted to the authority
of the amir in Daraiea.(34)
Subsequently, the amir sent as envoy in 1811 Ibrahim Bin
Abdul Kareem to Shiraz to protest to the Persian government
concerning the aid given to Said Bin Sultan so as to keep Persia
from interfering in the Wahabi/Omani conflict again. Bin Abdul
Kareem succeeded in obtaining the guarantees which he sought: he
visited the British resident in Bushire to discover British
intentions and to advise that he was authorized to conclude a
commercial agreement with Britain. He returned to his country
convinced that nothing was to be expected from Britain in the
near future, the Bombay government declining to enter into any
commercial relations with the Wahabis. (35) Apart from this, the
government in Bombay while realising that unrest on such a scale
affected its overland post between Basra and Aleppo, maintained a
policy of benevolent neutrality towards the new Saudi state
(which collapsed in 1818) and chose to ignore the religious
fellowship which characterised the Qawasim and the Saudis. This
policy was entirely pragmatic; the British had neither the
(33) Abdul Rahim, A A, op cit, p 175.
(34) Ibn Bishr, op cit, p 514.
(35) BA, SDD 312; Hughes op cit, pp 434-5.
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inclination nor the substantial forces of infantry necessary to
engage in a campaign against the Saudis; nor did they have the
necessary knowledge of the terrain. Neutrality was virtually the
only available option. In 1793, the East India Company had
shifted its Gulf premises from Basra to Kuwait after a conflict
with the Ottoman authoHties. This move coincided with a Wahabi
attack on Kuwait, leading the Bombay government to provide the
new company centre with guards to protect it. Nonetheless, the
Bombay government maintained its neutrality in the conflict
between Kuwait and the Wahabis, partly from pure pragmatism, as
mentioned above, and partly derived from the fear that the
Wahabis, if provoked, would cut its land route for mail.
Brydges, the deputy manager of the East India Company, went so
far as to say that the company's men were sympathetic to the
Wahabis and sent gifts to their sheikhs. (36) Renaud, one of the
assistants to the British envoy in Basra, admitted that the
company did not abide by strict neutrality in the Kuwait/Saudi
conflict of 1793 but sided with the Kuwaitis when the company's
guards participated in driving back the Wahabi attack.(37)
Renaud added that upon the instructions of the British resident
in Basra, Samuel Manesty, two cannons from a British cruiser were
put ashore and the company used them to defend their premises.
This affair caused Manesty to order Renaud to travel to Daraiea
to restore good relations with the Wahabis. Accordingly this
latter was the first European to visit Daraiea in the era of the
first Saudi state; he met the Wahabi Amir, Abdul Aziz Bin Saud,
(36) Brydges, H J 9
 An Account of the Transactions of His 
Majesty's Mission to the Court of Persia, London, 1834, Vol 1, pp
12-16.
(37) Abu Hakima, A M, History of Kuwait (1750-1965), Kuwait, That
Aslasil Press, 1984, pp 130-131.
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being received courteously and warmly. Renaud tried to get a
promise from the amir for the safety of the mail which moved via
the desert route from Basra to Aleppo, but the latter demanded
in exchange that the British should Mediate for peace with the
ruler of Baghdad on his behalf. This the British could not or
would not do, so Renaud's mission failed, leaving the British
attitude to the Wahabis based on a desire not to antagonise the
Saudi state and indeed to maintain good relations but without
officially recognising it.(38)
It can be seen that the political development that took
place in the second half of the eighteenth century in the Arab
peninsula and Oman was basically due to the religious movement of
Wahabism, founded by Mohamad Ibn Abdul Wahab. The spread of this
movement in the Arab peninsula had enormous implications not only
religiously but also politically. Formerly, the head of a tribe
was the supreme authority and the tribe was an independent
political system, but the whole picture changed with the
emergence of the Wahabi movement; all Arab tribes became united
under one flag, and formed one state having an independent
existence and a political identity. But this union did not come
as a result of a universal aspiration, the Wahabis used force and
killed many who rejected their teachings; it was because many
people had broken away from the movement at its beginning
because of its stern extremist interpretation of Islamic
monotheism that Mohamad Ibn Abdul Wahab made the alliance with
Prince Mohammad Ibn Saud, the ruler of Daraiea, to give his move-
ment a political and military character, thus changing it from
(38) Abdul Rahim, A A, op cit pp 184-185.
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a religious movement derived from the Koran and Sunna.( 39) This
alliance shows the political foresight of Prince Mohammad Ibn
Saud; he saw that the Saud family had no significant standing at
that time. Their sphere of influence was confined to Daraiea
with no further control over the rest of the Nejd. The most
appropriate way of expanding this sphere of influence was by an
appeal to religion; accordingly	 he made the alliance with
Mohamad Ibn Abdul Wahab, which ruled out further alliances by
this latter, which could have diminished Mohammad Ibn Saud's
power. This alliance was fundamental to the foundation of the
first Saudi state; it improved the Saudi family's rank; no sooner
•had it become widely known in Nejd, than people from all over the
area came to Daraiea which became simultaneously the religious,
political and military capital.
Initially, the Wahabi movement was strongly opposed by the
Qawasim; their leader Saciar Bin Rashid fought them and blocked
the spread of the movement on the western coast of the Gulf.
Ultimately the Wahabi force besieged Ra's Al-Khaimah, the centre
of the Qawasim, and forced them to join the movement. The
Qawasim proved loyal and played an important role in expanding
Wahabism further and further throughout the Gulf area.
Their loyalty was attributable to the fact that while
affiliation to the movement implied religious commitment, the
provision of tribute in the shape of alms and the promise of a
further one-fifth of any war booty, local rulers were still left
with continuing local autonomy. Further, exploiting the conflict
between the Wahabi and Muscat and providing the Wahabi with
vessels for their fight with the Omanis 	 allowed the Qawasim to
(39) Tarbeen, A, op cit, p 116.
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take revenge on the Omanis for their competition in Gulf commerce
and gave them the opportunity to establish a monopoly in diving
for pearls. Finally, the Qawasim could use Wahabism to
legitimise interference with British ships in the Gulf, regarding
this not as piracy but as jihad.
	 Given that the Bombay
government was unwilling to begin a war with the Saudi Wahabi
state,	 attacks by the Qawasim on British ships increased in
number with the tacit approval of the Wahabi in Daraiea.
Notwithstanding Qawasim support in the Wahabi struggle
against Oman, the ruler of Ra's Al-Khaimah was displaced; his
successor enlisted the support of the Qawasim of Linja in the
conflict which extended the attacks upon shipping; one-fifth of
the booty went to the amir in Daraiea.
Wahabi strategy was, then, simple and straightforward;
Qawasim tactics equally so. More and more tribes embraced
Wahabism rather than run the risk of being attacked.(40)
Political astuteness was supplemented by political duplicity;
thus the agreement concluded in 1803 between Sultan Ibn Ahmad,
the ruler of Muscat and Salem Al Harq, the Wahabi leader, was
not a genuine treaty, as stated by Lorimer, (41) but a device to
gain time until new Wahabi supplies arrived from Daraiea: the
Wahabi leader never intended to let Oman alone although he agreed
to the treaty. Interestingly, the treaty is not mentioned in
contemporary Arab documents, notably those of Ibn Bishr, the
scribe who gathered information about the Wahabi movement, nor by
Ibn Rziaq, the Omani who also recorded these events.
(40) Samoor, Tarikh Uman Al-Siyyasi Fi Al-NSF Al-awal Mil Al-
qarn Al-Tasashen (The Political History of Oman in the First Half 
of the Nineteenth Century), Kuwait, That Aslasil Press, 1985, p
87.
(41) Lorimer, J G, op cit, Vol 1, p 425.
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Arab sources however confirm that the Qawasim were
responsible for the death of Sultan Bin Ahmad of Muscat on his
return from Basra in mid November 1804, contradicting Kelly who
says that the identity of the three ships is still unkown.(42)
Arab sources also confirm that when the Qawasim attacked the
Al-Badri they did not know that Sultan Ibn Ahmad was on board.
The reason both for their ignorance and for the attack was the
Al-Badri was flying the British flag; outnumbered three to one,
and small in size; it was too tempting a target. 	 •
The death of Sultan Bin Ahmad led to political disturbance
in the whole region; Persian forces entered Oman upon the request
of the new ruler, and a treaty was also signed between Oman and
France in 1807 aiming at resuming relations. The Qawasim
benefited from the political upheavals in Oman and worked on
strengthening their naval situation as well as their military
forces. There were British residents in Muscat and in Bushire
and Basra; and British vessels were subjected to Qawasim
depredation. To the Bombay government, Wahabism was a politico-
religious movement which- while expanding did not necessarily
require British intervention; hence the care not to get involved
in Oman.	 Qawasim activity in the Gulf was something else,
however; it was regarded as piracy.( 43 ) Their tenderness towards
the Wahabi-Saudi authorities was not, however, attributable to
concern about the desert mail. The Bombay government had a much
more compelling reason for its apparent lack of response; it knew
about Ottoman and Egyptian plans to smash the Wahabi-Saudi
alliance and with it the power of the Qawasim.
(42) Kelly, J B, op cit, p 168.
(43) Public Records Office (PRO), F0/60/1/, Canning to Jones, 28
Aug 1807.
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In his study Britain and the Gulf, Kelly does not describe
the events which led the Ottomans to try to end the Wahabi
movement in Daraiea and enabled Britain to dominate the Gulf,
following the expedition of the Bombay government in 1819 against
the Qawasim. This omission may be because Kelly did not use the
Turkish documents in Cairo. He confirms that the Ottoman empire
Ivas weak and submissive when faced with the Wahabi movement; the
Turkish documents make clear that what nevertheless forced its
hand was that the Wahabi Amir, Al Imam Saud, had prevented
pilgrims from Syria and Istanbul from entering Al Madinh Al
Mounawara (Medina) in 1805. Among those turned back was the
mother of the Ottoman Sultan, Mustofer IV. The Sultan therefore
directed his viceroy in Egypt, Mohamed Ali, to invade the Saudi
territory, capture Medina and Mecca from the Wahabi and thus put
an end to the movement there.()
To begin with, Mohamed Ali declined; his finances were poor,
he needed a loan from the Ottoman sultan and he proposed a delay
in the implementation of the mission. ()
 The Sultan insisted
and Mohammed All finally agreed; the attempt offered him a way
out of his financial difficulties, not least by the possiblity of
obtaining booty from Hijaz.( 46 ) Accordingly in September 1811,
Mohamed All sent his son Tomson Pasha to lead a military campaign
to Hijaz to put an end to the Wahabi movement and to take Mecca
and Medina. The attempt was a failure, and Tomon Pasha was
obliged to make a truce with the Wahabi emir, Abdulla Bin Saud,
before returning to Egypt, where he died. Mohamed Ali did not
accept the truce and therefore sent another son, Ibrahim Pasha,
(44) Cairo National Archives, The Citadel, (henceforth NA), Hijaz 
Portfolios, No 5 Turkish, 1807.
(45) NA, No 4, 1808.
(46) NA, No 7, 1808.
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to continue the war against Daraiea. He had a major success in
April 1818, which greatly weakened the Wahabi; and it was in this
that the Bombay government saw an opportunity to settle with the
Qawasim whom it declared to be pirates threatening commerce and
the mails: we shall consider the validity of this view in chapter
five.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Franco-British rivalry in the Gulf 1798-1810 
In the mid-eighteenth century the Arabian Gulf was
undergoing political changes which affected East India Company
and French trading interests in particular; the commerce of
European trading companies were subject to considerable losses in
Persia, the main trading zone in the area. The losses were
attributable to the chaos and upheaval in Isfahan between 1722
and 1729 on account of the Afghan, and then the Ottoman and the
Russian invasions of Persian territory. They were also
attributable to Nadir Shah's ambition to achieve quick wealth by
forming a Persian fleet in order to monopolise trade. Persia had
begun to suffer a stagnation in trade that led to the internal
unrest. When in 1747 Nadir Shah was assassinated, this had a
further deleterious effect . on the economic situation, not only of
Persia but of the whole of the Arabian Gulf, since new military
forces came to the fore in the political arena, and influenced
the developments that took place in the Arabian Gulf at a later
date. These changes caused the East India Company to close its
factory at Isfahan in 1735, followed by the French closure of
their trading factory at Bander Abbas in 1743.
• British trading activity in Persia went back to the early
seventeenth century; in 1608, the East India Company had sent its
first English ship to India under the command of Captain William
Hawkins and in January 1613 the East India Company established
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the first English trading agency at Surat, on the west coast of
India, under Thomas Oldworth. The agency was not commercially
profitable, because the quantity of woollen cloths held at Surat,
which had been imported from London, were surplus to the
requirements of the Indian market; the Company therefore pressed
its representative to search for other markets; western Persia
was close to the Surat agency, and when it was learned that the
markets of Persia would accept the whole quantity held there a
cargo of textiles was despatched to Persia on a British
merchantman.
The ship put in at Jask on the east coast, and, being well
received by the Persian authorities, was able to discharge its
cargo in peace. From Jask the Surat agency was able to persuade
the Persian authorities to open trading factories at Shiraz and
at Isfahan, and to obtain an agreement from the ruler of Persia
that conferred on the East India Company the right to trade
freely in Persia. The company even had the right to apply
English law in Persia in resolving disputes involving its own
nationals. The agreement.also permitted the East India Company
to appoint a permanent English representative resident in Tehran,
the Persian ruler promising to supply the company with 1,000 -
2,000 bales of silk annually for export free of customs duty from
Jask.(1)
Trade relations between Persia and the East India Company
did not develop as much as had been expected; the rapid economic
decline in Persia as a result of the Afghan invasion of Persian
territory (1722 - 1729) on the one hand and the
(1) IOR, List of Factory Records of the late East India Company,
p xxii.
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monopolistic commercial and economic ambitions of Nadir Shah on
the other caused the company to move its trading factory from
Isfahan to a nearby island until such time as Persia should
become more stable. (2)
 The company's factory at Bander Abbas was
destroyed by the French in 1759, and the company was obliged to
move to Basra in 1763. This was a temporary change, because the
company considered the Persian market to be lucrative in the
long-term. Accordingly, in 1763 it chose the port of Bushire on
the Persian Gulf coast as a suitable trading base for its Persian
operations. ()
 In 1769, however, the company was obliged to
close its factory there after becoming involved in a dispute
between the Persians and Ottoman Empire over ships seized by the
Beni Kaab - tribe of Oman, over whom both the Persians and Ottomans
claimed jurisdiction.
British activity in Iraq as indicated above commenced with
the transfer of the company's trading factory from Bander Abbas
to Basra in 1763. In view of the importance of the location of
Basra for the East India Company, situated as it was on the
western littoral of the Arabian Gulf, and the last landfall for
the Aleppo-Basra desert mail, the Company gave it residency
status; within a year the residency was upgraded to a factory
with responsibility for the company's trade with the Gulf; it was
also regarded as a consulate, enjoying diplomatic immunity.()
Just as a decline in the economic life of Persia occurred as
a result of war and internal turmoil, so in 1773 Basra was
afflicted by the plague, which brought about a total collapse of
(2) IOR, L/PS/20 C227, p 42.
Aitchison, C U, opcit, pp 33-4.
Lorimer, J G, op cit, vol 1, p 138.
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economic activity there; this led to the temporary closure of the
factory until the catastrophe was over. A further cause of
decline in the East India Company's trade was the Persian siege
and capture of Basra (1776-1779). By the end of the century, the
factory was recording steady losses; thus:
"The general account of the Basra factory for the year•
1792-1793 shows a net loss of RS 63.850, oC,Nhich RS 59.345
was the cost of the upkeep of the factory.'
The average loss on the sale of woollen goods was 247
compared with 19% in the year 1789-1790. Had it not been for
the 2% consular tax levied by the company on the traders whose
goods destined for Iraq enjoyed the company's protection,
additional losses would have been more than 3,000 rupees (&3OO).
The reason the East India Company retained its factory at Basra
in the face of these reversals and losses was that, as well as
being a post for the company's desert mail, it was regarded as an
observation post from which to monitor French activity in the
Gulf.(6)
French trading activity was not notable in the Gulf early in
the eighteenth century, on account of France's preoccupation with
the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1712), her inability to
compete with British and Dutch trade in the East, together with
the further diminution of French influence after the Seven Years
War (1756-1763). There was some trading activity, but not on a
scale comparable with that of the British. The French had,
however, obtained in 1665 the consent of the ruler of Persia to
an exemption from customs duty at Isfahan for a period of three
years. In 1667 France set up a trading factory at Bander Abbas,
(5) IOR, G/29119,
	
Account, Profit and Loss, General Books, 
Busra Factory, 1 May 1792 - 30 April 1793,
(6) Ibid
62
but the French company made no profit until the end of the
seventeenth century because of active opposition from the English
East India Company. In 1705 the French company became moderately
successful, having obtained the Persian government's agreement to
a five-year tax exemption. Faced with the economic decline that
pervaded the Arabian Gulf, Persia and Basra, the French company
closed its factory at Bander Abbas in 1743, but their ships
continued to visit Persian ports on an irregular basis. A
consulate was, however, established in Basra in 1755, which
permitted occasional interference with the East India Company's
mail, though trading activity remained limited.
It was to be expected that the presence of European merchant
-ships in a small area like the Gulf would give rise to clashes
between the different companies; each company wanted the Gulf as
its own exclusive preserve, which led to fierce competition
between the East India Company and the French company, and to
armed clashes between their vessels. The background to this
increased antagonism was the Seven Years War, for which the
Arabian Gulf became a secondary theatre. In 1758 the 30-gun
French vessel Bristol engaged the East India Company vessels
Drake and Peveage. The Bristol was sighted off Bander Abbas by
the British, and sailed between the island of Kishm and Hormuz
before continuing her trip to Basra to transport wheat: she was
intercepted by the British ships on her return from Basra, but
without success. ( ) The following year, a French fleet of three
warships attacked the East India Company's factory at Bander
Abbas, setting fire to it and capturing the company's vessel,
Speedwell, anchored off the port.
(7) IOR, L/PS/20 C227, p 125.
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Subsequently, when France became involved in the War of
American Independence, three French vessels in 1781 captured the
East India Company's Beglerbeg, and entered Muscat harbour to
capture another British vessel anchored there; they withdrew
when the ruler of Muscat came to its defence. After this rebuff,
the French vessels intercepted the 50-gun Omani frigate Saleh
bound for Basra with a cargo of British goods from India, and
captured it. Two months later, Omani forces attacked two French
vessels which had put into Muscat harbour for supplies and
captured one of them, La Philippine.(8)
Notwithstanding instability in Muscat, the British sought to
maintain its trade with Oman; in 1796 the Bombay government sent
the ruler of Muscat an envoy to assure him of their goodwill.
The ruler's response was to confirm the friendship between Muscat
and Bombay: "friends of the Indian government are my friends, and
their enemies are my enemies." ()	This did not mean that
Muscat's position at the end of the century was one of simple
alignment with the Indian government; the ruler of Muscat did not
want to sever his relations with the French, but rather to
maintain a position of neutrality in the competition for trade
between the East India Company and the French company. 	 With
Britain and France again at war this was difficult, and as time
went by it was to prove more difficult for the ruler of Muscat to
comply with the request of the Governor of Bombay that French and
Dutch vessels be not permitted to fly the Omani flag and should
help the Bombay government thwart enemy plans. (10) At the time,
C8) Miles, S B, op_cit, p 277.
(9) 10R, L/PS/20--=, letter from the Imam of Muscat to the
Government of Bombay, 18 January 1797.
(10) IOR, L/PS/20 C227, letter from Duncan to the Imam of Muscat,
Bombay, 25 March 1797.
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Bombay could have no appreciation of the magnitude of the plans
of the enemy; a year later, in April 1798, the French government
issued a formal order for an expedition to Egypt under the
command of Napoleon Bonaparte. The order comprised 41 preamble
and six articles; the preamble set out the reasons for the
expedition, namely to punish the Mamelukes who were in power in
Egypt and who had established relations with the English and
treated French traders badly, and at the same time to provide the
French with a trade route to the East, since the English
controlled . the Cape of Good Hope route, and denied its use to
French shipping.
The articles directed Bonaparte to assume command of the
land and naval forces necessary to occupy Egypt, to drive the
English from their possessions in the East, including India, to
destroy their trading factories in the Red Sea, and to extend
French influence by driving a canal across the Suez isthmus.
Throughout, he was to maintain friendly relations with the
Ottoman Sultan.(11)
In July the expedition reached Alexandria, annihilated the
Mamelukes, and occupied Cairo. Once established in Egypt
Napoleon took the initial steps to open a canal from the
Mediterranean to the Red Sea in an attempt to divert trade to the
East and he threatened the British presence in India by
establishing contact with an Indian prince who was hostile to the
English, Tipu Sultan of Mysore. Napoleon sent a letter to Tipu
Sultan in 1799 urging him to revolt against the British and
promising him assistance to this end.
	 Tipu Sultan did not
receive it; it went, via the Shereif of Mecca, to the British
(11) Abdul Rahim, A, op cit, p 203.
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representative at Mocha, Samual Wilson. (12) It was not the case,
as Torrens has it, that Tipu Sultan received the letter and sent
delegates to Egypt to meet Napoleon, and that the negotiations
came to nothing for lack of maritime transport.(13)
Once it was learned that the objective of the expedition was
not only Egypt but French expansion in the East and an advance on
India British foreign policy stiffened; Napoleon's movements and
his overtures to Indian princes, inciting them to rise up against
the British administration led inevitably to the idea of
expelling the French expedition from Egypt because by pushing the
French out of Egypt, the British would remove the French threat
to their presence in India in particular and in the East in
general. It was recognised that the native forces in India were
bound to the Indian government by fear, rather than affection and
that these forces would be exploited by the appearance of any new
power. "We have won an empire by armed might, and it must
continue to rest on armed might, otherwise it will fall by the
same means, to a superior power. 11(14) Further:
"We cannot doubt ford6 moment that the French Republic would
try to exploit this situation to introduce into India the
revolutionary machinations she has successfully employed in
almost all parts of Europe. We have to extirpate the French
presence in Egypt, and as quickly as possible, quite apart
from ruling India. We cannot expect continued stability if
we al19 1 , ‘France to maintain a strong establishment in
Egypt."IJ,
(12) Al-Abid, S, Mawaif Biritanya Min Al-Nashat Al-Firinsi Fi Al-
Khlii Al-Arabi, (The British Attitude to the French Activities in 
the Arabian Gulf), Baghdad, Al-Ani Press, 1979, p 81.
(13) Torrens, W M, The Marquess Wellesley, Architect of Empire,
London, 1880, Vol 1 9 p 183.
(14) IOR, L/PS/5/450, Sec. Committee to the Gov-Gen at Bengal,
East India House, 18 June 1798.
(15) 10R, L/PS/51450, H Douglas to Gov-Gen, Bengal, and the
Governors-in-Council at Fort St George and Bombay, 27 Nov 1798.
66
The British government found itself forced actively to
confront the anticipated French advance on India to maintain its
possessions in India and its trade with the Gulf. Convinced that
India could only be occupied from the sea, the land route being
too arduous for the French forces, the Indian administration
considered it vital to protect the sea routes to India, and
decided to make every effort to prevent the French forces from
reaching the Red Sea or the Arabian Gulf. (As the subject of
this thesis is the Arabian Gulf we will not discuss the Red Sea,
but confine ourselves to policy in the Gulf; how policy was
decided and executed is explained in Appendix A on the government
• of India.)
Even before Napoleon's expedition the British government saw
Muscat as the key to the Gulf; if it won the cooperation of the
Omanis against any French advance it would have a sound base from
which to halt French influence. The fear was that France might
exploit its trading links with Muscat to set up a French base at
this strategic position. Thus, in 1798 Mandi Ali Khan, a Persian
who had long been in the Company's service and who had recently
been appointed resident at Bushire, was instructed by the
Governor-General of India to visit Muscat before going on to take
up his post, to endeavour to make a political alliance between
Muscat and the Indian government, to persuade the ruler to allow
a company factory to be established in Muscat, and to persuade
him to accept a British surgeon instead of a Frenchman as his
personal physician. (The company was convinced that the ruler's
French surgeon had been instructed to look after French interests
in Muscat.) He was not to let the ruler of Muscat succumb to
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French influence, and to do all he could to frustrate a possible
French ingasion.(16)
Mandi Ali Khan amply fulfilled his instructions when he
concluded a political agreement with the ruler on 12 October
1798. (See Appendix B). The ruler of Muscat undertook not to
allow France or Holland to have a factory or even to set foot in
Muscat or its ports. If a naval encounter should occur between
French vessels and those of the East India' Company, Omani vessels
were to assist the company's ships against their attackers.
Mandi Khan also prevailed upon the ruler of Muscat through this
agreement to make it possible to re-establish the factory at
Bander Abbas. (17) While the treaty did not extend to the opening
of a factory, the ruler being unprepared to sever all possible
commerce with France, it only remained for the company to
neutralise Persia in order to be safe from French invasion of the
sea routes to India.
Having concluded the political agreement with the ruler of
Muscat, Mandi Khan left for his post at Bushire. He met the
Persian ruler three times, and was able to convince him to
cooperate with the British against the menace of France. (18) In
return for the Persian government taking such a stance, the East
India Company was ready to supply the Persian army with arms and
ammunition. (19)
 Notwithstanding the fact that the Persian ruler
declared that he would arrest any Frenchman arriving on Persian
soil, the Indian government then decided to send a full
(16) 10R, SPP/380/71, Gov-in-Council, Draft instructions to the
Resident at Bushire, Bombay Castle, 3 Sept, 1798.
(17) 10R, SPP/380/72, Mandi Ali Khan to Duncan, 14 Oct 1798.
(18) 10R, L/PS/20 C227, Mandi Ali Khan to the Gov of Bombay,
Tehran, 21 Dec 1798.
(19) IOR, SPP/380/73, Duncan to Mandi Ali Khan, 2 Nov 1798.
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diplomatic delegation to Tehran to monitor the political
developments occasioned by Napoleon's campaign and assess the
likelihood of an invasion of India through Persia. The
delegation was to be led by Captain John Malcolm, the assistant
resident at Hyderabad.(20)
Malcolm was given full authority to sign an agreement with
the Persian ruler to frustrate French expansion, in return for
which Persia would receive an annual financial subsidy of 400,000
rupees (£40,000) for a period of three years, the duration of the
proposed treaty, the subsidy to be renewable. Regarding the
threat from France, the Governor-General left it up to Malcolm to
persuade the Persian ruler that it was in his interests to
resist: in the event of France attempting to advance on Asia, the
Persian ruler could expect strong British naval support when
French forces advanced towards his country. If he actually took
part in fighting the French, the Indian government would pay him
a monthly financial subsidy in return. (21) The Governor-General
also asked Malcolm to try to emphasise the importance of
commercial	 cooperation -between	 the	 Indian	 and	 Persian
governments. If he convinced the Persian ruler of this he was
to try to conclude a commercial convention which would be of a
permanent nature and would not terminate on the expiry of the
political engagement.
Malcolm's instructions also directed him to go to Muscat on
his way to Persia to strive to make its ruler observe to the
letter the agreement of 1798. Finally, he was to put an end to
the dispute that had recently arisen between the ruler of Muscat
(20) 10R, G729/21, Duncan to Malcolm Bombay, 2 Dec 1799.
(21) 10R, G/29/21. Gov-Gen-in-Council to J Duncan, Fort William,
10 Oct 1799.
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and the Pasha of Baghdad, a dispute causing complications for the
British in view of the alliance existing between the Indian
government and the Ottoman Empire; the behaviour of the ruler of
Muscat was at odds with the spirit of the agreement that Mandi
Khan had signed, article two of which stipulated that "the
friends of one state are the friends of the other". (22)
Malcolm reached Bombay in December 1799. A report on the
trade of Persia had been prepared for him by the customs-master
and accountant-general of the residency, who recommended that the
trade of India with that country should remain predominantly, as
it had been to date, in the hands of private merchants. So far
as the company's trade was concerned, no specific fresh
privileges were being sought. Malcolm might take up with the
Shah a proposal that had been made at various times in the past,
most recently by Mandi Ali Khan, that the company should acquire
an island off the Persian coast as a site for a factory which
could in time become an emporium for Gulf trade.(23)
At the end of December Malcolm left Bombay for Muscat,
arriving in January 1800 After a ten-day passage. Unable on his
arrival to meet the ruler, and learning that he was at the
entrance to the Gulf on board the vessel Gun'ava, Malcolm decided
to catch up with him near Kishm island. He was well received,
and after long discussions spoke of the Governor-General's regret
over the ruler's conduct in leaning towards France and having
links with the French government. Malcolm expressed his hope
that the ruler would now understand that his best policy was to
(22) (IOR), G/29121, J Duncan to Capt J Malcolm, Bombay, 12 Dec
1799; see also G/29/21, Gov-Gen-in-Council to J Duncan, Fort
William, Bombay, 12 Oct 1799.
(23) Saldanha, J A, Selection from State Papers, p.201.
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fall in with the British government and uphold the 1798 agreement
between the two countries: by upholding the agreement the ruler
would not only do service to the political security of the
region, but would ensure the economic prosperity of the land over
which he ruled. To this end Malcolm offered the services of an
Englishman of great talent as an agent of the East India Company.
The ruler of Muscat agreed enthusiastically and accepted the
surgeon Archibald Boyle to be both his personal physician and the
Company's agent in Muscat. (24) Malcolm found the ruler of Muscat
more prepared to cooperate with the British government than at
any time in the past and was thus able to sign an agreement
comprising two articles on 18 January 1800.
	 (See Appendix C.)
The first article emphasised the importance of the 1798 agreement
signed by the ruler and Mandi Ali Khan; the second gave the
British government the right to appoint and install an agent in
Muscat, a significant development in Omani-British relations.(25)
When Malcolm was satisfied that the ruler of Muscat was
ready to cooperate and was convinced of his obligation to observe
and uphold the 1798 agreement, he left Muscat for Persia,
arriving at Bushire on 1 February, where he was well received by
Persian trade representatives and by the ruler, Sheikh Nasser.
He sent messages to the Persian court, to the prime minister in
Tehran and to the Prince Regent in Shiraz explaining to them the
purpose of his mission. . As he was delayed in meeting the Persian
ruler in Tehran because of protocol, he made a number of
(24) 10R, SPP/38177, Duncan to Assistant Surgeon Boyle, 26 Dec
1799.
(25) IOR G/29/20, Malcolm to Gov-Gen-in-Council, 18 Jan 1800;
SPDD No 89 of 1800, Malcolm to Gov. of Bombay (giving result of
his negotiation with the ruler of Muscat), 4 Feb 1800; see also
Aitchison, C U, op cit, Vol 12, pp 208-9.
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enquiries into the political and economic condition of Persia,
the result of which was to convince him that a new commercial
agreement would be of little use to the Company. Trade with
Persia was best left in the hands of private merchants. He was
however in favour of acquiring an island site for a factory, but
more for political than for commercial reasons.
	 The French
expedition to Egypt had exposed the weakness of the Ottoman
Empire and made a French advance on India through the Ottoman
dominions feasible. An eventual Russian move southwards from the
Caspian was also a possibility. An island base would help to
some extent to counteract both dangers, besides attracting to it
Persian and Turkish merchants seeking security for the conduct of
their transactions. If relations between the British government
and the Shah became strained, the Pasha of Baghdad might be
disposed, through the existence of such a strongpoint in the
Gulf, to favour the British. None of the islands in the upper
Gulf seemed to Malcolm suitable for a base. Kharg Island was not
suitable; it had no safe harbour, it did not command the trade
route between India and Persia, nor could it ever become an
emporium of consequence. (26) Malcolm's preference was for Kishm
Island, near the entrance to the Gulf. Properly developed, he
believed it might attract to it half the trade that passed
through Muscat. It would be administered by a resident who would
not be permitted to engage in trade and who would have under his
command a force for the defence of the settlement and its trade.
The cost of the establishment could be met by a duty of 3% on all
imports (27)
(26) IOR, G129122. Malcolm to Wellesley, Bushire, 26 Feb 1800.
(27) IOR, G/29/22, Malcolm to Wellesley, Bushire, 1 Feb 1800.
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On 16 November 1800 Malcolm was able to meet the Persian
ruler at the royal court in Tehran. He was accompanied by an
entourage composed of six European gentlemen, two European
servants, two surveyors, 42 troopers of the Madras Native
Cavalry, 49 Bombay Grenadiers, 68 Indian servants and followers,
103 Persian attendants, and 236 servants and followers belonging
to the gentlemen of the mission. Although the Persian government
had ordered that supplies should everywhere be forthcoming for
the English embassy at the expense of the State, making many of
the servants redundant, Malcolm had earlier decided that the
success of his mission depended upon the impression that he gave
of the power, wealth, and standing of the company, and of himself
as its envoy .(28)	 In fact, however, changes in the wider
political context since Malcolm's arrival in Persia affected the
political aim of the mission, and the importance of the island
that Malcolm intended to convert to a strategic base for the East
India Company. Of major significance was the diminished threat
of a French advance on India, because the French army was not,
after the Battle of the Nile, capable of staying for a further
long period in the East. As far as Persia was concerned, the
threat from Afghanistan under Zaman Shah was held to be
diminished.
But nonetheless, Malcolm was determined to arrive at a trade
agreement with the Persian ruler, and to consolidate all the
company's former concessions, in addition to obtaining new ones,
including the lowering of the duty on export goods from 4% to 17g.
In the matter of the surrender of the islands of Hanjan and Kishm
to the East India Company, Malcolm faced severe resistance from
(28) Kaye, Sir J W, Life and Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm,
London, Smith and Elder and Co, 1856, Vol 1, pp 116-117.
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the ruler's ministers: despite his feigned lack of interest he
was in fact very anxious to obtain this. The Persian ministers
were obdurate in their opposition to this request, for they
believed that relinquishing any Persian land at that time to the
advantage of the East India Company would shortly be followed by
the gradual subjugation of-other tracts of Persia on the pattern
of the expansion the company had achieved in India. (29)
 In the
event, Malcolm's mission to Persia yielded two agreements, one
political and one commercial, signed in Tehran on 28 January
1801. In the political treaty the two contracting states agreed
to provide assistance and mutual aid to stop the King of
Afghanistan if he should ever show a resolution to invade India
or Persia. They also agreed that if the French army attempted to
invade Persia, a joint force should be formed to destroy it. The
commercial treaty gave the merchants of the two states the right
to travel and carry on their affairs in the territories of both
nations in full security and confidence, British traders and
merchants being permitted to settle in any of the seaports or
cities of Persia free of duties and taxes.
On 23 February 1801 Malcolm left Bushire for Bombay having
ratified the two agreements with the Persian ruler, returning
quickly because he feared a hardening of the attitude of the
Persian ministers: "the only way left to me to hasten the end of
negotiations that are becoming more difficult by the moment, and
being prolonged indefinitely because of the Persian ministers'
deceitful disposition. . •"(3o) In the view of the Governor-
General of India the mission had achieved its objective, even
(29) IOR, L7PS/20 C227, Malcolm to Marquis of Wellesley, Humadan,
20 Feb 1801.
(30) Ibid
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though it had cost about a million rupees (about £100,000); the
conclusion of the political agreement with Persia was held to be
an excellent achievement because it was a move towards
establishing a close liaison with Persia and total British
domination of Persia's Gulf coast.(31)
From the Persian viewpoint, the treaty was seen as an
instrument enabling it to withstand external pressures . and when
in 1804 perceptions of a Russian menace to Persia increased, the
Persian ruler approached the British government of India for
assistance, citing the 1801 agreement. The Indian
administration's negative attitude to the request made the
Persian ruler look to France for assistance against Russia;
accordingly a message was sent to Napoleon expressing the Shah's
desire to form an alliance with France. This was an ideal
opportunity for France to achieve her objective of destroying the
British presence in India; Napoleon, while despising the Persian
ruler's need to secure assistance from France after failing to
secure it from the British, replied confirming France's concern
for Persia's safety and pledging France to recover what Persian
land Russia might take.(32)
He also despatched two envoys to Persia, Amadee Jaubert and
Adjutant-General Alexander Romieu. Jaubert's brief was a
political one, to persuade the Persian ruler to persevere in the
war with the Russians and to try to draw up a Franco-Persian
alliance in accordance with the Persian ruler's request.
(31) Owen, S J, A Selection from the DesRatches, Treaties and
other Papers of the Marquess Wellesley during his Government of
India, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1877, pp 607-613.
(32) Ramzani, R K, The Foreign Policy of Iran, A Developing 
Nation in World Affairs, 1500 - 1941, University Press of
Virginia, Charlottesville, 1966, p 40.
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Romieu's brief was military; he was to provide France with a
detailed description of Persia and a report on Persia's military
resources.() Romieu arrived in Tehran in October 1805, having
experienced many hazards on his way to Persia, British agents,
who had learned of his assignment, having attempted to obstruct
his progress. He was made welcome by Persian officials and had a
meeting with the Persian ruler to whom he presented expensive
gifts.( 34 ) He also met Persian ministers and suggested a Franco-
Persian alliance, in return for which France would give the
Persian government assistance against the continuing menace from
Russia.() In recognition of the help they received from France
the Persian government was to allow France certain maritime
concessions in the Gulf, such as the transfer to France of one of
Persia's Gulf ports.( 36 ) Th0 Persian government hesitated over
the decision whether to hand over to France a port on the eastern
shore of the Gulf, and fate took a hand when on 15 October 1805
Romieu died of fever. () France considered this a pretext for
her supporters in Persia to accuse the English of having him
poisoned by one of their agents.(38)
Napoleon's other ambassador, Jaubert, was delayed in getting
to Tehran because of obstruction by the Turks and did not arrive
there until May 1806. He arrived in Persia just in time to
complete what Romieu had begun. Persian forces had been routed
by Russian forces at Askeran, resulting in the loss by Persia of
(33) Shupp, R F, The European Powers and the Near Eastern
question 1806 - 1807, New York, np, 1931, pp 443 - 4.
(34) IOR, G/29/31. Extract of letter from Acting Resident at
Bushire to H Jones, 11 Nov 1805.
(35) IOR, G/29/31, Translation of letter from Mirza Kuli to H
Jones, 20 Nov 1805.
36 TOR, G/29/31, Extract Bombay Consul, 21 Jan 1806.
37 TOR, G/29/31, Jones to Charles Grant, Baghdad, 10 Dec 1805.
38 TOR, G/29/31, Jones to the Chairman, 27 Mar 1806.
76
Baku and the province of Dagestan. The Persian ruler was
therefore more anxious than ever to secure the aid of the French
against Russia, particularly as he had received discouraging
reports from the Persian ambassador in India. Jaubert did not
stay long in Tehran because the climate was bad for his health
and because the Persian government wanted to come to a definite
understanding with Napoleon as quickly as possible. Accordingly,
Jaubert left Tehran accompanied by Mirza Muhammed Khan, the ruler
of Caspia, as ambassador empowered to sign a treaty with France.
According to the instructions given to Mirza Muhammed Khan the
Persian government was prepared to cooperate with France in an
operation to invade India, to the extent of sending the Persian
army to advance through Kandahar and Kabul and allow the French a
base on the Gulf from which to launch operations against the
British. (39)
In consequence, in May 1807 a treaty was signed between
Napoleon and the Persian ruler's envoy. This Franco-Persian
treaty comprised 16 articles in which Napoleon . pledged himself
to the integrity of Persia and recognised Georgia as part of
Persia. He engaged to make every effort to constrain Russia to
evacuate that province and to conclude a treaty of peace. 	 A
French embassy would be established at the Persian court in a
permanent capacity, and arms and military instructors would be
supplied to help reorganise the Persian army on European lines.
For his part, the Shah was to break off all political and
commercial intercourse with the British, to declare war upon
them, and to commence hostilities without delay. British
(39) PRO, FO 60/1 (Persia), Instructions of Persian emissary,
translated by John Hine (Asst Resident, Baghdad).
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officials and merchants resident in Persia were to be expelled
and all communications by the Shah's subjects with any British
possession was to be forbidden. Should a French squadron appear
in the Persian Gulf it was to receive any help required at
Persian ports. The Shah was to use his influence to persuade the
Afghan states to join him in a descent upon India, and he was to
afford every assistance to any French expedition despatched
against India.(4°)
The agreement revived in stark form the old spectre of a
French drive on India; by way of its implementation Napoleon sent
a large military mission to Persia under General Claude Gardane,
whose instructions of 10 May 1807 required him to achieve two
objectives. The first was to aim a blow at the Indian Government
by bringing about a rapprochement between Persia and the Ottoman
Empire and to highlight the common danger the two countries faced
from Russia, to prevent a bilateral settlement between Russia and
Persia, and even to incite Persia to attack Russia, while the
latter was occupied with events in Europe. Gardane was further
instructed to work to stir up hostility between the Persians and
the English and to get Persia to cooperate in a projected French
invasion of India. He was also to make detailed and exhaustive
enquiries into the possibility of a French advance on India
through Persia and the Gulf. If such a campaign were launched,
it would disembark at Alexandretta andithen march across Syria
and Mesopotamia to Persia, or would sail around the Cape of Good
Hope and disembark near the entrance to the Gulf.	 Gardane
therefore had to ascertain what ports on the Persian coast could
provide good anchorages and water and supplies for a fleet large
(40) Kelly, J B, op cit, pp 80-81.
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enough to carry 20,000 men. Upon disembarkation of this force
Gardane had to be sure that Persian soldiers, to be trained by
the officers of the mission, would join it.(41)
General Gardane reached the Persian capital Tehran on 4
December 1807 heading a team of 60 military, engineering and
technical experts, and two doctors. With him was the Persian
ambassador to France, Mirza Muhammed Khan. (42)
 On arrival he was
welcomed by the ruler, who conferred upon him the honorific title
of Khan. ()
 After a short time in Tehran General Gardane found
himself restricted by the ruler's clearly expressed doubts of
France's sincerity concerning the implementation of her agreement
with Persia against Russia, now that France and Russia had come
to a settlement in Europe. This settlement did not however mean
France had abandoned her projects in the East and the planned
invasion of India and in Napoleon's view, France had not
abrogated her commitment to military and political aid to
Persia
	 against Russia.
	 General Gardane's appraisal proposed
that the Persian ruler be persuaded that it was possible to
regain the Persian territory occupied by Russia through France's
mediation rather than by her arms. Gardane managed to conclude
two agreements, one military and one commercial. The military
agreement provided for Persian purchase of French arms, and the
release of the islands of Kharrack and Hormuz into the charge of
the officers of the French mission for purposes of fortification.
The commercial agreement permitted France to established
factories at Bushire and Bander Abbas and granted French
(41) Gardane, Comte Alfred de, (ed), Mission du aneral Gardane 
en Perse sous le Premier Empire, Paris, np, 1865, pp 31-94.
(42) 10R, G/29728, Smith to the Gov-Gen-in-Council, Bushire, 25
Dec 1808.
(43) 10R, G/29/28, Smith to the Gov-Gen-in-Council, Bushire, 1
Jan 1809.
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merchants concessions in commercial dealings.()
In the summer of 1808 Gardane began having some difficulties
when it became clear to Persia that France was not serious about
implementing her pledges to the Persian government to recover
Persian territory, particularly Georgia. Gardane did much to
improve the Persian ruler's impression of France by undertaking
to guarantee the return of Russian-occupied Persian territory,
and arranging a year's truce between Persia and Russia during
which there would be no fighting between them. (  also
obtained a pledge, that Russian forces would not conduct military
operations against Persia before replies could arrive from the
French and Russian governments to the proposal made by the
Persian ruler that France should mediate and hold negotiations in
Paris for a peace between the two countries. (46)	Gardane's
position became very weak however when the replies from Russia
and from his own government were received. Russia's response to
the Persian ruler's request for peace and negotiations was a
refusal; the French government's reply was that they were not
interested in the suggestion that they should mediate between
Persia and Russia.. 	 All that they sent was a message of
friendship and fellowship with the Persian government. In the
light of what had transpired, Mirza Shuffi, the Persian Prime
Minister, sent a strongly-worded letter to General Gardane
complaining that at a time when his country was fulfilling all
its obligations according to the conditions of the alliance,
France was doing nothing to put a stop to the Russian
(44) IOR, G/29/29, Malcolm to Lord Minto, Bushire, 8 Jun 1808.
(45) IOR, G/29/25, Pasley to Edmonstone, Bushire, 23 Jul 1808.
(46) IOR, L/PS/5/303, Pasley to F Warden, 22 Aug 1808.
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aggression. ()
 At the end of the summer of 1808 Russia
threatened to renew the fighting north of Persia unless the
Persian government accepted Russia's conditions, which were that
the line of the Aras, Kur and Arpatchai rivers should form the
border between their two countries. This prompted the Persian
ruler for the last time to beg France to intervene, but Napoleon
did not reply to Persia's pleas for assistance, being occupied
with the war with Spain which had broken out in 1808.
Gardane suffered the consequences of these events, and was
quite unable to reach any further understanding with the Persian
government. The situation further deteriorated when the Persian
government began preparing to fight Russia. 	 Gardane tried to
calm the tense situation, sending an officer of the French
mission to ask the Russian commander on Persia's northern borders
if he would desist from commencing battle, but ill fortune took a
hand; the envoy reached the commander much too late to perform
his task: the battle had begun before he arrived, and the Russian
forces had advanced to lay siege to Erevan. The Persian ruler
summoned General Gardane on 23 October and asked him to define
the French government's position; if within two months France did
not demonstrate the friendship between the two countries, the
Persian government would approach the British for discussions and
expel Gardane himself from Tehran:
"Persia is in a desperate situation, ,attacked in the
north by a power which she dreads, on the point of being so
in the south by the English, who with one hand offer war and
with the other a fatal friendship, abandoned by France, her
protector and, ally. Persia does not know where to find
support. • ."06)
(47) TOR, G/29/25, Translation of a letter from Mirza Shuffi to
Nasorollah Khan, 23 Jul 1808.
(48) Deherain, H, La Vie de Pierre Ruffin, Orientaliste et 
Diplomate, 2 vnls, Paris, Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner,
1929, Vol II, p 52 (citing letter from Joseph Jouanin).
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There was nothing left but for Gardane to prepare to leave
Tehran; on 8 February 1809 he had a meeting with the Persian
ruler and expressed his wish to do so. He left Tehran for Tabriz
in northern Persia a day after the arrival in Persia of a British
envoy.
Surprisingly, Napoleon was angry with General Gardane,
wanting him to stay on in Tehran to observe developments
until such time as the Persian ruler forced him to leave; he
informed the Persian ruler in a letter that he had dismissed
General Gardane his service because he had left Tehran without
permission, and that he would within a short time be sending
another ambassador, adding that he appreciated the ruler's
reasons for receiving the British envoy.(49)
At the end of 1809 Napoleon despatched Monsieur Joseph
Jouanin, a member of the previous French mission, as France's
ambassador in Tehran; but he got no further than Azerbaijan in
northern Persia, as the Persian ruler ordered the governor of
that province to expel him from the country as required by the
agreement signed between Persia and Britain.(5°)
The vagaries in Franco-Persian relations were well known to
the British government in London and the Indian government in
Calcutta, thanks largely to the reports of the various residents
in the Gulf. Both were acutely aware of the dangers of
attempting to stir up Indian rulers in the Mahratta states
against the British and equally aware of the perils of any French
penetration of India itself. There were, however, distinct
(4) Al-Abid, Sp o cit, p 171.
(50) 10R, G/29/2 , translation of letter from Hajee Mohammed
Hussein Khan to H Jones, 7 Jan 1810.
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differences in their respective views on how these perils were to
be countered.
For the British government in London, action to counter
French influence in Bushire had to be action determined by the
current state of Franco-Russian relations, which veered between
outright conflict and wary friendship, as well as Britain's
relations with Russia, Britain herself then engaged in a war with
France which would only end with the defeat of Napoleon in 1815.
Since 1806 the issue of Russian expansion along the Caspian
Sea and the extension of the Russian Empire towards India had
been a matter of concern to Britain. In that year a detailed
memorandum arrived in London pertaining to a possible Russian
breakout towards the Caucasus and its bearing on British
interests in the East.	 The British government had to decide
whether it should intervene and stop the Russian advance, as
otherwise some of the rich silk-producing provinces south of the
Caspian Sea might fall into the hands of the Russians; this con-
stituted a threat to British interests in the Gulf, for if the
Russians and the French made peace in Europe France might allow
Russia to expand in the Gulf. This raised the question of
whether Britain should seek to obtain a swift understanding
between Russia and Persia, which would block the French, and stop
the Russians breaking out towards the south. Britain would have
to be prompt in suggesting to the Russians that she mediate in
this, because it was believed that the Russians would welcome a
peace with Persia that would allow them to keep the territory
they had recently occupied. Britain's mediation would also help
to maintain her friendly relations with Persia, but Britain could
not afford to damage relations with Russia by supplying arms to
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Persia in order to improve relations with that country. It did
not seem likely that Russia would accept a peace on Persian
terms, that is, Russia's withdrawal, the return of Georgia and
the liberation of other Russian annexations in Azerbaijan, but
Britain could join with Russia to put pressure on the Persian
government to accept peace on Russian terms.(51)
In early January 1807 the government in London received an
interesting report from the former resident in Baghdad, Harford
Jones, who had just returned to London, in which Jones made clear
the dangers that would result from a rapprochement between the
French and Persian governments: for France to gain a foothold in
Persia would constitute a massive threat to Britain's standing in
the East, and every effort should be made to prevent that
happening. France was not interested in assisting Persia against
Russia either through mediation or by force of arms; it was now
in Britain's power to achieve this through her mediation, and the
British government should - urge Russia to sign a peace agreement
with Persia to counter the menace of France. The British
government should also send a diplomatic mission of embassy
status to Tehran without delay, proceeding to Tehran via St
Petersburg in order to persuade the Tsar to settle his
differences with the Persian government. Jones emphasised that
in order for it to have more weight, the mission should represent
the British crown and not the East India Company, and that it
should also strive to restore Anglo-Persian relations to an
amicable footing. In his report, Jones also asserted that it was
important to treat the agreements signed between the Persian
ruler and France as if they had never existed. (52)
 .
(51) Al-Abid, S, op cit, p 210.
(52) IOR, G/29/27, Memorandum from Jones, London, 7 Jun 1807.
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The British had to act quickly, particularly now that the
overall situation was aggravated by the reversals in the war with
France during the first half of 1807. Throughout the previous
year the Ottoman Empire had been inclining towards going over to
the French camp, and in February 1807 had severed relations with
Britain. As the Ottomans were at war with Russia so Russia
became Britain's ally in the east, though there was still a
frigidity in relations between Russia and Britain in Europe. In
the early summer of 1807 the danger to Britain increased when in
the east the Ottoman Empire and Persia both went over to France,
at a time when Russia was assuming a posture of neutrality.()
This development spurred Britain to adopt Jones' proposal to send
a diplomatic mission to Persia with the task of preventing the
alliance between Russia and Persia leading to an invasion of
India. (54)
The government accepted the memorandum and appointed Jones
to head the mission as the representative of the British crown in
Persia, to work in liaison with the Governor-General in India and
convey to him the authority to sign an agreement with the ruler
of Persia. () On 18 August 1807 Jones received final detailed
instructions; he was to strive to urge the Persian ruler to
adhere in toto to the agreements of 1801. Should he fail in
this, he was to try to persuade him to maintain a position of
neutrality in relation to both Britain and France. If the
Persian ruler did show himself prepared to sever his links with
France, Jones was to offer him arms and financial assistance, and
(53) Kelly, J B, op cit, pp 81-82.
(54) IOR, L/PS/5/541, G Halford
House, 24 Sept 1807.
(55) 10R, L/PS/5/541, G Halford
House, 1 Jun 1807.
to Gov-Gen-in-Council, India
to Gov-Gen-in-Council, India
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provide him with military experts and naval support in the Gulf.
In exchange for this, Persia was' to enter into an agreement that
would strengthen the British position in the event of an
attempted invasion of India by any European country, whether
France or Russia. Jones, in short, had to play upon the Persian
ruler's fear of Russia in order to convince him that the new
friendship between France and Russia exposed his country to great
danger. On his way to Persia Jones was to find out how the Pasha
of Baghdad viewed Britain, and try to come to an agreement with
him. If the Pasha proved to be well disposed to the British,
Jones was to offer him the support of Britain against attack,
either from the Ottoman Empire or from France or Persia. If the
Pasha showed himself hostile to Britain, Jones was to get in
touch with the Wahabi prince, Saud Abdel Aziz, who controlled
most of the Arabian peninsula, and to ensure his cooperation
against a French advance from the Mediterranean. Finally, Jones,
if he failed in his mission and it seemed that the Persian ruler
was resolute, was to resort to force, for example by inciting
internal rebellion against the Persian ruler.(56)
The newly appointed Governor-General, Lord Minto, was
unhappy about the' London government's decision to send an
ambassador such as Jones to Persia from London; Jones was in his
view a parasite on the Indian government administration and its
policies in the Gulf: "I consider Jones a marplot in our
play". ()
 The Governor-General also believed that the state of
tension in the area could not await the arrival of Jones from
London, particularly as Jones was regarded by the authorities in
(56) PRO, FO 60/1, Canning to Jones, 28 Aug 1807.
(57) Kaye, Sir J W I op cit, p 411 (citing letter from Minto to
Malcolm, 9 Mar 1808).
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Calcutta as an unsuitable person to perform such a delicate
mission. (58) The Governor-General was particularly displeased
that Jones was coming into the area as the representative of the
British crown because, although he was nominally subject to the
authority of the Indian Governor-General, by going to Persia as
ambassador of the British crown he would undoubtedly undermine
the prestige of the East India Company in the eyes of the rulers
of neighbouring countries. Direct contact between London and
Persia would diminish the East India Company's autonomy; Minto
was anxious to preserve the company's reputation and standing in
the area and to cause other countries to look upon it as a
sovereign state at a time when, effectively, it was exercising
all the authority of such a state.
Reports reaching the East India Company from the resident at
Bushire in the first weeks of 1808 gave a clear picture of the
expansion of French influence in Persia. They confirmed that the
Persian ruler had ceded the islands of Hormuz and Kharrack to
France, and that France had built commercial factories at the
ports of Bander Abbas and Bushire. The reports also contained
information that a part of the French army in Poland commanded by
General Menon was driving overland through Turkey and Aleppo
heading for the Gulf, while a French fleet composed of two ships
of the line and four to six frigates carrying several hundred
troops had left Rochefort for the East, intending to reach India
via the Gulf, exploiting the ports and islands France had
obtained from Persia.()
(58) IOR, G/24/28, Minto to Lieut-Gen G Hench, Commander-in-
Chief, Fort William, 30 Jan 1808.
(59)BA, SPDD No 237 of 1808 (intelligence papers received by
Malcolm).
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The situation appeared critical; Minto therefore resolved to
pre-empt Jones and send his own embassy to Tehran under General
Malcolm; as the French had established a very impressive embassy
for themselves in Tehran, described by Malcolm as the advance
guard of the French army, the Indian government decided that the
embassy of Malcolm should be just as impressive, "with the
portfolio of the diplomatist masking the muzzles of our British
guns. n(60) In late January 1808 the Governor-General issued
instructions to Malcolm giving him plenipotentiary powers in
political affairs and in matters concerning the British
government in the Gulf. The instructions also revoked the
political authority of the residents in Baghdad, Basra and
Bushire and placed them under Maicolm's control. The warships at
Bombay were also put at Malcolm's disposal in the Gulf area. The
Governor-General expressed his hope that Malcolm would be able to
prevent Persia's alliance with France and persuade the Persian
ruler not to offer France passage across Persian territory or to
permit French soldiers to enter Persia. If he could not do this,
Malcolm was to persuade the Persian government to allow British
soldiers to use Persian territory to intercept the French army on
its march towards India, to strive to prevent the Persian
government from ceding any Persian port to France, and to find
out all that the British government and East India Company needed
to know about the actual state of affairs, the overall extent of
the agreements France had entered into with Persia, and the real
inclination
	 of	 the Persian government
	 regarding
	 their
implementation. (61)
(60) Kaye, Sir J W, op cit, p 402.
(61) BA, SPDD No 225 of 1808, Minto's instructions to Malcolm,
30 Jan 1808.
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In March 1808 Malcolm received additional detailed
instructions from the Governor-General concerning the mission to
Persia: most importantly, he was to find out how far the French
had so far progressed in their plans to invade India and the
state of the war between Persia and Russia. If Malcolm had found
the Persians not well disposed towards France, the British
government was prepared to send an expeditionary force to the
Gulf to collaborate with Persia against France. If it appeared
that the Persians favoured a position of neutrality, then this
British force would be useful merely by its presence in the Gulf.
Malcolm therefore had to recommend how large this force should
be; he was specifically asked to give information only about its
size, and was not authorised to take any steps in connection with
its employment without having first received explicit
instructions from the government in India: "For his information,
the government would itself only resort to this step in the case
of extreme necessity, to defend British provinces.(62)
The Governor-General had the capacity to send a British force of
between 20,000 and 25,000.fighting men on a contingency basis and
if convinced that France was attempting to establish herself on
the Gulf coast could send a further 4,000 to 5,000. (63) In a
personal letter to Malcolm the Governor-General expressed how
important his mission was for the Indian government:
"Our hopes rest on a confrontation with France in Persia,
and so every means must be used to prevent France from
adopting Persia as a base in which togeWrr her forces to
strike a blow against British interests.ku
(62) IOR, G/29/28, Edmonstone, Secy to Gov-in-Council, to
Malcolm, Fort William, 7 Mar 1808.
(63) Ibid
(64) IOR, G/29/28, letter from Minto to Malcolm, 9 Mar 1808.
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If a naval force were sent to accompany Malcolm's mission, Minto
intended it to be unobtrusive, being nominally Royal Navy and
East India Company vessels bound for the Gulf. Minto's aims in
this was not to alarm the rulers in the area lest they should
adopt an attitude not in the interests of the British in India.
Malcolm's instructions directed him to go to Muscat on his
way to Persia, to ascertain the views of its ruler, Said bin
Sultan, on Persia handing over the port of Bander Abbas to
France, as this port was under his control, and was not under the
authority of the Persian government, even though it was on
Persia's side of the Gulf. Malcolm was to ensure that the ruler
of Muscat would accept the Indian government's assistance in
keeping the French away from Bander Abbas and Hormuz in
particular and to find out he was disposed towards the East India
Company in general.
The opportunities for discord in the conduct of policy in
the Gulf were thus present from the start; when Jones, arrived in
Bombay on 26 April 1808 he learned for the first time that the
East India Company had sent its own embassy which had left Bombay
on 17 April bound for Muscat and then Persia on board the warship
Lapaych, with an escort of 50 soldiers of the 84th Regiment.(65)
With Malcolm having left Bombay hurriedly before Jones's
arrival, (66) the latter found himself in a quite extraordinary
position, and decided to await the outcome of Malcolm's mission
to the Gulf before going to Persia himself to carry out his task
for the government in London. Accordingly Jones wrote to the
East India Company in Bombay explaining that it was better for
C65) IOR, G/29729, Malcolm to Minto, La a ch at sea, 1 May 1808.
(66) IOR, G/29/29, Malcolm to Minto, Bom ay, 15 Apr 1808.
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the mission of the British crown, represented by himself, not to
lose face in the eyes of Persia or of other countries, and that
Malcolm's mission in the Gulf would cause embarrassment if they
met in Persia, and that would not be conducive to good results.
"Since General Malcolm did not think it appropriate for him to
await my arrival in Bombay, there is nothing to guarantee that he
would not strip me of my authority upon my arrival in
Persia.".(67)
 Jones also sent a similar letter to Minto, the
Governor-General of India.(68)
The Governor-General in reply justified himself by saying
that the grave situation in Persia had demanded that steps should
• be taken urgently, and that he had therefore decided to send
Malcolm to Tehran for preparatory negotiations and to advise the
Persian government of Jones's arrival, adding that Jones must be
patient and await the results of Malcolm's mission.( 69 ) At the
end of April 1808, the East India Company's mission arrived in
Muscat, but Malcolm, in a hurry to conclude his discussions and
proceed to Persia, found himself unable to meet the ruler.
However, while ashore he did meet the ruler's closest adviser,
Mohammed Gholam, and told him of the measures the Indian
government intended to take to stop the menace of a French
attack, explaining that the ruler of Muscat should maintain his
friendly relations with France, but that he should know that the
fact that the East India Company allowed him to do this did not
mean that they discharged him from assisting and supporting them.
When Mohammed Gholam tried to point out to Malcolm that Muscat
was neutral in the dispute between Britain and France, Malcolm
to Duncan, Bombay, 28 Apr 1808.67) IOR, G/29/25, Jones
68) IOR, G/29/25, Jones to Minto, Bombay, 28 Apr 1808.
69) IOR, G/29/27 1 Minto to Jones, 28 May 1808.
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was annoyed, and retorted that that was all very well if the
French did not come near the Gulf or the Indian coast; but if
this did happen, and he did not demonstrate total loyalty to
Britain, he would certainly be treated as an enemy. Mohammed
Gholam suggested to Malcolm that he should wait to hear the
ruler's views on this, but Malcolm, not having time to listen to
them, refused and decided to leave for Persia.(70)
Malcolm's high-handed manner in Muscat was quite at odds
with Minto's instructions to him. On hearing of it, Minto
commented "Malcolm's way of going about his task in Muscat
indicates a basic flaw in his behaviour as a whole."(71)
Malcolm's attitude in Muscat did not in fact affect the attitude
of the ruler, who wanted to maintain his close links with the
British, or at least to obtain British assistance in countering
the recurrent threat to his country from the Wahabis. Malcolm
arrived at Bushire on 10 May 1808, and was warmly received by the
governor and officials of the port. (72)
 He adopted the same
high-handed manner in Persia that he had with the ruler of
Muscat, apparently believing threats rather than the use of
diplomacy to be the only way to achieve the object of his
journey. It was Malcolm's military background that encouraged
him to employ this method and he believed that a military
demeanour would impress the Persian officials more than
entreaties and pleas. In his view, mild manners would reinforce
the Persians' exaggerated notion of their own strength, and
convince them of his weakness.
70 IOR, G[29127, Malcolm to Minto, Muscat, 1 May 1808.
71 Kelly, S B, op cit, p 89.
72 BA, SPDD 237, Malcolm to Edmonstone, 20 May 1808.
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In the light of this, Malcolm decided not to go to Tehran
himself, but to remain in Bushire and deputise Captain Pasley, an
officer of the mission, to go in his stead and meet officials
there. On 19 May 1808 Captain Pasley set off for Tehran taking
with him a declaration from Malcolm to the Persian ruler's
ministers in which he accused the Persian ruler of breaking the
two agreements of 1801 by receiving a French mission at his
court.	 The declaration requested the Persian ruler to expel
General Gardane and the members of his mission from Persia,
otherwise Malcolm as representative of the Indian Governor-
General in Persia would not come to Tehran. The declaration also
included a threat that the Indian government would stop all
commerce between Persia and India if Gardane remained ind'ersia,
with the added military threat that the Indian government would
send an expeditionary force to occupy one of Persia's Gulf
islands if the Persian government did not comply with his
requests.()
Before Pasley left Bushire for Tehran Malcolm told him:
"The King of Persia and his Ministers will be very desirous
of my advance, and it is that very consideration that has
made me determine not to visit the Court till I have
obtained those concessions that I deem indispen941pe for the
honour as well as the interest of the Country."k"
Malcolm remained optimistic about the results of his action
whilst he thought that Pasley had arrived in Tehran, but things
did not turn out as he had expected, for he received a letter
from Pasley in Shiraz on 11 June 1808 informing him that the
Persian government had stopped him going to Tehran and ordered
(73) BA, SPDD, No 237 of 1808, Declaration by Malcolm to
Ministers of the Shah, 18 May 1808.
(74) BA, SPDD, No 237 of 1808, Malcolm to Pasley, Bushire, 8 May
1808.
93
him and Malcolm to get in touch with the Amir of Shiraz, Hussein
Ali Mirza, whom the Persian ruler had charged with looking after
Persia's relations with the East India company. ()
 Malcolm took
this badly:
"I was concerned to observe the Ministers there not only
throw obstacles in the way of his progress to Tehran, but
declared they had orders from the King directing me to carry
on my negotiations with the Prince-Regent of the province of
Fars, and they had heard, without being moved from their
purpose, all those reasons which Captain Pasley had in the
most firm and spirited manner urged to satisfy them.
would never consent to an arrangement of so humiliatirAp4
nature towards myself and the Government I represented."k")
Malcolm therefore decided to leave Bushire and go aboard his ship
Doris at anchor in the harbour, from which he wrote Captain
Pasley that he was resolved to leave Bushire and Persia
altogether within a month if Pasley was not permitted to go to
Tehran. He ended his letter: "Your return and my immediate
embarkation for Boussarah or Kharak will bring these triflers to
their senses, and awaken them to all the dangers- of their
situation." ()
	In fact, the threats of Malcolm and Pasley
failed to budge the ruler of Shiraz; Pasley left Shiraz at the
end of June for Bushire and he and Malcolm sailed from Bushire
for India on 12 June.
Malcolm may be con'sidered to have failed in his task,
entirely on account of his high-handedness and arrogance. The
Persian government had asked not that he should leave Persia, but
that his envoy Pasley, who was in Shiraz, should meet the Amir of
Shiraz, who was the Persian ruler's plenipotentiary, so that the
Persian government in Tehran might avoid antagonising Napoleon's •
(75) IOR, G/29/25, Charles Pasley to Brig-Gen Malcolm, Shiraz,
2,4 & 5 Jun 1808.
(76) Kaye, Sir J W I
 op cit, p 240.
(77) (IOR), G/29/25, Malcolm to Pasley, Bushire, 9 Jun 1808.
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ambassador. In short, the Persian government, cognisant of the
dispute between Britain and France, wanted to negotiate with the
envoy of the Indian government and at the same time preserve good
relations between Persia and France. Nothing demonstrates this
better than the letter the Persian ruler's minister Mirza Shufi
sent to the deputy of the emir of Shiraz, Nasrullah Khan,
bitterly reproaching him for allowing Pasley to leave Shiraz and
for allowing Malcolm to leave Bushire - "it would have been
better to have them stay and to acquaint them with the Persian
government's position, and to find out Britain's precise
intentions" - and urging him to report directly there was any new
contact with the British, "for the ruler of Persia desires to
learn how the British stand".(78)
The Governor-General of India, Minto, was equally displeased
with Malcolm's whole conduct in Persia. In his view, Malcolm was
at fault in making his cooperation with the Persian government
conditional upon the dismissal of Gardane, as Minto made clear in
a letter to the Commander-in-Chief, General Hewitt:
"I must say that my confidence has been quite shaken by the
reckless manner Malcolm adopted and the bootless methods he
followed. . . Persia is an ally of France, and she cannot be
made to withdraw from that commitment except by means of
convincing reason pit to her in a conciliatory manner, not
by intimidation."k")
The right way, Minto felt, for Malcolm to induce the
Persians to withdraw from their commitment to France would have
been to exploit the Persian ruler's fear of Russia, and to
acquaint him of the alliance between Russia and France. Had he
(78) 10R, G129/25, Translation of letter from Mirza Shufi to
Nasrullah Khan, received from Jofar Ali Khan, 23 July 1808.
(79) Minto, Countess of (ed), Lord Minto in India: Life and 
Letters of Gilbert Elliot, first Earl of Minto, from 1807 to 
1814 1
 while Governor-General of India, London, Longmans, Green
and Co, 1880, p 114 (Minto to Lieut-Gen Hewitt, 30 July 1808).
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done this, Malcolm would probably have made the Persian ruler
lose his trust in the French.
In a letter to Malcolm himself the Governor-General
expressed disapproval of his threats to the Persian ruler and
enquired
"because
diminish
persuade
European
if he had thought of how he would carry them out,
whatever the Persian ruler's position, we may not
our strength or use up our resources in an attempt to
that large country, whether it be bolstered by a
army or not. (80)
On his way back to India Malcolm fell to pondering how he
might yet achieve his objective and punish the Persian ruler for
treating him poorly, and promised himself that he would return to
the Gulf and to Persia in particular and take possession of one
of the Persian islands and appoint himself its governor. He
therefore decided not to stop in Bombay but to go straight to the
Governor-General's headquarters at Calcutta to explain to him the
situation in which he had been in Persia and put to him his
counter-plans and ideas with the least possible delay. (81) "I
will apprise Lord Minto of all my hopes and intentions
	 . a
11month with Minto will work wonders.(82)
Before arriving in Calcutta Malcolm had decided how he
should present the plan to which he wanted the Indian
government's agreement. This was essentially to send a military
task force to the Gulf as soon as possible, to capture Kharrack
Island, and to turn it into a British base that would be of great
importance in monitoring developments concerning the French and
80 1011 9 G129/25, Lord Minto to Malcolm, 12 Aug 1808.
81 IOR, L/PS/5/303, Pol Consul, 26 Aug 1808.
82 Kaye, Sir J W, op cit, p 422 (letter from Malcolm to his
wife, 12 July 1808).
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any other opponents in that part of the Gulf; Malcolm himself
would direct the project.( 83 ) He recorded his notions on this
project in his journal:
"HMS Doris, near Karrack, 8th July.
"The more 'I contemplate this island, the more I am
satisfied it might be made one of the most prosperous
settlements in Asia, situated within a few hours' sail of
Bushire, Bunder Begh, Bussorah, Crane, Bahrain and Catiff.
It would, if under a just and powerful Government, be the
common resort of the merchants of Turkey, Arabia, and
Persia. • • The chief recommendations of this island are its
fine climate and excellent water. • • I could not
contemplate this island without thinking it far from
improbable that the English Government might be obliged, by
the progress of its enemies in this quarter, to take
possession of it, and my mind passed rapidly from that idea
to the contemplation of myspg as the chief instrument in
the execution of this plan." k°4)
Malcolm arrived in Calcutta on 20 August 1808 and was able
during his interviews with the Governor-General, to explain
himself in detail and to convince him and the Indian government
of the importance of his plan; his detailed arguments were as
follows:
"Firstly. That in the event of an attempt to invade India
being made by an European State, it was impossible to place
any dependence on the efforts of the King of Persia or the
Pasha of Baghdad, unless we possessed the immediate power of
punishing their hostility and treachery.
"Secondly. That the States of Persia, Eastern Turkey,
and Arabia, were, from their actual condition, to be
considered less in the light of regular Governments than as
countries full of combustible materials, which any nation
whose interests it promoted might throw into a flame.
"Thirdly. That though the French and Russians might,
no doubt, in their advance, easily conquer those States, in
the event of their opposing their progress, it was their
obvious policy to avoid any contest with the inhabitants of
the country through which they passed, as such must, in its
progress, inevitably diminish the resources of those
countries, and thereby increase the difficulty of supporting
their armies - which difficulty formed the chief, if not the
sole, obstacle to their advance.
(83) IOR, G/29/25, Malcolm to Minto, 15 Aug 1808.
(84) Kaye, Sir J W, op cit, pp 424-5 (citing entry in Malcolm's
journal).
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"Fourthly. That though it was not to be conceived that
the King of Persia or Pasha of Baghdad would willingly allow
any European army to pass through his country, but there was
every ground to expect that the fear of a greater evil was
likely not only to make these rulers observe a neutrality,
but to dispose them to aid the execution of a plan which
they could not resist, and make them desire to indemnify
themselves for submission to a power they dreaded by
agreeing to share in the plunder of weaker States - a line
of policy to which it was too obvious they would be united,
and to which their fear, weakness, and avarice made it
probable that they would accede.
"Fifthly. That under a contemplation of such
occurrences, it appeared of ultimate importance that the
English Government should instantly possess itself of means
to throw those States that favoured the approach of its
enemies into complete confusion and destruction, in order
that it might, by diminishing their resources, increase the
principal natural obstacle that opposed the advance of an
European army, and this system, when that Government had
once established a firm footing and a position situated on
the confines of Persia and Turkey, it could easily pursue,
with a very moderate force, and without any great risk or
expenditure.
"Sixthly. That with an established footing in the Gulf
of Persia, which must soon become the emporium of our
commerce, the seat of our political negotiations, and a
depot for our military stores, we should be able to
establish a local influence and strength that would not only
exclude other European nations from that quarter, but enable
us to carry on negotiations and military operations with
honour and security to any extent we desired, whereas,
without it, we must continue at the mercy of the fluctuating
policy of unsteady, impotent, and faithless Courts, adopting
expensive and useless measures of defence at every uncertain
alarm, and being ultimately obliged either to abandon the
scene altogether, or, when danger actually came, to incur
the most desperate hazard of complete failure by sending a
military expedition which must trust for its subsistence and
safety to States who were known, not only from the
individual character of their ruler, but from their actual
condition and character, to be undeserving of a moment's
confidence.
"Seventhly. That there was great danger in any delay,
as the plan recommended could only be expected to be
beneficial if adopted when there was a time to mature it and
to organise all our means of defence before the enemy were
too far advanced; otherwise that momentary irritation which
must be excited by its adoption would only add to the many
other advantages which our want of foresight and attention
to our irMysts in that quarter had already given to our
enemies."'
(85) Kaye, Sir J W, op cit, pp 433-4.
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Notwithstanding his reservations about his diplomatic style,
Minto decided that Malcolm should command the proposed
expeditionary force to occupy Kharrack Island on Persia's Gulf
coast. Orders were issued to the government in Bombay to make
preparations to dispatch the expedition, delegating Malcolm as
political and military plenipotentiary. Urgent orders were
issued at the same time to Jones' mission to delay his departure
for Persia and remain in Bombay.
On this occasion, Jones turned the tables on Malcolm; he did
not receive the orders because he had already left Bombay and was
at sea bound for Bushire, arriving in October 1808. The
Governor-General's orders caught up with him in Bushire, but it
would have been impossible to call off the mission even if he had
wanted to, and it would have been unwise to withdraw. He had
either to achieve the object of his mission or finally to prove
that the Persian government was hostile to Britain, thereby
providing cause and justification for any future military
action (86)
Malcolm meanwhile left Calcutta for Bombay to take command
of the military expedition to Persia. While he was at sea bound
for Bombay he received an urgent message from Minto informing him
that the Indian government had not had a reply from Jones
confirming that he had deferred his trip to Persia, and that
Malcolm was to delay his expedition and not to leave Bombay.
"Sir Harford Jones can obtain nothing, we know, but a
negotiation may with great ease be spun out to any length -
possibly till events themselves negotiate for him, or till
the invading armies are in possession of the country. • • I
cannot tell at what period the transactions he will report
to me will enable me to interpose, and if he goes to Shiraz,
or negotiates at Bushire, it appears to me that time must be
(86) 10R, G/29/25 1
 Jones to Minto, Bushire, 1 Nov 1808.
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allowed to him.
	
In this interval, Karrack must be
necessarily suspended. We cannot commit hostilities on
Persia while the King of England is negotiating with the
King of Persia. • • It appears to me that you should now go
to Bussorah, and apply yourself actively to that branch of
our affairs.
"You will be at hand to resume the Persian plans when
events admit of it. You will have to withdraw Captain
Pasley and all your establishment from Bushire• • • Mr Smith
should resume his station. . . I send you my first thoughts
on this ev ty which seems to disconcert all our late
plans• • •
There was no time to be lost; Malcolm ordered his baggage to
be transferred to another vessel. He was deeply disappointed,
and feelings of anger and bitterness were mingled with his
disappointment. Why had Sir Harford Jones sailed for the Persian
Gulf? Why had he not waited to learn the results of Malcolm's
visit to Calcutta? All the circumstances of the case were now
recalled and considered as Malcolm took boat for Calcutta.(88)
Unprepared to accept such a drastic reduction of his functions,
he wrote to Minto to protest against his decision, and to rail
against Jones for having been so perverse as to quit Bombay
before the orders to remain had arrived.
	
His protest was
successful. On 31 November 1808 the Governor-General, issued
urgent instructions to Jones to withdraw from Persia. He also
issued instructions to Malcolm to continue with the military
expedition. When Malcolm arrived at Bombay on 30 November he
found that preparations for the expedition were well advanced; a
force of 2,000 infantrymen, cavalry, artillery and pioneers had
been assembled, and a further 4,000 men could be supplied if
Malcolm needed them. All he needed was the final order from the
Indian government to depart for Persia.
(87) Kaye, Sir J W, op cit, ppp 437-8 (Lord Minto to Malcolm,
Barrakpore, 30 Sept 1
(88) Kaye, Sir J W, op cit, pp 437-8; see also Minto, Countess of
(ed), op cit, p 128.
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Meanwhile, additional instructions, that he should do his
utmost to impress upon the minds of the Persian authorities at
Bushire that the aim of the expedition was to do no more than
ensure India's safety and security, reached Malcolm in mid-
December 1808. If he found that the Persian ruler's attitude to
France had changed, he was to offer him a force of up to 5,000
men to assist him to counter a Franco-Russian invasion of Persia.
If, on the other hand, the Persian ruler had allowed in forces of
the Franco-Russian alliance, he was to make the same offer to the
Amir of Shiraz, and likewise with the Ottoman authorities in
Iraq. Finally, if he considered it to be in the interests of the
Indian government to initiate friendly relations with the Wahabis
in the Arabian Peninsula, the British government would have no'
objection (89)
The final order was not given, however, for developments in
the Gulf area led the Governor-General to stop Malcolm leaving
Bombay. Reports arriving from Bushire indicated that Jones had
been welcomed and that he was shortly expected to go to Tehran.
Further the conflict in Spain between Spanish rebels and French
forces had made it difficult for Napoleon to apply his energies
to projects in the East, and made it unlikely that French forces
would invade India.(90)
"The French forces operating in Spain come from all over
Europe. . . Napoleon is supervising military operations. • •
an attempt to carry ol4t plans to invade India is doubtful at
the present time."01)
The Indian government's orders for Malcolm's expedition not
(89) IOR, Bengal Sec. Letters Received, Vol 10 (i), Gov-Gen-in-
Council to Sec. Committee, Fort William, Dec 1808.
(90) IOR, L/PS/5/541, Sec. Committee to the Gov-Gen-in-Council,
Whitehall, 6 Sept 1808.
(91) IOR, L/PS/5/541. Sec. Committee to the Gov-Gen-in-Council,
Whitehall, 24 Sept 1808.
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to leave Bombay affected Malcolm profoundly. 	 He was bitterly
disappointed, but recognised the logic of his position:
"The reports of Jones' progress made me consider it my
public duty to incur a short delay rather than risk by
precipita0JI the slightest embarrassment to the public
service."V/4
Jones himself had left for Bushire with the encouragement of
the Governor of Bombay who was out of sympathy with the Governor-
General in regard to Malcolm's expedition against Persia, as
indicated in a letter to Jones:
"My dependence for putting all this to right is on you,
because I conceive from your firmness, resource and
activity, you will be with the King, and we shall hear that
you are there before this ill-judged, unjustifiable, rash
expedition can sail, which, if it once start for the Gulf,
will cost the Company Crores and Crores of mles, and will
produce results I tremble to think of . .
On leaving Bombay, Jones resolved to send back the warships
accompanying him when he arrived on the Persian coast, and place
himself under the protection of the Persian government, to give
his mission political consequence and demonstrate his good
intentions.() On 14 October the mission arrived at Bushire
where they were met by . a number of senior Persian government
officials. Tehran was not reached until 14 February 1809. On 12
March 1809, at Tehran, Jones arrived at a preliminary agreement
of friendship and alliance between Britain and Persia. () The
articles were drawn up by Jones on behalf of H M Government and
by Muhammed Shufi and Muhammed Hussein Khan on behalf of the
(92) IOR, Home Misc., Vol 737, Malcolm to G Buchan, Bombay, 24
Dec 1808.
(93) Brydges, H J, An Account of the. Transactions of HM Mission 
to the Court of Persia, 2 Vols, London, np, 1a34, Vol I, p 170
citing Duncan's letter).
94) 10R,.L/PS/5/303, Pol. Consul, 27 Sept 1808.
95) 10R, L/PS/6/171, Gov. of Bombay to the Court of Directors,
14 Jun 1809.
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ruler of Persia and the agreement became the basis for Anglo-
Persian relations. In article two the Persian ruler committed
himself to abrogating any previous agreement or treaty signed
with any European country, and not to permit any European force
whatsoever to pass through Persia to India. For their part the
British government undertook to assist the Persian government in
the event of an invasion by a European country, 	 with
military	 forces	 if necessary, or with financial support and
armaments, until the invading forces were expelled. (96) Such
forces, and the amount of financial assistance, were to be
defined in "the final agreement". 	 In the event of Britain
signing a peace treaty with the countries concerned, she was to
do her utmost to mediate and to arrive at a peace between Persia
and those countries. If mediation should fail, she was to fulfil
her obligations according to the agreement. It was also agreed
that in the event of an attack or invasion of British possessions
in India by Afghanistan or any other country the ruler of Persia
was to supply a military force for the protection of those
possessions.
Articles five and six show how far-sighted Jones was, for he
decided to provide for the eventuality of forces of Malcolm's
expedition landing on Kharrack Island by ensuring that in the
event of British forces arriving in the Gulf and landing, with
the Persian ruler's permission, on Kharrack Island or at any
other Persian port, the Persian ruler was to receive them in
friendship; however the landing of British forces was in no way
be construed as granting right of possession. Article seven
stipulated that Britain should not intervene in the event of war
(96) 10R, G/29/26, H Jones to R Dundas, 10 Mar 1809.
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breaking out between Persia and Afghanistan unless her mediation
was requested by the two parties. The eighth and final article
affirmed that this was by nature a defence agreement, emphasising
that the Persian ruler was constrained not to enter into any
agreements hostile to Britain or which might be injurious to
British interests in India. ( ) Jones strove to persuade the
Persian ruler to cede the island of Kishm to Britain, with the
offer of increased annual financial support if he should accept
the proposal, but he did not succeed, for the Persian ruler
refused to discuss the ceding of Persian possession. He did,
however, agree to diplomatic representation between the two
countries, and to send an ambassador to represent him in
England. (98)
That Jones succeeded where Malcolm failed is not
attributable to Jones' capability and Malcolm's lack of it so
much as to circumstances, which had changed in the previous few
months. Jones, learning that the Persian ruler had changed his
attitude to France after losing hope that she would assist him
against Russia, skilfully-exploited these changes. He remained
in Tehran until the end of 1810, when he returned to London.
Early in 1811 the British government decided that the appointment
of the ambassador to Persia should be within their competence and
not that of the Indian Governor-General, and ordered that Sir
Gore Ousley should succeed Jones as ambassador of the British
crown.()
It may thus be deduced that the increased British interest
(97) Al-Abid, S, op cit, p 272; see also Aitchison, C U, op cit 
pp 46-9.
(98) 1011 9 G/29/26, Jones to Dundas, 31 Mar 1809.
(99) Lorimer, J G, op cit, p 177.
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in the Gulf area over the period 1798-1810 was primarily a
reaction to the efforts of the French in the Gulf and in Persia
to establish their influence and set up strategic bases there
that would enable them to threaten British possessions in India.
Prior to 1798, the Arabian Gulf - both the Arab and the Persian
littorals - constituted a secondary theatre in the conflict
between Britain and France regarding the occupation of India;
there was in the last two decades of the eighteenth century a
noticeable decline in the activity of the East India Company, to
the extent that it considered withdrawing its factories from the
Gulf. However, political and strategic considerations overrode
economic and commercials interests, primarily because the French
campaign in Egypt made the British government fear an attack on
British possessions in India; Napoleon's presence close to the
Red Sea and the Gulf, the two passages to India, was seen as a
threat to the East India \Company's possessions and interests in
the East. The British government therefore considered closing
these sea routes and preventing the French from reaching India,
by conducting a concentrated diplomatic campaign in the Gulf area
and in Persia. These resulted in the establishment of residences
in Baghdad and Basra so that the desert mail should be saved from
falling into the hands of the French, and the signing of
political and commercial agreements with Persia and Muscat that
guaranteed the British government influence in those countries.
There were two reasons for the period of reduced British
activity and of French superiority in the Gulf and in Persia in
the period from 1806 to 1808: the first was the belief that the
departure of the French from Egypt meant the end of the threat of
a French occupation of India; the second was that the Governor-
General of India was forbidden from entering into disputes that
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arose among the Arabs during the Wahabi expansion. This British
quiescense left the field clear for France to sign friendship
agreements with Persia through which the Persian government hoped
to recover the possessions that Russia had taken from her. In
the period 1807 to 1810 the Indian administration was able to
reverse its position, and increase its influence in the Gulf and
Persia, by political missions which were able to eliminate French
activity from Persia and the Gulf as a whole. Throughout that
the real reason for the increased involvement in the Gulf area
was fear of the French advancing on India through the Gulf or
across Persia to capture her interests and possessions in the
East.
In conclusion, it may be said that the decisive diplomatic
success achieved by the British in Persia, their attainment of
total superiority over their French competitors, and the
consolidation of that success with a series of agreements with
the rulers of Lahore, Kabul and Indus (100) made the British
position in the Arabian Gulf more firmly established than it had
ever been before. Britain now considered the Arabian Gulf to
be of real strategic importance and essential to the defence of
her possessions in India, to be defended against penetration by
any other country, which might have threatened India, British
maritime commerce, and her desert mail. In order to consolidate
their presence in the Gulf and extend total sovereignty over the
adjoining coastal areas, the British had however to destroy a new
force that had appeared on the political scene in the form of the
Qawasim, whose repeated attacks on British shipping constituted a
considerable threat to the British presence in the Gulf, and also
(100) 10R, L/PS/6/171, Pol. Consul, 20 Jan 1808.
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to the East India Company's mail. The East India Company
therefore decided to send a military task force to destroy the
Qawasim, the consequences of which will be dealt with in Chapter
Six.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Qawasim activity in the Gulf -
In Chapter Two we saw that the Qawasim were a race of Arabs
descended from the inhabitants of Nejd. Ra's Al-Khaimah, a
thriving port, formed the base of Qawasim power along with, but
to a lesser extent, the port of Sharjah located a few miles up
the coast. Other ports of strategic importance under Qawasim
control included Umm Al-Qawa.im, Al-Hemra Island, Al-Rams,
Buhail, Ajman, Shinas, Khor Fakkan and Khor Kalba. The tribe's
sphere of influence on the Persian coast of the Gulf extended
from Kharrack to Bander Abbas, taking in Linga, Luft, Kunk and
Ras Al-Heti, enabling them to play an important role in the
region's affairs.
To understand the Qawasim's role in the Arabian Gulf two
'
periods will be examined; before and after the Wahabi movement
reflecting two phases in their political history. Between 1747
and 1800, the Qawasim established themselves as a separate tribe
and increasingly dominated trade on the east coast of the Arabian
Gulf. During this period, relations between the Qawasim and the
East India Company became strained due to attacks by the Qawasim
on Company ships. Reference has already been made in Chapter Two
to the fact that the alliance in 1751 between the Qawasim and
Mala Ali Shah, Governor of Hormuz, Gamberoon and Minaa benefited
the Qawasim more than the Persian leader, making them the
strongest naval power in the Gulf and increasing their influence
over other tribes round that stronghold. Their activity was not
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limited to Arab or Persian targets; in December 1778 a brig
belonging to the East India Company fought a running battle for
three days with six Qawasim vessels from Ra's Al-Khaimah before
being captured and held to ransom for 40,000 Rupees. (1)
 In
January 1779 the Success,  en route from Basra to Muscat, was set
upon by eight to ten ships of the Qawasim fleet, but Success beat
them off. In February 1779, two Qawasim ships attacked another
Company vessel but were driven off after an engagement lasting 25
minutes. (2)
 In 1790 the Beglerbeg, bound from Bengal to Bushire,
was seized by Qawasim ships off Mussendam, where she remained on
the rocks for many years. () In May. 1797, the Bassin Snow, under
British colours, and charged with public despatches, was taken
off Rams by a fleet of dhows belonging to the Qawasim, and was
released two days later. In the following October the cruiser
	
Viper was attacked whilst at anchor in Bushire Roads.	 The
Qawasim dhows had arrived about six days before the Viper, under
the command of Sheikh Saleh, who was at war with the ruler of
Muscat. His aim was to intercept the Omanis who were at Basra.
On the day the Viper arrived, Sheikh.Saleh had a meeting with the
resident at Bushire, when,
	 after strong professions of
friendship, he begged that the British would refrain from
protecting the Omani dhows, and requested a supply of balls and
powder from Viper, which having been furnished, he treacherously
attacked the cruiser, but was beaten off.()
Between 1797 and 1804 the Qawasim refrained from attacks on
Gulf shipping, but abandoned their restraint in the period to
(I) Lorimer, J	 op cit, vol I, p 634.
• (2) IOR, R/15/1/3, extract of letter from John Beaumont
(Resident at Bushire) to the Board, 8 Jan 1779.
(3) Miles, S B, ov cit, p 284.
(4) Bombay Selections XXIV, p 302 (Warden).
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1820 after they embraced Wahabism and sought further to dominate
and control the waters of the Gulf.
The acceptance by the Qawasim of Wahabism did not imply
their temporal subjection to Wahabi religious leaders. All the
latter asked was payment of alms and one-fifth of booty gained in
war; the Qawasim exploited the wider support they gained by
embracing Wahabism both to further their long-running war with
Muscat and to legitimise their activities against East India
Company ships as Jihad.
	 The view of contemporary observers,
which has persisted until 	 comparatively	 recently, that
"conversion to Wahabism inflamed [the Qawasim's] naturally
warlike disposition" ) , is at best an oversimplification.
Wheigham nonetheless thought that Wahabism transformed the
Qawasim into fanatic fighters and violent pirates. (6) Malcolm
said that the Qawasim, after they embraced Wahabism, were savage:
"their job is piracy 4g4 their religion reason for every
attack they carry out."kll
There was some respite from their action against shipping at
the turn of the century until 1803 when the Company's brig fly,
14 guns, commanded by Lieutenant Mainwaring was attacked off Qais
by La Fortune, commanded by the famous privateer, Captain Lememe.
The despatches of the Fly were thrown overboard and three of the
officers, Mainwaring, Arthurs, and Maitland, were taken to
Mauritius. The other officers, having been released, succeeded
in recovering the despatches and sailed for Bombay, but were
5) Curzon, G, Persia and the Persian Question, London, 1892
new edition London, Frank Cass, 1966), vol II, p 448.
6) Weigham, H J, The Persian Problem, London, Isbister and Co,
1903, p 81.
7. Malcolm, J, Sketches of Persia, from the Journal of a 
Traveller in the East, London, Cassell and Co, 1888, vol I, pp
27-8.
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captured on the way by a Qawasim squadron, which carried them to
Ra's Al-Khaimah. Here they purchased their liberty and then set
out for Bushire, which was reached by two survivors only, Pennel
and Jowl, the rest having died on the way.(8)
Within weeks of the sultan of Muscat's death in November the
following year the Gulf was up in arms, as the Qawasim strove to
usurp the maritime supremacy held by Muscat. They captured
Bander Abbas and lay siege to Minab, a few miles away. Masters
now of the Straits of Hormuz they could strike at any vessel
making for or leaving the Gulf. Two European brigs, Shannan and
Trimmer, the property of Samuel Manesty, the resident of Basra,
were taken at the close of 1804, and in January 1805 a fleet of
40 Qawasim dhows attempted to close upon the Company's 24 gun
cruiser Mornington as she passed Polior Island, but were beaten
off.()	 Finally, on 30 April, the Company's cruiser Queen was
attacked by a very large Qawasim ship near Muscat on her way up
to the Gulf. The Qawasim ship had ten guns and a large crew, but
after a severe struggle was beaten off.(10)
Kelly distinguished between the attacks in 1804 - 5 and the
earlier ones by the tinge of religious fanaticism which
accompanied the latter, although he considered it doubtful that
they had been deliberately ordered by the Wahabi amir. The
Qawasim of Linga had also been converted to the creed, but as yet
neither they nor their kinsmen at Ra's Al-Khaimah seemed to be
completely under the amir's thumb: they paid him zakat but they
did not conform to the usual Wahabi practice of remitting to
(8) Miles, S B, op cit, p 296.
(9) 10R, L/PS/6	 vol 1, Governor-in-Council (Bombay) to
Court of Directors, 26 Feb 1805..
(10) Miles, S B, op cit, p 305.
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Daraeia one-fifth of all booty taken.(11)
This view is however contradicted by the Bombay documents;
writing at the time, Warden declared that the Qawasim had been
deliberately ordered to attack European vessels by the emir, (12)
a fact confirmed by a letter that Samuel Manesty sent to the
Governor General-in-Council:
"The only possible immediate mode of attempting to
check the inimical proceeding of the Qawasim Arabs towards
English vessels by negotiations is through the medium of
their new master, Shaikh Sood Aziz, the present Wahabi
Shaikh and I have consequently determined to dispatch a
confederal person to Drauah Daraeia) charged with a letter
to the Shaikh explanatory of the unfortunate events which
have taken place, and of the necessity of his causing
immediate restitution of the Trimmer, of his issuing
positive orders to the Qawasim Arabs, whose chief residence
is at Rasel Khima [Ra's Al-Khaimah] to observe a friendly
conduct towards British vessels in future, and his declaring
the natvvg
)
 of his own sentiments towards the British
nation,"k"
After the death of the ruler of Muscat, who had held in
check Qawasim sea power aimed against Muscat's interests
in the Gulf, the Bombay administration felt its interests in the
Gulf to be threatened, especially if Muscat were to accept
Wahabism. These fears wete enhanced by the interference of the
French in Muscat,	 Accordingly, Captain Seton was ordered to
Muscat in 1805 to re-open the residency there.
The Bombay government had previously been content to leave
the protection of the Gulf's seaborne commerce to Sultan Bin
Ahmed, believing him to be a steadying influence in Gulf
politics, a view not wholly justified by his conduct. Now, it
was clear, that if Muscat was still to play this role, some
11) Kelly, J B, op cit, p 106.
12) Bombay Selections XXIV,p 300, (Warden).
13) BA, SPDD 164A, Manesty, Resident at Bushire, to Wellesley,
Governor-General-in-Council, Basra, 2 Jan 1805.
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support would have to be lent to the sultan's successor. Seton
was ordered to help • one of the sultan's two sons gain the
succession. He was cautioned by the Governor-General, Sir George
Barlow:
"to confine his support to the candidate whose pretensions
shall appear to be founded on justice, provided that support
can be afforded without the hazard igg,involving the British
Government in hosting with Muscat."4 4)
The cruiser Mornington was placed under his orders, to be used in
support of any move he might make in concert with the new ruler
to recover the ships and cargoes taken by the Qawasim. Little
freedom of acti9n was left to Seton.
"In your proceedings towards the pirates you are . . . to be
particularly cautious to act with the greatest moderation,
to aim at pacification by means of negotiations, and to
avoid hostilities at all events. • • • You are likewise . .
to keep clear of all disputes with the W41A1is or either of
the two Governments of Turkey or Persia."0-J
A similar warning had been issued to the commanders of the
Company's cruisers the previous month. (16) When Seton reached
Muscat in May 1805 he found the then ruler Bader Bin Saif had
decided to recover Bander Abbas and Hormuz from the Qawasim's
allies, the Beni Mu l in, and had started to prepare for a big
assault by sea and land. Seton decided to help the ruler in
this; on 7 June the Muscat fleet with Mornington arrived off
Bander Abbas. After a day's bombardment the garrison yielded. A
blockade was then imposed on the Beni Mu l in on Kishm Island;
After 70 days Seton succeeded in imposing a treaty on the Qawasim
in which they promised to hand over the ship Trimmer and its
cargo or the value of the cargo in cash.(17)
(16) 10R, LIPS/1/1, Gov-in-Council to Court 26 Feb 1805.
(17) 10R, Boards Collections, Vol 192, Cohn 4155, Seton to
Duncan, 25 July 1805.
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In October an agent arrived at Muscat from Mola Hussein,
deputed by the Qawasim to negotiate a peace for them. The
instructions of the Bombay administration having been sought,
Captain Seton was informed, that in the event of its becoming a
party to the peace, it should extend generally to the whole Gulf,
and he was to require full indemnification for losses sustained.
Captain Seton, finding it impracticable to obey the orders of the
government to obtain the required indemnity without having
recourse to hostilities which would have involved the government
in general warfare, nonetheless judged it advisable to enter into
the agreement with th4 Qawasim.(18)
At Bander Abbas on 6 February 1806, Seton therefore
concluded agreements with the representative of Sultan Bin Saqar,
the paramount sheikh, binding the Qawasim to respect the property
of the East India Company and its subjects. If they failed to do
so they would be liable to a fine of 30,000 thalers. Should the
Wahabi amir compel the Qawasim to break the peace at sea, they
were to give three months' warning of their intention to do so.
In return, Seton dropped the claim to the cargo of the Trimmer 
and informed the Qawasim representative that his tribesmen would
be permitted to resume their calls at ports in British India,
from which they had been barred since the attacks on the Shannon 
and the Trimmer. On 29 April the agreement was approved and
signed by the Governor General-in-Council,(19)
It was noteworthy that the agreement did not include
restrictions on the Qawasim in their relations with other than
British, and it gave the Qawasim the right to ignore this
(18) Bombay Selections XXIV, p 304, (Warden).
(19) BA, SPDD No 181 of 1806, Treaty with Al-Qawasim.
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agreement if they were forced to do so, because of the
possibility of the Wahabi amir calling for Jihad, although it
said they should give three . months' notice. This •said, the
agreement was rejected by the Wahabi leaders because Sultan Bin
Sagar did not refer to them when he signed the agreement; he was
thus felt not to be trusted and it was decided to depose him and
place his uncle Hassan bin Ali, the ruler of Ram s, as the leader
of the Qawasim.
The Qawasim themselves respected the terms of the agreement
of Bander Abbas largely because of the presence of the East India
Company fleet in the Arabian Gulf for two years, consisting of
the Royal Navy ship Fox and eight other boats. The reason for
having the fleet there was the French presence in Persia in 1806
and the outbreak of warfare by Persia against•Russia.
After the renewal of friendly relations between Britain and
Persia, Britain withdrew most of its fleet from the Gulf and it
returned to Bombay. The Qawasim promptly resumed attacks on East
India Company ships and others in the area. They were able to
attack ships near the Indian coast north of Bombay, where Lively 
(an East India Company ship) engaged in a fierce battle with four
ships near the Gujerat coast in April 1808, which were beaten
off.	 Nevertheless, the Qawasim during the subsequent months
captured 20 ships in the Arabian sea north of Bombay. This
success led them to increase their activity in the area,sending a
fleet consisting of 50 ships towards Sind and Kutch.(20)
On the afternoon of 2 May 1808, the Company's cruiser Fury,
en route from Basra to Bombay with despatches, was attacked a few
(20) Bombay Selections XXIV, p 305 (Warden).
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leagues east of Muscat by two dhows manned by upwards of 500 men.
After a chase lasting several hours the dhows tried to board but
were driven off by the cruiser's stern guns and musket fire.
Three weeks later, on 23 May, the Minerva, owned by Samuel
Manesty, ran into a fleet of 55 Qawasim vessels off Ras Musandam.
She fought them in a running fight for two days before being
taken. Most of the crew and many of the passengers were put to
death, but among those spared was Mrs Robert Taylor, wife of
Lieutenant Taylor of the residency at Bushire, and her infant
son. Minerva was taken to Ra's Al-Khaimah where she was stripped
of her cargo and fittings and sent to cruise against other
merchant shipping. Most of the captives were later released,
among them Mrs Taylor, who was bought by an Arab from the Qawasim
chief for 670 thalers and ransomed by the resident at Bushire in
October 1809 for the sum of 1,000 thalers.(21)
The Qawasim now began to cruise in squadrons of 15 - 20
vessels, each commanded by a naib, or lieutenant, responsible to
Husain ibn Ali, the Wahabi vice-regent. Having little in the way
of conventional armaments, the Qawasim dhows usually overcame
their prey by closing and boarding. Virtually all who resisted,
and even those who did not, were butchered.(22)
The Qawasim continued their activities in the Arabian Gulf
area in the autumn of 1808. Five of the Qawasim's ships in
October attacked the Nautilus owned by the East India Company by
the entrance of the Arabian Gulf; after a battle Nautilus was
(21) BA. SPDD No 232 of 1808, Charles Gowant, Commander of Fury,
to Money, Superintendent of Marine, Bombay 10 May 1808.
(22) IOR, SPP/383/7, Ali Monjee (passenger on Minerva) to Seton,•
July 1809.
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able to escape, though with loss of life. (23) Three days later
the Qawasim attacked the Sylph armed with eight cannon and
belonging to the Bombay fleet when it was on its way back to
Bombay from Bushire after escorting Jones on his mission to
Persia. The Qawasim captured the Sylph but the presence of
Nereide nearby equipped with 36 cannon allowed the British to re-
take Sylph and sink the Qawasim ship.
	
The incident left 30
sailors dead from Sylph and three wounded. (24) If Sylph had
fired earlier at the Qawasim these casualties might have been
avoided but the captain had adhered strictly to his orders, which
were not to provoke the Qawasim and only to open fire if they
attacked English ships.(25)
The attitude of the Bombay government towards the Qawasim
reflects both political and military motives. Politically, the
Bombay administration did not want to fight the Wahabi in the
Arabian peninsula because the motive for the presence of the
British in the area was to counter the aims of Napoleon who had
increased his activities in Oman and Persia, not to start a new
war against the Wahabi amir. From a purely military point of
view, Bombay was too short of equipment to declare war against
the Qawasim; the government only had 12 ships in 1808 and the
occupation of Kharrack Island in 1808 tied down even these.
Hence Jones was ordered to contact the Wahabi amir and to ensure
his cooperation against the imminent French advance from the
Mediterranean; (26)
 for its part, and despite its lack of
(23) BA, SPDD No 255 of 1808, Report from Bennett, Captain of
Nautilus, Bombay, 1 Dec 1808.
(24) BA, SPDD No 251 of 1808, Graham, Commander of Sylph, to
Money, Bombay 28 Oct 1808.
(25) Buckingham, J S, Travels in Assyria, Medina and Turkey,
London, Henry Colburn, 1829, vol 2, pp 236-7.
(26) PRO, F0/60/1, Canning to Jones, 28 Aug 1807.
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warships, the Bombay government felt that the attacks carried out
by the Qawasim against ships owned by the East India Company and
other British ships in the Arabian Gulf left them with little
alternative but to take action. On 11 November 1808 the sloop
Teignmouth was ordered to sail to the Gulf to do some training in
the area between Muscat and Bushire and
"to destroy or capture any of the Qawasim vessels he may
fall in with until their chief may be made sensible of the
enormity of their aggression and reduced to solicit a
restoration of peaç. such terms as the same may safely be
extended to them."k")
The Qawasim naval operations had a dramatic effect on trade
in India. Malcolm, charged with defending British interests in
the Gulf sent Captain Seton to Muscat as resident in January
1809. Wahabi influence had greatly increased, as evinced by the
overthrow of the ruler of Ra's Al-Khaimah, Sultan Bin Sagar, who
was deported to Daraeia because in 1806 he had signed the Bander
Abbas agreement with the British resident without consulting the
Wahabi amir. But the matter that most worried the British
authorities was that the new Qawasim leader, Hassan bin Ali,
asked the Bombay administration to pay tribute to enable the
British ships to pass through the Arabian Gulf. Accordingly
Seton proposed to Bombay that the British help the ruler of
Muscat to maintain the independence of his country from Wahabism,
and to limit Qawasim activity and ensure the free passage through
the Gulf. (28)	After some hesitation the
Council agreeded to send troops to the Gulf. He planned a major
offensive against the Qawasim from the sea to expel them from
harbours such as Khor Fakkan, Shinas and others, thus limiting
(27) IOR, SPP/380/354, Minute by Duncan, 24 Nov 1808.
(28) BA, SPDD No 325 of 1809, Seton, resident at Muscat, to
Bombay Company, 8 Feb 1809.
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danger in the future and enabling the ruler of Muscat to improve
his defensive powers.
In May 1809, Captain Wainwright, a Royal Navy officer well
acquainted with the Gulf, was appointed to lead the expedi-
tion.( 29 ) Seton and Duncan, Governor of Bombay, were in favour
of the expedition proceeding immediately in order that the
Qawasim boats should be caught in their ports in summer.
Malcolm, however, was for mounting the expedition in September in
order to take advantage of favourable weather conditions. As
almost all the timber of which the Arab vessels were built was
bought in Malabar, it would also be a good auxiliary measure to
the Governor-General's plans not to allow any wood to be exported
from that province by the Arab timber vessels without special
permission.( 30	Wainwright supported Malcolm's suggestion(31)
and on 7 September Duncan issued his detailed instructions; Ra's
Al-Khaimah was to be the main point of attack, and all the
Qawasim war fleet was to be destroyed and any other vessels found
there. The aim was to control the coast and, if possible occupy
other harbours nearby from Rams to Ras Al-Had. Operations were
also to be extended to Linga and other Qawasim ports on the
Persian Coast, as well as to Luft, the Qawasim stronghold on
Kishm Island. Instructions were given to Bruce the new resident
at Muscat to help the ruler to destroy all the naval equipment
belonging to the Qawasim in that harbour. Wainwright was to
assure the Persians that Britain did not have any intention to
occupy any part of their territory and, most important of all, he
(29) BA, SPDD No 339 of 1809.
(30) BA, SPDD No 329 of 1809, Malcolm to Duncan, 1 May 1809.
(31) BA, SPDD No 334 of 1809, President's minute by Duncan, 24
Jun 1809.
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was not to interfere with the Wahabi amir. (32)
 The instructions
made clear that military operations, except in cases of emergency
on land, should be limited to the sea and to the destruction of
the pirate vessels and that crews of the ships and the troops
embarked on them should not be employed on shore against Wahabi
land forces, as the Governor-General had earlier written:
"We consider it of some importance to manifest as much
as possible both by declaration and by action, that the
expedition is directed, not generally against the tribe of
Wahabis but exclusively against the piratical branch of that
tribe whic11, as so long infested the commerce of India and
the Gulf."1/4-3
On 14 September the expedition sailed from Bombay. The
force consisted of the frigates Chiffonne and Caroline (35 and 36
guns) and five cruisers each with between 10 and 20 guns, as well
as the gunboat Fury, a bombarding vessel Stromboli (which sank
between India and the Gulf) and three transports carrying about
800 European troops and 500 sepoys. (34)
Owing to contrary winds the squadron did not arrive at
Muscat until 23 October, and then spent 10 days taking on water.
On their arrival the news reached them of the death of David
Seton on 2 August 1809 at his country house at Bushire where he
had been taken from Muscat.() Wainwright was seconded by
Captain Smith of the 65 th Regiment; they found the ruler of
Muscat unenthusiastic about the expedition and gloomy about its
prospects. Ten thousand troops at least, he said, would be
needed to take Ra's Al-Khaimah. Nor would the frigate guns be of
much use in reducing the fortifications, as the approaches to the
02) BA, SPDD, No 339 of 1809, Warden to Wainwright, 7 Sep 1809.
(33) BA, SPDD, No 339 of 1809, Minto to Duncan, Fort William, 3
Apr 1809.
(34) BA, SPDD, No 339 of 1809, Expedition against the Qawasim.
(35) BA, SPDD, No 346 of 1809, Regrets on the death of Capt Seton
at Muscat.
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port were too shallow to allow them inshore.(36)
In early November the fleet sailed from Muscat, and on 11
November the whole armament hove to outside Ra's Al-Khaimah. As
predicted, because of the shallowness of the water the frigates
were not able to approach the town closer than four miles, but
the smaller ships like the cruisers and transports could do
better and advanced to within two miles. () The Minerva, an
armed ship in the hands of the Qawasim, retired to the westward
of the town under cover of a tower. She was immediately attacked
by boats of the squadron, supported by some of the cruisers,
taken and burnt. On the following day the town was bombarded for
three hours by the small cruisers and gunboats, with considerable
effect, after which, Wainwright reported:
"The place having been reconnoitred and the plan of attack
formed, the troops were put in the boats, early in the
morning of the 13th and rowed towards the shore. The Arabs,
who were in the mosque at prayer at the instant the gun
boats opened their fire, rushed to repel the apparent attack
while the main force consisting of His Majesty's 65th
Regiment, the flank companies of the 47th. the marines from
the frigates and the small party of artillery with a
howitzer and field pieces, advanced towards the southern
end. The instant they discerned their mistake the Arabs ran
towards the point of debarkation with tumultuous shouts; but
the grape shot from 'the gun boats shook them a good deal,
and the troops landing in great style soon overpowered them.
Brave and skilful in single combat, they were unable to
withstand the shock of adversaries acting in a body. By ten
o'clock the Qawasim were driven out of the town, the shells
and spherical case shot from two howitzers and five field
pieces annoying them very much. The former setting fire to
some cadjan huts soon spread the conflagration to the town,
a great part of which with the whole of the dhows and naval
stores were burnt by four o'clock. Thus, in a few hours was
this enterprising and powerful people reduced to poverty and
weakness.
"Upwards of 50 dhows were destroyed, 30 of them of very
large dimensions. The troops embarked on the next day, and
the commanders of the armament had the satisfaction to find
(361 PRO, Adm 1/182, Wainwright to Rear Adm W Drury, La Chiffon,
Muscat, 31 Oct 1809.
(37) BA, SPDD, No 346 of 1809, Wainwright Report, 14 Nov 1809.
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that the service had been perfocmecl with the trifling loss
of 4 men killed and 19 wounded."08)
On 15 November, the expedition sailed to the Persian coast
to attack the Qawasim there. Two days later, the expedition was
off Linga. The town was abandoned on the approach of the ships
and 20 Qawasim vessels, nine of them very large, were destroyed
without loss of life. The fleet sailed for the eastern end of
Kishm Island to attack Luft, which was held by the Qawasim and
their allies, the Beni Mu'in. On the 26th the fleet arrived
there and Captain Wainwright tried unsuccessfully to induce their
sheikh, Mullah Hussein, to surrender. The next day, Wainwright
ordered to troops ashore to attack the town. 	 The Beni Mu'in
abandoned the town's defences and retired to a large fort perched
on top of a steep cliff.	 The 11 Beni Mu'in vessels, in the
harbour were burnt and the gun boats and the cruiser Fury which
had been town within musket shot of the port, bombarded the town
and fort. The Sheikh of the Beni Mu'in agreed to yield up the
place on the following day to the English together with all the
property in it belonging to the ruler of Muscat. Casualties in
the storming of Luft had been 80 - 90 killed and wounded on the
Qawasim side, and 2 men killed and 31 wounded among the attacking
troops.(39)
Having accomplished their designs against Linga and Luft,
the expedition returned to Muscat, arriving there on 7 December.
There they hoped to be joined by the forces of the ruler for the
purpose of attacking Shinas, Kalba and Khor Fakkan. On 24
(38) BA, SPDD, No 346 of 1809, Final Report by Wainwright, 14 Nov
1809.
(39) BA, SPDD, No 350 of 1810, Wainwright to Rear-Adm Drury,
Muscat, 7 Dec 1809.
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December the expedition sailed from Muscat in company with the
Omani vessels and troops and arrived at Shinas on the evening of
the 31st.
The task confronting them at Shinas was a formidable one. A
massive fort commanded the bay. It was known that the garrison
had lately been heavily reinforced and supplied to stand a siege,
but what Wainwright and Smith did not know was that the
reinforcements were Wahabis despatched by Muttlaq Al-Mutairi
after the attack on Ra's Al-Khaimah. On 1 January, Wainwright
sent a call to surrender to the garrison. It was rejected with
derision and soon afterwards the ship and gunboats began their
bombardment. The fort was however too distant from the ships to
be reduced by these means.	 On the 2nd, Wainwright and Smith
landed troops with mortars and howitzers, without effect. At
dawn on the 3rd, however a breach was made in the curtain wall
and soon afterwards one of the towers of the fort collapsed.
Despite determined resistance by the defenders, the fort was
taken later in the day. It had, however, been so badly damaged
that the ruler of Muscat,"doubting his ability to defend it, did
not think it prudent to keep possession of it. Qawasim
casualties were over 400: the attacking forces lost two killed
and 11 wounded.(40
Following this action, the ruler of Muscat expressed some
hesitation about attacking Khor Fakkan: he feared a similar
obstinate resistance to that made at Shinas, which might not end
in the same way. Accordingly, the object was abandoned, there
being no British interest connected with it, as there were no
(40) BA, SPDD, No 351 of 1810, Smith to Gov-in-Council, 8 Jan
1810.
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pirate vessels based at that port.(41)
The fleet spent the remainder of January 1810 on the Gulf
searching out and destroying any ships belonging to the Qawasim
and any pirate vessels. In February the transport with the bulk
of the troops sailed for Bombay while the two commanders examined
the islands at the entrance to the Gulf in search of a suitable
site for a base.
There are different views on the success or otherwise of the
Bombay government expedition. Kelly thought it had not been very
successful. Several dozen Qawasim dhows and their chief port had
been destroyed, but most of the Qawasim fleet had escaped. At
the approach of the expedition the Qawasim had concealed many of
their dhows in the deep inlets on the western side of the
Musandam peninsula, the existence of which was unknown to the
expedition's commanders. Other dhows were away on trading
voyages or free-booting cruises to the Red Sea and East Africa.
No marked benefit accrued to the sultan of Muscat from the attack
on Shinas or the chastisement of the Qawasim. Khor Fakkan and
the other harbours on the Shamailiyah coast remained in their
hands and he continued to lose ground to the Wahabis, abandoning
all Oman north and west of the Batinah to them.(42)
Warden, on the other hand, wrote at the time that the
commanders of the expedition had succeeded in their objective,
that of destroying all dhows and large boats of the petty
chieftains from Rams to Abookelr , on the Arabian side as well as
Mongoo on the coast of Persia. The chief of Kharrack, not
C41) Bombay Selections XXIV, p 306 (Warden).
(42) Kelly, J B, op cit, p 123.
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having any dhows or large boats, was admonished to refrain from
giving encouragement or protection to future pirates. (43)
 It
could be argued that Kelly was mistaken in thinking that the
operation was unsuccessful because he did not differentiate
between military and political results. From a military, point of
view, the operation succeeded in destroying many of the Qawasim
ships in the Arabian Gulf area whether these ships were on the
Arabian or the Persian coast. Additionally the cruisers Prince 
of Wales and Benares were on station in the Arabian Gulf to
ensure that there was no further piracy in the area.
	
Hence
Warden was able to say:
"It was prevalent opinion in the Gulf, founded on the result
of this expedition, that the Qawasim had been rendered qviji,
incapable of committing any further depredation by sea.'
But from a political point of view however the mission failed
because its leaders had been ordered to destroy the Qawasim
without touching the Wahabi in the area, and had not forced any
agreement with the Qawasim. The operation did not succeed in
restoring to the East India Company the ships that the Qawasim
had taken nor in obtaining compensation for the goods that the
Qawasim had seized; in short, from the political point of view,
the expedition had failed, and the Qawasim had reason to be glad
of Wahabi support, This was renewed in May 1814 when Abdulla Ibn
Saud succeeded as the Wahabi amir, and Qawasim ships appeared
again in force off the northern coast of India, and the Arabian
Gulf.
In December 1816, 11 Qawasim ships appeared off the coast of
Bombay and looted a dozen vessels. In the same year, three
(43) Bombay Selections XXIV, p 307.
(44) Ibid, p 307.
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vessels, sailing from Surat under British pass and colours, were
taken in the Arabian Gulf and many of their crew murdered. Many
other vessels sailing under British protection were captured,
together with the company's armed escort, the Turrarow. (45)
 Sub-
sequently the Qawasim engaged and defeated the ruler of Muscat
and very nearly took the frigate Caroline (32 guns). A Bombay
vessel, sailing under British pass and colours, was captured off
Muscat, the greater part of her crew put to death and a ransom
exacted for the release of the remainder.(46)
The audacity of the Qawasim increased to such a degree that
they attacked the Company's cruiser, Aurora, but stood off when
the cruiser flied on them. ()
 The Qawasim did not confine their
activities to British ships; they also began attacking European
and other vessels in the Gulf. In 1818 the American ship,
Persia, was chased and fired upon, and a French schooner from
Mauritius was boarded and looted. Warden gave more details about
their attitude:
"A deputation was sent to Ra's Al-Khaimah to obtain
redress for the capture of the vessel in the Arabian Gulf,
which failed. The Qawasim explicitly and boldly declared
that they would respect the sect of Christians and their
property, but none other; they did not consider any part of
Western India as ours beside Bombay and Mangalore; that if
we interfered in favour of the Hindoos and other unbelievers
of India, we might take all India, andMpp lt also, when
nothing would be left for them to plunder."k4°
Also in 1818 Qawasim boats landed in Busheab, burnt and
plundered the village at the western end of the island, carrying
off all the cattle, and killing great numbers of inhabitants; at
r45) Ibid, p 310.46) DT-Eimer, J G, op cit, vol I, p 653.7) BA, SPDD No 429 of 1816, Bruce, Resident at Bushire, to
Governor of Bombay, Bushire, 8 Feb 1818.
(48) Bombay Selections XXIV, pp 310-11.
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the close of the year they entered the harbour of Aseeloo, took
five large laden buggalowsi valued at three lakhs of rupees,
and murdered their crews. The inhabitants of Bushire were
thrown into the greatest consternation fearing that the Qawasim
were contemplating an attack. The Governor with great difficulty
restrained the inhabitants from leaving, and retiring further
into the interior. The Qawasim fleet remained at Aseeloo for 12
days and then proceeded to Congoon, but finding the place
prepared to receive them, they weighed anchor, and, standing to
northward, anchored off Daire, where they landed and destroyed a
number of date trees.
	
They were repulsed, however, by the
inhabitants, and obliged to take to their boats. Generally,
however, they met with little real opposition and their vessels
proved more speedy than their opponents.
The expedition of 1809, then, had demonstrably not been as
successful as Warden made out; far from being "rendered quite
incapable of committing any further depredation by sea" the
Qawasim had renewed their activity with greater vigour over a
wider range; attempts to . cajole them into peaceful ways by the
despatch of envoys from Bombay in 1816 had been a total failure.
The situation was intolerable; but it was open to. improvement.
Following the instructions of the Ottoman sultan, Egyptian forces
had penetrated the Arabian peninsula and were about to fall on
the Wahabi power base in Daraeia; were the Qawasim to lose the
backing of the Wahabi amir, an opportunity arose for their
activities to be halted provided sufficient military power was
brought to bear. The decision to do so was taken in Bombay in
the summer of 1818.
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CHAPTER SIX 
The 1819 expedition and the pacification of the Gulf 
The Bombay governments intention to end the practice of
piracy in the Gulf, whether it be off the Arab or Persian shores,
would necessarily affect its relations with Persia and Turkey if
its operation was arduous and lengthy; for political as well as
military reasons, the campaign had to be executed quickly as well
as efficiently. Accordingly the Governor of Bombay, Sir Euan
Nepean, began to collate all the necessary information on the
Gulf area relating to the Qawasim ports, their allies, their
naval and military power and especially their political disputes.
His main source of information was a report presented by Captain
Robert Taylor (Assistant Political Attache in the Turkish
territory) in the summer of 1818. The report dealt with the main
ports used by pirates on the Gulf coast, namely Ra's Al-Khaimah,
Al-Jazira, Al Hamra, Umm Al-Qawain, Ajman, Sharjah, Dubai and, to
the north, Al Zabara, Khor Hassan, Al Katif, as well as Linga,
Kharrack, Nakhilu, Luft and Bander Abbas on the Persian coast.
Nepean compared this report with one presented by Brigadier
General Lionel Smith who had been joint commander in the British
campaign against the pirates in 1809. Smith believed that in
order to achieve the destruction of the Qawasim, a campaign had
to be launched with a force of no less than 3,000 men, supported
by artillery. In addition to these reports, Nepean received some
help and advice from a number of naval officers who had worked in
the Gulf area and had been involved in operations against the
Qawasim in 1816. These officers informed him that the,Arab
seafaring tribes on the Arabian coast of the Gulf were in a
position to provide him with no less than 89 large ships and 161
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small ships, as well as a fighting force of approximately 10,000
(1)
In September 1818, after studying and discussing with
members of his command all the information he had at his disposal
relating to the Qawasim's naval power, Nepean submitted a
comprehensive report to the Governor-General of India, the
Marquis of Hastings. Accompanying his report was a proposal for
the immediate preparation of a punitive military expedition
against the Qawasim. Upon the successful outcome of this
expedition Britain would then set up a naval base in the Gulf,
thereby enforcing a system of indirect protectorship by making
the ruler of Muscat responsible for the pirate coast and
Bahrain.(2)
,
On 7 November 1818, the Governor-General sent his reply to
Nepean, expressing his personal conviction that piracy in the
Gulf had to be destroyed, but adding that the expedition needed
5,000 men and not 3,000 as proposed by Smith if it were to
accomplish its mission successfully. Such a vast fighting force,
the Governor-General added, could not be supplied by India at
that time. He therefore advised that such an expedition be
postponed until the following year. He suggested that the delay
might prove to be beneficial to the British Government,
especially following the recent news about the probable fall of
Daraeia, the Wahabi stronghold, to Ibrahim Pasha. () Such an
event Would necessarily weaken the power of the Qawasim, or at
least decrease the amount of supplies and aid they received from
I) IOR, G/29/32, Gov-in-Council to Court, 9 Aug 1820.
2) BA, Selection on Pirates in the Persian Gulf, Vol 74, 1819.
3) IOR, G129/38, Gov-Gen-in-Council to Gov-in-Council, Bombay,
7 Nov 1818.
men.
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the Wahabis as Ibrahim Pasha advanced further in the Gulf
territory. The Marquis of Hastings also stated that in his
opinion the first step towards the destruction of piracy should
be to seek the cooperation of Ibrahim Pasha. () This could be
done by sending a special envoy to congratulate him on his
victory and invite him to join forces with the British against
the Wahabi pirate ports on the southern shores of the Gulf. The
British navy would bombard the ports from the sea, while Ibrahim
Pasha's forces would attack them from the land temporarily making
Ra's Al-Khaimah their garrison town. As to the proposal that the
British should establish a naval base in the Gulf at the end of
the campaign, handing Bahrain over to the ruler of Muscat, the
Governor-General would only decide on this point when the
expedition was imminent.
The role of the Bombay Governor, he stressed, was to closely
observe the victories of Ibrahim Pasha with the aim of using them
to serve British interests in due course; at the same time, care
had to be taken that these victories did not lead to the
occupation of the Gulf sheikhdoms and Egyptian control of the
Gulf itself, similar to what had happened in the case of the Red
Sea.	 It was, therefore, important for the Governor-General to
show sympathy	 with Ibrahim Pasha at this stage.()
This reply from the Governor-General did not meet with
approval from the Governor of Bombay. The Marquis of Hastings
perceived the future stability and peace of the Gulf as linked to
Turkish-Egyptian influence, but this did not appeal to Nepean
who approved of cooperating with Ibrahim Pasha solely to attack
(4) BA, SPDD No 310 of 1819, Gov-Gen-in-Council to Bombay
Company, 7 Nov 1818.
(5) IOR, LIPS/u5, Draft to Gov-Gen-in-Council, 5 Jan 1818.
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the pirate ports. Nepean believed that peace and stability could
be achieved only through the expansion and consolidation of the
power of the ruler of Muscat; this could be achieved by awarding
him Bahrain and placing under his control the area north of Ra's
Al-Khaimah. The region stretching from Ra's Al-Khaimah in the
east to Kuwait in the west could then be placed under Turkish-
Egyptian protection. Nepean saw this demarcation as being
necessary in order not to stretch the ruler of Muscat's
resources, enabling him to face up to his enhanced responsi-
bilities and to contribute towards the expense of setting up the
British base in the Hormuz Straits, which Nepean believed to be
essential. (6)
At a meeting between Nepean and the other members of the
Council, on 13 April 1819, Nepean tried to justify his view that
it was necessary to place Bahrain under the influence of the
ruler of Muscat, even if force had to be used; indeed, force
might serve as punishment of the ruler for his readiness to
cooperate with the Qawasim. Gradually, two opposing groups began
to emerge at the meeting: those who supported Nepean and those
r
who were opposed to the idea of placing Bahrain under Omani rule.
Among the latter group was Francis Warden; he believed that the
rise in piratical activity was largely due to foolish policies
followed by the ruler of Muscat towards the independent tribes
that had often threatened his sovereignty. In Warden's opinion,
the ruler ought to show more political flexibility towards these
tribes; he also believed that the proposed military campaign
should be kept to a minimum level, and its purpose should be
limited to replacing Hussein Bin Ali as the paramount sheikh of
(6) 10R, P1383/40, Draft letter from Nepean to Gov-Gen-in-
Council, no date.
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the Qawasim by Sultan Bin Saciar who was not a Wahabi and whom he
believed to be the only man able to cooperate with the ruler of
Muscat with other Arab tribes, as well as with Persia and Turkey.
Warden agreed with Nepean on the necessity of establishing a base
on the island of Kishm, but thought that negotiations in that
respect should be conducted with the Persian government and not
with the ruler of Muscat.()
By the end of the meeting, two of the Council's members, Guy
Prendergast and Alexander Bell, agreed that the points Warden had
put forward deserved closer attention. Nepean, however, was not
prepared to be persuaded to withdraw his advocacy of reliance on
the sultan of Muscat; he did agree with Warden on one point,
namely that the British government should agree with Ibrahim
Pasha to the establishment of a base in Ra's Al-Khaimah as
suggested earlier by Hastings. However, this was to be an
unwritten agreement, made by special envoy of the Governor-
General, the envoy also to present a ceremonial sword.(8)
The man chosen for the mission was Captain George Forster
Sadlier of the 47 th
 Regiment, selected by Hastings, Governor-
General, to convey to Ibrahim Pasha an address of congratulation
on the reduction of Daraeia and the proposal for joint action
against the pirates.
On 14 April 1819, Sadlier received written instructions to
sail in the Company's cruiser Thetis, a brig of war mounting 14
guns, commanded by Captain Tanner, to land on the Arabian coast,
with two letters, one from Lord Hastings and the second from Sir
C7) BA, SPDD No 465 of 1819, Board's minute, 29 Apr 1819.
(8) IOR, P/383/40, minutes by G Prendergast, 20 Apr 1819; also
BA, SPDD No 311 of 1819, minutes by Bell and Prendergast.
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Euan Nepean, together with the ceremonial sword. Specifically,
he was to see if Ibrahim Pasha would avail himself of the British
Government's help in the reduction of the Qawasim who had become
adherents of the Wahabis. If he agreed, the suggestion was that
he should besiege Ra's Al-Khaimah by land'
 and •the British would
attack it from the sea; the Egyptians would then be allow
k
ed to
garrison the town.()
Sadlier sailed from Bombay to Muscat; the wind was light so
that he reached Muscat only on 7 May. The next day Sadlier met
the ruler of Muscat, offered him presents and the proposal for
joint action by the British, Omanis and Egyptians against the
pirates. (10)
 After several 'interviews the ruler agreed to
cooperate with the British against the Qawasim, but he strongly
refused any alliance between the Omanis and Ibrahim Pasha as he
detested the Turks as much as he did the Wahabi; also he believed
that some of the Qawasim chiefs were prepared to submit to him
and that consequently British and Omani forces would suffice. He
himself had for many years coveted the island of Bahrain with its
pearl fisheries and trade, and he feared that Ibrahim Pasha
planned to occupy it. (11) While the discussions were proceeding,
Egyptian forces arrived at Al Hassa, which served to increase his
suspicions.
After a long conference, Sadlier failed completely to
persuade the ruler of Muscat to join a tripartite alliance
between the British, the Omanis and Ibrahim Pasha: they agreed
(9) BA, SPDD No 311 of 1819, Newnham, Acting Chief Secretary to
Capt Sadlier, 13 Apr 1819.
(10) BA, SPDD No 312 of 1819, Sadlier to the ruler of Muscat, 15
May 1819.
(11) BA, SPDD No 321 of 1819, Sadlier to Gov-in-Council, Muscat
15 and 17 May 1819.
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that Omani troops would not be expected to act in conjunction
with the Ottoman forces. The principal object of the ruler was
to prevent the introduction of the Turkish army to the Gulf, but
as he could not field an equivalent force, this point was not
acceptable to the British. He naturally turned his thoughts to
forming a barrier against any future encroachments of Ibrahim
Pasha, and expressed his hopes that he would find the British
government ready to support him in this. Sadlier's reply was
invariably that the good relationship which had hitherto existed
between Mohammed Ali Pasha and the British government were to be
considered the best pledge that could be offered for the future
relations which the British government expected and hoped to see
established between Ibrahim Pasha and the ruler himself.
Sadlier spent 11 days at Muscat, and it was agreed that
Omani forces would co-operate with the British to eliminate
piracy in the Gulf; the ruler of Muscat himself would accompany
the expedition in a warship and take with him at least 1,000 men
who would land and act in conjunction with the British force. He
also agreed to cooperate by land with a force of 7,000 infantry,
130 horses and 1,500 camels to proceed by the passes above Ra's
Al-Khaimah and invade. Further, he would supply boats to assist
in the disembarkation of troops and baggage; he said that he
could not promise a greater number than 70, but that if possible
he would increase this to 100 boats, each capable of conveying
from 30 to 50 men, plus water and firewood, a sufficiency of
which would be supplied at his expense.
So far, Sadlier's mission was proving successful; Sadlier
himself, in the course of his discussions became convinced that
the power of the Qawasim was on the decline since the overthrow
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of the Wahabi amir had given rise to a lack of confidence in the
different sheikhs towards one another, and a determination of
each to advance his own interests if necessary at the expense of
his neighbour's. He was therefore was convinced that the
situation was very favourable; the lack of a leader of talent and
the confined state of the Qawasim since the overthrow of the
Wahabis was likely to breed dissension among them, and very few
of those who escaped from Daraeia had joined them.
Reporting back to Bombay, Sadlier offered his estimate of
the disposition of the Qawasim forces thus:
From the remains of the Wahabi force	 approx 300 men
At Bukha	 20 men
" Shaam	 150-200 men
" Rams	 200 men
" Ra's Al-Khaimah and Hamrah, 25 large boats, 71
small and	 3000 men
" Oomul Goweyn (ie Umm Al-Qawain), 1 large
boat, 30 small and 	 400 men
" Ajman, 4 large boats, 35 small and 	 1000 men
" Fusht and Sharjah 12 ldrge boats, 150 small and
	
1280 mn2)
" Dubai, 4 large boats, 100 small and 	 800 men
Sadlier's report was sent before he left Muscat for Bushire
aboard the cruiser Mercury, which he reached on 7 June. He
wished to have information in respect of the situation of the
Pasha's camp and also the right roads to Daraeia; he had been
informed prior to his arrival that Ibrahim Pasha was preparing to
perform the pilgrimage to Mecca immediately after the month of
Ramadan, and that it was probable he would return thence to
(12) BA, SPDD No 312 of 1819, Sadlier to Gov-in-Council, 17 May
1819.
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Egypt, an officer having been appointed to whom control of
Daraeia would be entrusted in Ibrahim Pasha's absence.(13)
It was imperative for the success of his mission that
Sadlier make contact with Ibrahim Pasha before his return to
Eypt; though the prevailing winds at that season were
unfavourable, Sadlier trusted that he would be able to accomplish
this part of the task allotted to him. Accordingly, he left
Bushire on 16 June for Al-Kateef, reaching the Arab coast at noon
on 18 June, but unfortunately he discovered that his pilot was
not well acquainted with the coast. He therefore despatched
Sheikh Khamees with a letter to the Turkish governor at Al-
Kateef, requesting a pilot to take them to Al-Ojeer, which was
nearer to Al-Hassa. On 21 June Sadlier landed at the village of
Seahat, about three miles below Al-Kateef. He found that the
Turkish officers there had little idea of the plans of Ibrahim
Pasha; they had been separated from him for a long time and their
thoughts and hopes were centred on the expectation of being
recalled. (14)
On 28 June 1819 Sadlier left Seahat accompanied by Moushraf
Bin Areer and bedouins from the Ajman tribe, despite the Turks'
advice not to trust or depend on the bedouins. Sadlier's
decision to accompany Bin Areer to Al-Hassa proved, in the event,
that the protection of bedouins was much more effective than that
of the unhelpful Turks. It was a difficult journey and Sadlier
was troubled by fatigue; he reached Al-Hassa on 11 July 1819 and
took up residence at the fort of Hufuf. After several visits to
(13) BA, SPDD No 312 of 1819, Sadlier to Gov-in-Council, Bushire,
9 Jun 1819.
(14) BA, SPDD No 312 of 1819, Sadlier to Gov-in-Council, Al-
Hassa, 17 July 1819.
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the Governor of Quaif, Sadlier learned that the ruler of Al-Hassa
had received orders to gather the remaining Turkish soldiers
(approximately 250) and send them to Ibrahim Pasha's camp at
Sedeer near Daraeia where the Pasha intended to remain for one
month; it was also confirmed that Ibrahim Pasha had attacked and
totally destroyed Daraeia, leaving nothing but smouldering
remains.	
•
Sadlier was disappointed to hear that Ibrahim Pasha had left
Al-Hassa before his arrival, for he had expected to meet him
there; after a 10 day stay, he left Al-Hassa on 21 July 1819 for
Daraeia, where he hoped to join him. After another exhausting
trip through the desert he arrived there on 13 August 1819. But
the news awaited him that Ibrahim Pasha had already left his
nearby camp and had gone ahead to Hejaz. Sadlier remained for 10
days in Daraeia, inspected the ruined town, and on 24 August
1819 he resumed his journey in pursuit of Ibrahim Pasha. After a
10 day march Sadlier arrived at Aneeze, to find it in ruins as he
had found Daraeia. After two further days he arrived at Ras
where Ibrahim Pasha had set his camp, hoping that this would be
the last station in his search, and eager to get back to Bombay
by way of Basra. But a further disappointment awaited him; he
found that Ibrahim Pasha had left Ras for Medina the day that he
had arrived in Aneeze. At that point, Sadlier requested the
Pasha's commissioner, Mohamed Efendi to convey his respects to
Ibrahim Pasha and appoint him an escort to accompany him back to
Basra, thus ending his arduous journey. Mohamed Efendi would not
comply with Sadlier's request on the pretext that he had no
instructions and could not take responsibility for such a
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dangerous matter alone.(15)
In the absence of any alternative, and still hoping to
complete his mission successfully, Sadlier accompanied the
Turkish garrison heading for Medina; at Elyar Ali, three miles
from Medina, he finally caught up with Ibrahim Pasha and gave him
the messages from the Governor-General. The Pasha seemed to take
interest in the documents and scanned them carefully and appeared
to be very pleased with the present of the sword from the
Governor-General. He was then told that the destruction of
Daraeia was in compliance with orders to his father, Mohamed Ali,
directly from the Ottoman court. While this proved the Ottoman
government's determination to crush the Wahabis, the Pasha told
Sadlier that he considered the Governor-General's proposals of
such importance that he would have to seek his father's opinion
on them. He added that he had no authorization to give replies
to official communications without Mohamed All's instructions.
Sadlier also learned from the Pasha that the ruler of Muscat had
written offering the services of his ships against the Qawasim
whenever the Pasha should need them, and that the Pasha had
written back to him twice following the fall .of Daraeia and the
advance of his force towards Al-Hassa informing him of his plans,
but that the ruler of Muscat had taken no further action.(16)
Sadlier accordingly decided to remain in Arabia until he received
Ibrahim Pasha's written reply to the Governor-General's letter.
Knowing that communication with Cairo could be very slow, Ibrahim
left Ebyar Ali for Jeddah on the Red Sea, having agreed that he
would meet Sadlier there after he had heard from Cairo. Sadlier
(15) BA, SPIN) No 312 of 1819, Sadlier to Henry Salt, H M Consul
General Egypt, 10 Sept 1819.
(16) Sadlier, G F, Diary of a Journey across Arabia during the
Year 1819, Bombay, Education Society's Press, 1866, p 99.
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himself arrived at Jeddah on 27 September, having thus traversed
the Arabian peninsula; he failed to get any information from the
Pasha with regard to the reply from Cairo which arrived on 19
October 1819.
Sadlier waited for several days for a second meetingj with
the Pasha; he then learned that the Pasha was leaving for Egypt
on 16 November. He was determined to meet the Pasha once more
before his departure and on 12 November Sadlier was finally
successful. The Pasha once more apologized for his delay in
giving his reply to Sadlier and gave as an excuse his inability
to find a trustworthy Arab scribe. He added that when his reply
was ready, it would include his regrets that such communication
between the British and Turkish governments . had not taken place
earlier as this would have enabled him better to appreciate the
British point of view. He also expressed to Sadlier his wish to
send as a gift to the Governor-General an Arab stallion and mare,
and to present Sadlier with an Arabian horse in appreciation of
his services; further, he had given instructions that a boat be
made ready to take him to . Mocha. Ibrahim Pasha then enquired of
Sadlier as to the Governor-General's full title and form of
address, upon which Sadlier gave him a copy of a letter that he
was carrying which contained these details. Among the titles
attributed to the Governor-General was that of "the Honourable";
this did not appeal to Ibrahim Pasha, who considered such a title
to be worthy only of the Prophet Mohamed. In order to maintain
the spirit of goodwill, Sadlier quickly changed it to "the
Illustrious". A few days later Sadlier learned through one of
the Pasha's relatives that the latter's gifts to the Governor-
General and to himself had already been loaded on the boat; he
was then given some items of accessories and fixtures that were
139
to accompany the Governor-General's horses. These consisted of a
headstall, a breastplate, a silver-mounted gilt saddle and a pair
of silver stirrups. On examining these, Sadlier found that they
were not new and indeed that they were well-worn; he asked that
the bearer take them back, and requested a meeting with Ibrahim
Pasha. This proved impossible; he finally met the Pasha's
private surgeon, to whom he proceeded to explain why he
considered these items to be unworthy of a man in such an exalted
position as Hastings. (17)
 To Sadlier's great surprise, orders
were given by Ibrahim Pasha for the horses to be unloaded from
the boat and for Sadlier himself to leave forthwith for Mocha;
worse still the Pasha then declared his intention upon his
arrival in Egypt to cancel the reply he was to give Sadlier and
to send a different message to the Governor-General, as well as
returning his sword. There was nothing further for Sadlier to
do; when on 1 January 1820 the cruiser, Prince of Wales arrived
in Jeddah, en route for Mocha, Sadlier decided to embark on it.
From Mocha he took ship for Bombay which he reached on 5 May
1820, after a journey . across Arabia that had lasted two
years.(18)
Looking back on these events it is clear that Ibrahim Pasha
had had no real wish to meet Sadlier: hence his continuous
movement across the desert; his abrupt dismissal of Sadlier and
of the Governor-General's proposals were more profound than his
disapproval of one of the Governor-General's titles, or the fact
that he was displeased by the comment on the quality of the
horses he was sending as a gift to the Governor-General, nor was
(17) BA, STDD No 312 of 1819, Sadlier to H Salt, Jeddah,.14 Nov
1819.
(18) Sadlier, G F, op cit, p 134.
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it the fact that the horses' accessories were returned by
Sadlier, although that might have been the pretext. The real
reason that Ibrahim Pasha was determined to avoid meeting Sadlier
in Jeddah was that he had received instructions from his father
in Cairo, in which Mohamed Ali told his son not to take Sadlier
too seriously, but only to behave carefully and wisely, this was
advice which reflected the policy of the Ottoman Sultan in
Constantinople.( 19 ) Suspicious as the Turkish government was of
British intentions in the Gulf, their apprehension was to some
extent justified, for the British had already demonstrated their
readiness to act on their own and not to wait for a favourable
response to their overtures to Ibrahim Pasha. While the latter
had been discussing presents with Sadlier, the British attack on
Ra's Al-Khaimah had already begun.
During the Sadlier expedition across the Arabian desert, no
message whatever had reached Bombay from him after his departure
from Hufuf. This made the Bombay Government Council initially
hesitant in arriving at a decision with respect to the military
expedition to eliminate the Qawasim. However the reports that
had reached the council from their sources in Bushire and earlier
from Sadlier himself suggested the unlikelihood of Ibrahim Pasha
cooperating with the British. Accordingly, Egyptian-British
cooperation was excluded, and they contented themselves with
Omani support exemplified in the cooperation of the ruler of
Muscat, who had not welcomed the proposed alliance with Ibrahim
Pasha as previously mentioned.
To avoid any misunderstanding of the objectives of the•
(19) NA, Abdin, N/O 267 letter from All Pasha, the Grand Vizier
Constantinople, to Mohamed Ali, the Viceroy of Egypt, 31 Mar
1820.
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Bombay government military expedition on the part of the Persian
government, influenced as it was by the Sheikhs of Linga, Mogoo,
Kharrack and Shiro, who - it was believed - had recently thrown
themselves into piracy operations, (20) Nepean sent Dr Andrew
Jukes, the superintending surgeon to the expedition, as an envoy
to Muscat, in October 1819. He was to enquire of the ruler, El-
Sayed Said, • whether he would allow the British expedition
to land on Kishm island and provide them with provisions and
boats for disembarking the equipment and artillery. He was also
commissioned to impart to the ruler of Muscat the magnitude of
operations that would be carried out by the expedition, and find
out whether he would take part in it, hopes of Ibrahim Pasha's
participation being faint, if not utterly excluded. Dr Jukes
reported that the ruler of Muscat was perfectly willing to
cooperate, and that he had ordered that provisions and other
requisites be collected at Bander Abbas, in addition to fitting
up 70 boats to disembark the soldiers and equipment. He had also
sent 4,000 men from the tribes to march overland towards Ra's Al-
Khaimah. He promised he would himself come out with three ships
and 600 to 800 men to take part in the naval attack upon Ra's Al-
Khaimah.( 21 ) Conciliatory letters next were sent from the
Governor of Bombay to the Governor of Shiraz and to the Persian
ruler in Bushire explaining to both of them the role and targets
of the military expedition, and urging them to cooperate with the
Bombay Government in the extermination of piracy in the Gulf.
Major General Sir William Grant Keir was selected to be the
political and military commander of the expedition to the Gulf;
at his disposal were a little over 3000 men; and the fleet
C207 Lorimer, J 	 op cit, vol I, p 660.
(21) 10R, P/383/43, Jukes, Acting Chief Secretary, to Keir, 1 Dec
1819.
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consisted of the following warships, cruisers and transport:
Warships 
HMS Liverpool	 (50 guns)
HMS Eden	 (24 guns)
HMS Curlew	 (18 guns)
Cruisers 
Teignmouth	 (16 guns)
Ternate	 (16 guns)
Benares	 (16 guns)
Aurora	 (14 guns)
Nautilus	 (14 guns)
Mercury
	
(14 guns)
Vestal
	
(10 guns)
Ariel
	 (10 guns)
Psyche
	
(10 guns)
In addition, there were 20 transport vessels; three of the
cruisers (Ternate,  Mercury and  Psyche) were already in the Gulf,
while the rest assembled in Bombay. (22)
On 27 October 1819 formal orders were given to Keir to
proceed to Ra's Al-Khaimah and seize it, to destroy the military
fleet of the Qawasim and leave them without any vessel that could
be used in any military or naval action. (23) He was also to
leave a British garrison at Ra's Al-Khaimah whether Ibrahim Pasha
took part in the attack or not. 	 Furthermore, Keir was
(22) BA, SPDD No 312 of 1819, Historical sketch of the Qawasim
from 1819 to 1831 by Lt. S Hennen.
(23) BA, SPDD No 314 of 1819, instructions issued by Bombay
Government.
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ordered after the occupation of Ra's Al-Khaimah to continue to
Rams, Sharjah, Al Jazera, Al-Hamra, Ajman and other ports
supporting the Qawasim, and to destroy the ships there even
though these might be at such ports as Linga and Kharrack on the
Persian side.
There were restrictions imposed upon the Bombay forces,
precluding them from any operations far from the places where the
pirates' vessels were stationed, save in exceptional circum-
stances. With respect to the Persian coast, they were to observe
extreme prudence in order not to infringe the Persian
government's sovereignty.( 24 ) The final military instructions
were for Keir to seek the most appropriate place for erection of
a permanent British base in the Gulf zone; as regards political
measures to be taken by Keir, these would be provided for later
on; this was due to the divergence of opinion in the government
council in Bombay already referred to.
If during the period the political attitude of the British
government in Bombay vis--vis the Gulf and its countries
changed, it is also true that the political attitudes of the
Qawasim and others evolved. Thus, when Hassan Ibn Rahama, the
ruler of Ra's Al-Khaimah, came to learn of the military
expedition currently being prepared in Bombay, of the fall of
Daraeia at the hands of Ibrahim Pasha and the decline of Wahabi
influence and of the attempt by Sultan Bin Saciar, the ruler of
Sharjah, and Rashed Ibn Hemaid, the ruler of Dubai, both of whom
had been considered the Qawasim's allies, to make an alliance
with the ruler of Muscat, he resolved to ask for aid and
(24) Lorimer, J G, op cit, vol I, p 661.
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assistance from the ruler of Linga. Ra's Al-Khaimah, the most
strongly fortified town on the Gulf coast, stood on a narrow
isthmus running north-east. Some three or four miles in length
and less than a mile wide, it had the open sea on one side, and
on the other, a creek which provided safe anchorage for dhows.
On the sea side it was protected by a long sand bank like a
breakwater enclosing a strip of deep water, where light dhows
could anchor close below the town walls. At the mouth of the
creek, there was a bar only passable at high tide, which rose and
fell about six feet. Warships, such as the Liverpool, thus had
to lie in the open roadstead, where they would be exposed to the
force of the northeast wind.
In the years following the 1809 expedition, fortifications
had been built in the form of walls with crenellated towers at
intervals, the towers mounted with cannon taken from captured
ships. The walls were made of coral stone and mud, and were as
much as 15 feet wide at the base, narrowing towards the top. On
the land side the walls extended to the edge of the creek with
strong towers at each corner. In the centre of this wall was the
town gate, defended by two square towers. The citadel, a high,
massive building, made of stone, faced the gate, and was
considered the strongest building on the Gulf. (25)
 The number of
the Qawasim at Ra's Al-Khaimah as assessed at the time amounted
to roughly 7,000. However, at the beginning of the military
expedition the number of fighting men was nearly 4,000. The
rest, women, children and the old, were moved to palm
plantations, whilst Hassan Ibn Rahama, his brother Ibrahim and
to
their supporters made ready confront the invasion.
A
(25) Lorimer, J G, op cit, vol I, p 666 footnote 1.
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The real enemy of the expedition was disease; the transports
were packed, their sailing qualities varied; no one could
forecast the length of the voyage. Extra vessels had been taken
on to provide hospital ships, for malaria was always present and
an outbreak of cholera or scurvy could inflict more casualties
than the Qawasim. After disease, the next problem was water,
then the provision of fresh food; and behind all was the
necessity to strike speedily.(26)
On Tuesday 13 November 1819, Sir William Grant Keir boarded
the Liverpool and sailed from Bombay for the Gulf, accompanied by
Curlew and Aurora. The rest of the expedition vessels followed
him a few days later; when the fleet arrived at the place
designated outside the island of Kishm, General Keir proceeded to
Muscat on board the Liverpool to meet the ruler7 returning after
he had obtained a promise from the ruler that he would offer the
necessary assistance to the British expedition: 4,000 men to
besiege Ra's Al-Khaimah from the land, as well as two military
vessels and 600 men to escort Keir, and provisions and water for
the forces.( 27 ) Upon Keir's arrival at the island of Qashim, he
was surprised to find that certain vessels of the military
expedition had not yet arrived from Bombay; he resolved
accordingly to utilize the period of waiting for the arrival of
the vessels in exploring the roads leading to Ra's Al-Khaimah.
On 24 November a violent wind blew, compelling the military
vessels to resort to an anchorage off the island of Kharrack next
to the island of Kishm in the Strait of Hormuz. Four days later
(26) BA, SPDD No 312 of 1819, Bombay President's and Councillor's 
Minutes on the expedition against the pirates on the Arab and
ersian	 coasts), 21 July
(27) BA, SPDD No 312 of 1819, Ruler of Muscat's proceedings
against Ra's Al-Khaimah.
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the Liverpool set course for Ra's Al-Khaimah with a view to
seeking a suitable place for disembarking the force. When
Liyea221, commanded by Captain Collier, and Eden, commanded by
Captain Loch, arrived off the coast, the peninsula was encircled
preventing either entrance or exit. Some Qawasim ships were
noticed trying to enter the port by night on 30 November, but
were prevented from doing so. On 1 December the Omani fleet
commanded by the ruler of Muscat arrived. The fleet was com-
posed of three big vessels and 600 combatants from among the
tribesmen. The following day the expedition arrived at Ra's Al-
Khaimah and at 5 o'clock in the morning of 3 December boats,
loaded with troops, moved in a long line towards the beach, with
gunboats on the flanks.(28)
There was little resistance from the Qawasim to the
landing, due to the feint attacks conducted by the Nautilus and
one of the transports which came close to the Gulf entrance and
fired at the town from the eastern side; the inhabitants had not
expected such a number of vessels to disembark troops in such a
short time.	 As daylight broke,	 boats landed the troops
unopposed, two miles south-west of the town. By evening, all the
stores and equipment were ashore, including two howitzers and two
six-pounder guns. The vessels of the ruler of Muscat played a
paramount role in the landing and his men were invaluable for
their help in disembarking guns and ammunition. The following
day, the expedition made ready to shell Ra's Al-Khaimah, while
the Qawasim withdrew within the city.
Before nightfall, a detachment of the 65 th Battalion
(28) 10R, Boards Collections, F/4/Vol 651, Colln 17855, Kier to
Adjutant-Gen, Bombay Army, Ra t s Al-Khaimah, 9 Dec 1819.
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succeeded in advancing up to a distance of 25 yards from the
large quadrangular citadel to reconnoitre. An advanced rampart
made of sandbags was set up with a battery of four big guns, 300
yards distant from the southern tower; to its right a . battery of
mortars was set. (29) Throughout the day, shelling from the
government ships was continuous supported by the British land
batteries.	 The Qawasim succeeded, however, in destroying the
sandbag rampart of the British battery. During the night,
Collier brought the Liverpool as close to the town as possible,
and the next day (5 December), shelling from both sides, became
more intense. The land batteries concentrated on the north-
west corner of the main tower, and expected to demolish it
without much difficulty, but this solid piece of masonry stood up
against the gunfire without any signs of a breach. In the
evening, the atmosphere worsened, and morale on both sides fell:
the British feared a suicide attack and the Qawasim realised
their position was hopeless. On 6 December the British once more
began to shell the town and its strongholds; their 18-pounders
began breaching the fort, while a couple of howitzers in the
battery of the right and a few six-pounders played on the defence
of the towers.
The Qawasim reply to this bombardment was weak owing to a
serious lack of ammunition; they even fired huge stones from
their guns and when the British guns discontinued the shelling,
they hastened to gather the shells which had not exploded. They
succeeded however in resisting the attacks. During the night,
after other guns had been disembarked from the fleet with a view
(29) Lorimer, J G, op cit, vol I, p 666.
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to intensifying the shelling, a suicide group from the Qawasim
commanded by Ibrahim Ibn Rahama, the brother of the ruler of the
town, attacked and took the British position. They also occupied
a mortar battery and succeeded in moving one of the howitzers
approximately a hundred yards. Later, Major Warren succeeded in
re-taking the position with a group from the 65 th Regiment,
though only after a fierce battle; at . least 90 Qawasim were
killed, including Ibrahim Ibn Rahama. Before dawn, the Qawasim
launched another attack; this time it was repulsed.
The operation had now extended over four days; the Bombay
artillery kept on shelling Ra's Al-Khaimah from its positions but
General Keir decided that bombarding from ships did not have any
positive effect: he therefore disembarked several 24-pounders, as
well as new forces to consolidate the land forces already
present. Two of the Liverpool's great guns, the 24-pounders from
the main deck, were brought ashore and two 18-pounders were
placed in the battery on the left; they were manned by specially
trained seamen and on 8 December they went into action. This had
a deadly effect; and the citadel towers began to be damaged,
while the Qawasim found that the unexploded shells did not fit
their guns, being too big, and therefore they could only use
small grenades and stones.
By evening, the shore guns had breached the walls. During
the night of 18 December, there were parleys between the General
and an envoy of Sheikh Hassan Ibn Rahama about the possible
surrender of the town, but it appeared that the object of the
pirates was to gain time: no agreement was reached. On 9
December at dawn, firing was resumed and this time a breach made
in the citadel. A group of British sailors followed by forces
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under the command of Captain Mariott rushed into the breach,
broke into the towers and hoisted the British flag. No
resistance whatever was encountered; the Qawasim had retreated to
the hills during the, night. Thus Ra's Al-Khaimah was occupied;
and not only that, but 80 ships of up to 250 tons were taken.
Sixty-two guns were also captured on shore, including one 24-
pounder.(30)
The action had taken six days; faced with the loss of his
fortified base, his ships and his artillery, the ruler of Rats
Al-Khaimah had no alternative other than to surrender. He
declared to General Keir his desire to give himself and his
followers up on the understanding that the British government
would guarantee their safety. His request being granted, he
presented himself to General Keir's camp accompanied by four of
his entourage on 10 December and was placed in confinement until
further specific instructions. (31) Meanwhile, the British forces
destroyed the citadel and the remaining fortifications; The
house of the ruler and the contiguous buildings were kept to
serve as accommodation for the soldiers. General Keir did not
deem it wise to destroy the vessels that had been captured by the
British forces; indeed, he used nine of these ships with British
seamen on board; these ships were subsequently permanently taken
over by the British. The Qawasim casualties in the siege
amounted to 400 killed and wounded; British casualties were four
soldiers killed and one wounded. Qawasim casualties might have
(30) For the action of Ra's Al-Khaimah, see IOR, Boards
Collections, F/4/Vol 651, Cohn 17855, Keir to Adj-Gen, TFIErgi7
Army, Ra's Al-Khaimah, 9 Dec 1819 and also BA, Political Dept 
Diary, No 469 of 1819 (Operation against Persian Gulf Pirates).
(31) 10R, Saldanha, J A, Precis of Correspondence regarding the 
affairs of the Persian Gulf, (1801 - 53), p 103
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been greater had the Omani land force arrived as they abandoned
the town; they arri tyed two days after Ra's Al-Khaimah had been
seized. At the request of General Keir, they returned to their
country because of the scarcity of provisions and in case their
presence should lead to increased problems; nonetheless the ruler
of Muscat remained up to 7 January.
The fall of Ra's Al-Khaimah was not the end of the Bombay
expedition to the Gulf; it was intended to destroy the Qawasim
power wherever it was to be found. General Keir therefore
decided to move against certain small towns on the Arab coast
where some strongholds and citadels were likely to be found and
which protected the Qawasim and their ships. When the expedition
arrived at Rams, a small coastal village several miles north of
Ra's Al-Khaimah where there were a number of Qawasim vessels, the
Curlew, Nautilus, Aurora and two transport vessels blockaded the
town until the arrival of the rest of the force. (32) When the
British landed, they found it empty of inhabitants. Sheikh
Hussein Ibn Aly and his followers had retreated to the village of
Al-Dayah on one of the heights at a small entrance of the Gulf
two miles from the sea. There they strengthened their position
in one of the ancient citadels well known for the solidity of its
fortifications. () The number of combatants in this stronghold
was assessed at nearly 400 men; it was situated on a steep and
rugged hill and commanded the passes over the mountains and the
road to • the south-west along the shore, and was thought by the
Arabs to be too high for the elevation of the British guns. The
British commanders judged that the defeat of this "invincible"
C32) Lorimer, J G 9 op 0it 9 Vol 1 9 pp 667-8.
(33) BA, SPDD No 315 of 1820, Keir to Warden (fall of Ra's Al-
Khaimah), 6 Jan 1820.
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fortress would destroy the morale of the Qawasim in the other
parts of the country; a task force to destroy it was created
under the command of Major Warren. He was given the 65th
Regiment under Captain Dunlop Digby, the flank companies of the
1st/2nd Native Infantry under Captain John Cocke, and a force
ordinance commanded by Lieutenant William Morky of the Bombay
Artillery, consisting of two brass 12-pounders, four field pieces
and eight-inch mortars.
On 18 December, the British forces marched on Al-Dayah.
General Keir arrived the same day, accompanied by Captain
Collier, on board the Liverpool, in order himself to supervise
the course of operations. In the evening, the expedition marched
towards the citadel; the Qawasim opened fire to repulse them. On
19 December during the shelling, the Qawasim retreated to the
stronghold, fighting every inch of the way. When Sheikh Hassan
Ibn Aly was called to surrender he did not respond; though the
mortars had been shelling the citadel uninterruptedly, no damage
whatever was caused to it; the fortification and defences were
stronger than the British expedition had anticipated.	 Con-
sequently, the British commanders were compelled to bring
reinforcements from the 47 th Regiment and the 1 5t Battalion, 3'
Native Infantry. More importantly, two 24-pounders were landed
from Liverpool, and with great difficulty were hauled by sailors
from Curlew up the hill from Rams to Al-Dayah. In the evening,
the 24-pounders were ready to breach the fort on the north-east
and the 12-pounders were directed toward the sheikh's house to
the west; the shelling began the following day and on 22 December
at noon the citadel wall was breached and the citadel
surrendered. Within a couple of hours, the capture of Al-Dayah
was complete; fifteen guns were found and seized. Warren entered
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and hoisted the British flag above the citadel and the house of
the ruler after he and the defenders had surrendered on condition
that their lives would be spared; the number of prisoners taken
was estimated at 398 men and 400 women and children. General
Keir ordered the release of a number of prisoners who had had
nothing to do with the fighting, allowing them to go with their
families to the village of Shemeil close to Seir. Only 169 men,
including Sheikh Hussein Ibn Aly and the elements closely
connected with him remained in captivity; they were removed to
Ra's Al-Khaimah then placed in confinement with the others. The
British forces casualties amounted to four killed including one
officer and 16 wounded, one of whom died later.( )
 Having
destroyed the citadel, the house of Sheikh Hussein Ibn Aly and
all the other fortifications, the expedition then returned to
Ra's Al-Khaimah on 26 December.
Once back, General Keir considered how to reach a political
settlement with the Qawasim, which would ensure that they were no
longer a threat on the seas, in particular between Basra and
Bombay. He was increasingly concerned with the fate of the
captive leaders, including Hassan Ibn Rahama and Hussein Ibn Aly,
particularly when he realised a few days after the confinement of
Hassan Ibn Rahama that there was grave disruption among the Arabs
because of his capture; he realized that a continuation of his
captivity would result in political obstruction to good relations
with the inhabitants of the neighbouring regions, relations which
had to be based on trust and peace. ()
 Accordingly as Keir had
(34) 10R, Boards Collections, F/4/Vol 651, Cohn No 17855.
(35) 10R, Saldanha, J A, Precis of Correspondence Regarding the 
Affairs of the Persian Gulf, (1801-53), p 154.
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not received any new instructions relating to the measures to be
taken after the completion of the military expedition, he decided
to set Hassan Ibn Rahama free on condition that he would not
repeat his' previous behaviour. It was a shrewd move; the
decision was welcomed by the inhabitants who demonstrated their
trust in Keir in return, by coming in large numbers to buy rice
and dates that they had left in Ra's Al-Khaimah.
Other judgements proved equally well grounded; the fall of
Al-Dayah, considered by the Arabs to be impregnable was an
important factor in the Arab coast surrender to General Keir, as
was the decision of a group of Qawasim after the fall and overall
destruction of Ra's Al-Khaimah to choose peace rather than fight
the British forces. Sheikh Qadib Ibn Ahmed, the ruler of Jazerat
Al-Hamra, came to Ra's Al-Khaimah after he had been granted safe-
conduct to offer his surrender. He was followed by Sheikh Sultan
Bin Sager, of Sharjah on 5 January 1820 and Mohamed Ibn Hassah,
the ruler of Dubai, who was not more than nine years old. The
rest of the sheikhdoms surrendered in succession, namely Sheikh
Shakhbut Ibn Dhiyab, father of Tahnun Ibn Shakhbut, the ruler of
Abu Dhabi from El-Buflah, and the Sheikhs of Ajman and Umm Al-
Qawain. It was a total capitulation; the whole operation had
lasted barely a month, and the Bombay forces had clearly
demonstrated that any further resistance was useless.
The troups could not, however, be kept at length on station
in the Gulf; the weather also was worsening and the fleet had
completed its task. Mindful of saving time, General Keir
hastened, as a first step, to enter into primary treaties with
all those rulers who had surrendered, dealing with each one
separately, stipulating the special commitments pledged by each
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sheikh.	 General Keir imposed as a condition that these
treaties be signed prior to the time at which each sheikh should
re-enter into a detailed peace treaty. The first among the
sheikhs who signed a preliminary treaty was Sheikh Sultan Bin
Saqar, the ruler of Sharjah, on 6 January 1820, followed by
Hassan Ibn Rahama, the ruler of Ra's Al-Khaimah on 8 January,
then successively the legal guardian of Mohamed Ibn Hassah, the
boy Sheikh of Dubai on 9 January, Sheikh Shakhbut Ibn Dhiyab on
11 January and on 15 January the Sheikh of Rams, Hussein Ibn Aly,
who had been freed with his supporters with a view to
facilitating negotiations in case he should die in captivity
after disease had spread among the prisoners.
The preliminary treaty concluded with Sultan Bin Sagar,
incorporated four clauses stipulating that he should hand over to
General Keir the strongholds, guns and vessels kept at Sharjah,
Ajman and Umm Al-Qawain, and any captives in the zones
subordinated to him )
 and should prohibit his ships from sailing.
In compensation, the General would leave at his disposal the
boats designed for pearling and fishing; the rest of the ships
were to be at the disposal of Keir. As an added inducement, the
expedition forces were not to be allowed to destroy the towns.
After the fulfilment of these commitments, Sultan Bin Saciar would
be allowed to enter into a general peace treaty. The treaty
concluded with Hassan Ibn Rahama, though similar to the treaty
signed by Sultan Bin Saciar, contained his recognition of the
British occupation of Ra's Al-Khaimah and the strongholds in the
palm plantations close to them. The preliminary treaty concluded
with the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi left the citadel and towers
untouched out of consideration for the ruler of Muscat who had
asked this favour but it was also stipulated that the ships in
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dependent zones must be handed over; the preliminary treaty
concluded with Hassan Ibn Aly did not differ significantly from
this. To monitor the capability and willingness of the sheikhs
to execute their commitments, General Keir determined that
British vessels patrol the Arab coast; they would also destroy
any actual or potential pockets of resistance.
Thus, on 17 January 1820 a garrison of 800 sepoys and some
artillery were left at Ra's Al-Khaimah and the expedition turned
to the other Qawasim ports. Jazirat Al-Hamra was found deserted,
but the fortifications and larger vessels were destroyed at
Dubai. It was then reported that 10 pirate vessels had taken
refuge in Bahrain, and a naval force was sent to destroy them
there; they met with no resistance and accomplished their
mission. (36)
	
The operation was not entirely without incident,
however, for in the course of the descent on Bahrain, three
vessels had been observed in Asseeloo on the Persian coast; two
were from Kharrack and one from Dubai. Loch, Captain of the Eden
promptly captured them and burned the vessels from Kharrack.
Later, finding two more armed ships from Linga in Congoon, he
ordered that they also be burned.
To avoid embarassment with the Persian authorities, Keir
arranged for Bruce the British resident in Bushire, to determine
whether the inhabitants of the ports Kharrack and Linga had been
responsible for piracy; Bruce reported back that the people of
Kharrack had plundered a ship that had been wrecked near Qais in
1814.
	 A second such incident had been committed by the
inhabitants of Linga the following year.
	 Under the circum-
stances, Keir deemed it prudent not to proceed to extend his
(36) Lorimer, J G, op cit, vol I, p 669.
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search-and-destroy policy to the Persian side of the Gulf; an
added consideration was that the Governor of Bombay thought the
enterprise risky and indeed in March ordered that the owners of
the ships destroyed by Loch be indemnified.)
Keir had already got the signatures of the rulers of the
sheikhdoms to a general peace treaty supplementing the bilateral
preliminary instruments; it was brief, consisting of 11 clauses;
its opening words were:
"In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.
Praise be to God, who hath ordained peace to be a blessing
to his creatures. There is established a lasting peace
between the British Government and the Arab tribes, who are
parties to this contract on the following conditions: • • ."
Article I of the treaty prohibited acts of piracy and made a
distinction between robbery, piracy and legitimate war; article
III compelled the Arabs to hoist a distinctive flag on their
ships while article IV expounded the British political role in
the Gulf. The measures to be taken on the Arab ships, to spread
discipline and peace on the seas, was stipulated in Article V.
In the remaining clauses, the treaty dealt' with the question of
peace in the region through the commitment of the Arab tribes on
the Gulf coast to the principles of humane conduct and
cooperation with the British Government; article VI prohibited
slave trading. The treaty concluded by affirming the liberty of
the reconciled sheikhs to visit the European ports in India with
the guarantee of protection against any aggression, and affirming
the necessity of signing the treaty once more from time to
time. (38)
The first to sign. the general treaty was Hassan Ibn Rahama,
(37) IOR, P1383/46, Minutes by Elphinstone, 15 March 1820.
(38) See Appendix D.
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who had been refused recognition as Sheikh of Ra's Al-Khaimah
when the preliminary treaty permitted British occupation; he was
however acknowledged as ruler of Al-Khatt and Al-Falahia, two
locations contiguous to Ra's Al-Khaimah. General Keir then
convoked him in the afternoon of the same day in his capacity as
a ruler of Al-Khatt and Al-Falahia to sign the general peace
treaty, signed also on the same day and at the same place by
Hassan Ben Rahama and Qadib Ibn Ahmed.
	 On 11 January Sheikh
Shakhbut Ibn Dhiyab signed; Hussein Ibn Aly signed at Rams on 15
January. Zayed Ibn Seif signed on behalf of his nephew, the
Sheikh of Abu Dhabi in Sharjah on 28 January, Sultan Bin Saciar
in Sharjah on 4 February. The next day, an envoy of the Sheikh
of Bahrain came to Sharjah and signed. Lastly, Rashed Ibn
Hamid, the Sheikh of Ajman and Abdulla Ibn Nahshan, the Sheikh of
Umm Al-Qawain signed the treaty at El-Falahia on 15 March.
The terms of the general treaty reveal that General Keir had
in some way been compelled to adapt to existing circumstances; he
had not received any instructions from his government relating to
the expedition after the fulfilment of its mission. His personal
desire was to give the British government a greater opportunity
to pursue their policy vis-a-vis the sheikhdoms on the basis of
fraternity and mutual cooperation after the Qawasim's political
and military force had been definitively suppressed. Once this
was done, their independence could be recognised while providing
Britain with the right of political and military interference in .
their affairs. His approach did not however please the ruler of
Muscat who considered the settlement to be greatly indulgent vis-
a-vis the Qawasim. The instructions from the Bombay government
for which Keir had been impatiently waiting, were issued by
Elphinstone, the Governor-in-Council who had succeeded Nepean,
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shortly after the despatch of the military expedition; they
arrived on 28 January. The instructions consisted of an extract
of Elphinstone's recommendations which he had sent to the
Governor-General on 15 December with regard to the policy that
must be followed by General Keir in the Gulf. () They confirmed
the policy of destroying all Qawasim bases in the Gulf and of
appointing a local agent at Ra's Al-Khaimah to make sure of the
commercial character of every ship leaving; furthermore, Keir was
to foster the Qawasim's commercial spirit by allowing them freely
to visit Indian ports. In any event, all the ships in the Gulf
would be subject to regular inspection by the British fleet;
British ships should be allowed to enter the port of Ra's Al-
Khaimah at any time, and British armed ships should consolidate
their position at the port entrance, or any neighbouring
entrance.
Elphinstone also suggested that Hassan Ibn Rahama be
discharged from the sheikhdom and a successor, willing to comply
with British policy be nominated. Furthermore, all petty states
on the eastern coast of the Gulf, which had been subordinated to
the Persian government prior to the Qawasim supremacy, were to
return to their former allegiance; the ownership of the Al-Seer
was to be assigned to the government of Muscat. Elphinstone also
stressed the importance of creating a permanent British base in
the Gulf, important for exerting direct control over the Gulf,
since a naval force positioned at such a base would enable the
British government to watch over the ports of the Gulf and sieze
any ship having a military character. Finally, Keir was to pro-
hibit the importing of timber for shipbuilding from India to any
(94) 10R, P1383/53, Gov-in-Council to Gov-Gen-in-Council, Bombay,
15 Dec 1819.
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part of the Gulf.(40)
Keir judged these instructions not inconsistent with the
settlements made with the sheikhs of the region and the treaty he
had concluded with them and accordingly sent Elphinstone a copy,
hoping that it meet with his approval. The Governor, however,
who had eulogised General Keir's command of the military
operation and supported the humanity of his subsequent policy,
disapproved of the settlement owing to General Keir's "immoderate
tolerance" of the Qawasim, particularly with respect to setting
free the two leaders Hassan Ibn Rahama and Hussein Ibn Aly, as
well as the lack of such provisions as the destruction of
military vessels and strongholds. The rules for the regulation
of shipping in the Gulf were perceived as the weak points in the
treaty, since they did not provide an adequate guarantee of the
Qawasim's further good behaviour; the documents and statements
referred to in the treaty only incorporated reference to the port
from which the ship had sailed. In Elphinstone's opinion, to
be more effective these statements should have stipulated that a
deterrent punishment would be inflicted upon ships with either
false papers or no papers all. As for the rest, clauses which
appeared beneficial, such as the pledge to abstain from
practising piracy and slave trading, Elphinstone deemed as
illusory since there were no firm guarantees that they would be
adhered to. As things stood, however, Elphinstone did not have
any opportunity to change the treaty; any alteration would have
beeen considered by the Arab signatories as a violation of what
had been agreed. Hence Elphinstone had no alternative other than
to ask the Governor-General to ratify, which was done without
(40) IOR, P7383/32.
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further amendment. (41)
General Keir only received Elphinstone's critical comments
on his way back to Bombay, after the termination of the
expedition. He did not hesitate to defend vehemently his action
and the settlement concluded with the Arabs and wrote a report in
reply to the points to which Elphinstone had objected. He sent
it to the government in Bombay on 11 April 1820. In the report,
he agreed with Elphinstone's point on piracy, that one could not
rely on promises alone; for this very reason the naval force in
charge of the patrol in the Gulf must be on the alert, keep a
good watch and suppress the first indication of any return to
piracy, the more so because Article II of the treaty had
stipulated that capital punishment and confiscation of property
should be inflicted on any one committing piratical acts. He
argued that one could not say that the treaty failed to specify
the punishment to be inflicted on anyone not observing the treaty
provisions; as for the destruction of the strongholds and the
Qawasim ships, this constituted one of the most important and
essential results of the expedition and had been underscored by
the treaty itself.
As for the critical comments pertaining to his treating the
captives with indulgence and setting Hussein Ibn Aly and his
followers at liberty, this was in the first place due to the fact
that a great number of them suffered from illness and wounds, and
had therefore been released lest their death in captivity should
lead to disagreeable political consequences.	 Moreover, they
(41) IOR, Saldanha, J A, op cit, (report from Keir to Gov-in-
Council, 11 Apr 1820), pp 1 -
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surrendered of their own free will and pledged their allegiance
to Keir after they had witnessed • his behaviour towards the
captives and his setting a great number of them at liberty at Al-
Dayah. Had they anticipated the rigorous restriction imposed by
Elphinstone, they would not have acted in this manner. Moreover,
General Keir stated in his report that had the Qawasim declined
to surrender, he would have been compelled to enter a long war
with them, an eventuality in conflict with the instructions
ordering him to distance himself from the coast as quickly as
possible. As for the replacement of existing leaders by others,
this would require that the British government continue to
bolster up and support them, a matter which would involve the
government in the domestic problems of the tribes and would lead
to more interference in the region in the future; concerning the
prohibition on wood from India and in particular ship timber,
General Keir deemed that the British government was in a position
to impose such a prohibition in India itself; there was no need
to make reference to it in a treaty with the Qawasim. Moreover,
any measures the Government might like to impose or enforce,
could be imposed at any time provided they were in accord with
the general spirit of the treaty
In March 1820, most of the military vessels returned to
Bombay, annogncing the end of the British naval expedition to the
Qawasim ports. Since Keir had not received any instructions to
establish an island as a British base he had no alternative but
to leave a British garrison in Ra's Al-Khaimah, no fewer than
1160 men with 40 gunners and an artillery battery, 60 sailors and
160 European infantrymen. He appointed Captain Thompson from the
(42) Lorimer, J G, op cit, pp 673-4.
•(42)
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cavalry squadron head of this garrison, before leaving the Gulf
on 46 March 1820 and returning to Bombay. (43) Subsequently,
orders were given to Thompson to remove his forces to the island
of Kishm after asking permission from the ruler of Muscat, and to
evacuate the region of Ra's Al-Khaimah after ensuring that no
fortifications were left there. He was then to deliver the town
to Sheikh Sultan Bin Sagar or any other suitable local
sheikh. (44) On 18 July 1820 Thompson and his forces departed
from Ra's Al-Khaimah in the direction of Kishm; Sultan Bin Sagar
refused to be ruler over Ra's Al-Khaimah and by default it
reverted to Hassan Bin Rahama.
The British forces were not however able to stay on the
island of Kishm owing to the insalubrious climate and problems
raised by the Persian government over the occupation. These
factors led the Bombay government and the Governor-General to
consider a plan for a naval presence in the Gulf consisting of
six armed vessels, three of which would take the island of Qais
as a base and patrol the Arab ports from Rams to Dubai on a
regular basis, and two to carry messages and envoys between
Muscat and Basra. The sixth would be devoted to communications
with Bombay. At the end of 1821, the British government accepted
the plan and agreed that Qais should be the base from which the
patrol ships operated owing to its proximity to the Arab coast; a
small storehouse was erected for supplies , and an anchorage built
for the armed boats guarded by a small group of Indian soldiers.
(43) 10R, P/383/32.
(44) BA, SPDD No 316 of 1820, Warden to officer commanding
withdrawal of British troops from Ra's Al-Khaimah to Qashim, 13
Apr 1820.
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While less than the military base originally envisaged, the
naval patrol proved entirely adequate to police the Gulf now that
the Qawasim power had been destroyed and in consequence their
pre-eminence in the Gulf sheikhdoms ended. Ibrahim Pasha had put
an end to the first Saudi state and in so doing had dramatically
increased Qawasim vulnerability to the British; the British for
their part, notwithstanding the early reservations of the
Governor of Bombay on the durability of Keir's pacification, by
their readiness to accommodate Qawasim commerce encouraged their
acceptance of a diminished political role in the Gulf as Wahabism
lost its drive to expand. At the beginning of the nineteenth
century, fears of a French penetration of the Gulf as a
preliminary to penetration of India had meant that the Gulf had
remained high on the security agendas of the home governments in
London and of the governors of Bombay and the governors-general
in Calcutta; with this spectre removed in 1815 with the defeat of
Napoleon at Waterloo, subsequent concerns involving other powers
notably Germany led to the elaboration of further treaties and
truces so that what had been known as the Pirate coast became the
Trucial coast. Content to police the waters and to keep out of
tribal politics on the peninsula itself, British influence was to
remain pre-eminent for a century and a half; it rested on action
over a few months in 1819, which brought to an end the
pretensions of the Qawasim.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusions 
This study set out to examine the political impact of the
Qawasim from the middle of the eighteenth century until their
power was destroyed at the hand of the British in 1820. The
conventional wisdom of such writers as Lorimer and later Kelly
was that the British were motivated by a desire to keep open an
important commercial and mail route and that the Qawasim while
professing Wahabism were mainly motivated by considerations of
piratical plunder. While partly true, these are incomplete
explanations, as is the counter-argument that the Qawasim were
proto-nationalists concerned to forge one nation in the Gulf,
only peripherally interested in the proceeds of piracy and much
more influenced by the desire to maintain their commerce from the
ruthless competition of the East India Company; the most recent
sustained argument to this end published by Al-Qasimi in 1986 has
the revelatory title "The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf". Both
sides to the conflict had more subtle motives relating to the
broader political environment.
The British on the one hand were engaged in bitter rivalry
if not actual warfare with France throughout the period under
review; the only interludes of peace were the years 1748-1756,
1763-1777 and 1783-1789. Losing their Canadian empire to the
British in the Western hemisphere led to the French helping to
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deprive Britain of her American colonies in the War of
Independence; in the Eastern hemisphere the British were able to
consolidate themselves in the Carnatic and Bengal and to confirm
their role as legatees of the Portuguese in Bombay. French
advisers however still fanned anti-British sentiment in the
central Mahratta states as well as training native armies. The
trading companies of both countries jockeyed for position in the
Gulf, notably in Persia and the British in particular kept a
close watch on the desert mail which accompanied overland trade
from Basra to the Mediterranean. Providing as they did the bulk
of the political reporting available to the authorities in
Britain and in India, British company agents ensured that their
interests were high on the policy agenda in both places.
Napoleon's Egyptian campaign at the turn of the century ensured
that for the next 15 years the security of the land route to
India via the Gulf coastline became a major preoccupation; even
with Napoleon safe in St Helena and the fear of French
penetration removed, the British were prepared to take the
opportunity to put their security on a permanent and sound basis;
the opportunity was created by the piratical activity of the
Qawasim and the erosion of Wahabism in Arabia by Ibrahim Pasha.
The Qawasim, on the other hand have most recently been
portrayed by Al-Qasimi as early Arab nationalists, whose main
political goal was to unify the Arab side of the Gulf and whose
main economic thrust was to expand their share of the trade in
the Gulf and the north-west Indian Ocean. Both were important;
but both were the outcome of the espousal of Wahabism by the
Qawasim at a time when the collapse of Persian power gave them
the chance to establish themselves as the predominant naval power
in the Gulf, and when tribal rivalry on land coupled with the
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zeal to expand Wahabism provided the opportunity for the Qawasim
to establish themselves as the predominant grouping on land while
legitimising their attack on shipping by appealing to the -jihad 
against unbelievers.
4
Thus, motives of both British and Qawasim policy were mixed.
Incensed as the East India Company was at the treatment of Hindu
crews taken by the Qawasim, they were concerned with the
immediate aspects of activity they could only accept as piracy,
being unable to accept the concept of jihad. The attitude of the
governments in Britain and India were coloured by longer term
considerations relating to the security of India; once these were
relaxed following the defeat of Napoleon and the crushing of
Qawasim power, they took care not to • become embroiled in the
seething politics of the peninsula while maintaining an
essentially police role at sea.
That which confirmed the British success in 1820 and the
subsequent pacification was the moderation of Keir as made
manifest in the readiness not to inflict punishment and in the
terms of the general treaty; readiness to open Indian ports to
Qawasim vessels now no longer supported by warships reduced
hostility and made them as much as the British beneficiaries of
the pacification process. The collapse of Saudi power in Daraeia
restored Turkish authority for the remainder of the century; it
was only to crumble when Britain encouraged the Arab revolt and
the final decay of the Ottoman Empire. No longer pressed for
zakat and booty and under constant British surveillance, the
Qawasim settled for a share in regional commerce and freedom to
indulge in the dynastic and territorial squabbles which were to
characterise Gulf politics. British tutelage was to endure for a
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century and a half, sufficiently benevolent for there to be
general dismay amongst the sheikhdoms and emirates in 1968'when
the British government announced the withdrawal of its military
forces by the end of the decade; the various trucial agreements
including the 1820 treaty were rescinded, to be replaced by
bilateral agreements as against imposed settlements. A further
chapter in the history of the Gulf had been concluded and with it
the violence which had attended its beginning.
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A PPE N DIX A
The government of India
Two important Acts of Parliament determined the government
of the British possessions in India; the first of these was Lord
North's Regulatory Act 1773 which remodelled the constitution of
the Company
tentatively
supervision.
presidencies
Council of
at home, remodelled its constitution in India and
and incompletely subjected the Company to the
of the British government while subjecting the
of Bombay and Madras to the supervision of the
Bengal; the Governor of Bengal was designated
Governor-General of India, assisted by a council of four with
whom he shared authority, having •a casting vote only when there
was an equal division in the council. The Crown supervised the
actions of the Company, its directors being required to lay
before the treasury all correspondence from India dealing with
the revenues it handled in relations with Indian rulers, and
before a secretary of state everything dealing with civil or
military administration.
In practice, the lack of provision against difficulties that
might arise were the council to outvote the governor-general
proved to be a problem; further the clause giving Calcutta
control over Bombay and Madras worked badly. While the latter
were prohibited from engaging in hostilities or making treaties
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without the consent of Calcutta, two exceptions were admitted,
namely, unless the case were one of such imminent necessity as to
make it dangerous to await the arrival of orders or unless the
local government had received orders direct from home. According
to the Act, the governor-general could only be removed by the
Crown on representation from the court of directors; following
committees on enquiry on the administration of justice and the
causes of the war in the Carnatic, the General Couet of the
Company resolved to defy a vote in the House of Commons recalling
Warren Hastings, the first governor-general. The directors
ultimately agreed to approach the Crown for his recall, but the
letter of recall was never sent as the General Court of the
Company voted by a large majority to rescind the resolution.
The Regulatory Act had clearly broken. down; it had neither
given the state a definite control over the Company, nor the
directors a definite control over their servants, nor the
governor-general a definite control over his council, nor the
Calcutta presidency a definite control over Bombay and Madras.
An attempt by Fox to remedy the problem in 1783 failed; his
successor, Pitt, introduced his India Bill in January 1784,
adroitly dissolved Parliament to secure a triumphant majority and
thus secure the passage of the Bill in August of the same year.
The Act established a board of control consisting of a
secretary of state, the chancellor of the exchequer and four
privy councillors. Urgent or secret orders of "the Commissioners
for the Affairs of India" might be transmitted to India via a
secret committee of three directors, and the court of proprietors
of the company was deprived of any right to annul or suspend any
resolution of the directors approved by the board. The governor-
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general assisted by a council of three was to be supreme over the
other governors in all questions of war, revenue and diplomacy;
only company officers were to be appointed members of the
council, this to obviate a repetition of the calamities which had
followed the establishment of four outsiders as Warren Hasting's
council in 1776.
The board of control obviously provided for control by the
government of the day, its two most important members changing
with each ministry. They did not, however, exercise patronage
and could not appoint or dismiss the Company's servants in India,
but they had access to all the Company's papers and their
approval was required for all dispatches relating to other than
commercial business. In case of emergency they could send their
own drafts to the secret committee of the directors, to be signed
and sent out in the name of the Company. The secret committee
afforded the court of directors a show of independence though
liable to the complete control of the board; according to the
Act, the secret committee was to consist of not more than three
directors; in practice it nearly always consisted of two, the
chairman and deputy chairman of the court. Clearly the ultimate
direction had passed to the cabinet; for the most part the
directors of the Company were satisfied that they were left with
the patronage and the right of dismissing their servants.
Supplementary legislation in 1786 empowered the governor-general
in special cases to override the majority of his council and
enabled the governor-general to hold also in emergencies the
office of commander-in-chief.
Pitt's India Act defined the relations between the British
government and the Company possessions in India until 1858 when
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the Company ceased to exist; however, changes in practice
occurred, notably the loss of its powers by the board of control,
powers which became concentrated in the hands of the board's
president. The position of the president as regards the cabinet
varied; some presidents were members, others not. Similarly,
relations with the court of directors also varied. In practice,
despite the superiority of the board of control and its access to
the cabinet, and despite its power of sending orders through the
secret committee of the directors, which the latter could neither
discuss nor disclose, policy was determined when disputes arose
on a basis of compromise. In the last resort and in matters of
real importance, the government of the day could impose its will
upon the most factious court of directors or on the most
independent of governors-general, while the governor-general had
to run the risk of determining policy without support in the
House of Commons. Further, under the new system, the governor-
general could enforce his will over the subordinate presidencies,
orders from the government of Bengal to be obeyed in every case
except where contrary ones had been received from England as yet
unknown to the superintending government.
One consequence of the 1784 Act, the curtailing of the
patronage of the home authorities, had effect upon the calibre of
government in India. The Act forbad vacancies in the councils to
be filled by other than covenanted servants of the company except
in the case of the governors-general, the governors and the
commanders-in-chief, and confined promotions to due order of
seniority except in special cases notifiable to the court of
directors. The covenanted servants benefited from the change,
which removed the necessity and opportunity for intrigue; the
system of appointing the governors-general straight from England
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also on the whole worked well; many of them were noblemen with a
wide experience of affairs whose representations carried more
weight with the home authorities than would have been the case
with the Company's servants.
Bengal set the pattern for the subordinate presidencies of
Bombay and Madras. There the governors each had a council of two
civil members with the commander-in=chief when that post was not
joined to that of the governor. Under the Governor-in-Council
were three boards - the Board of Trade, the Board of Revenue and
the Military Board. These conducted the detailed administration
of the presidency and were normally headed by a member of the
council. Ultimate responsibility, as in the case of Bengal was
vested in the governor who enjoyed the same power of overruling'
the council as the governor-general.
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APPEN DIX
Treaty concluded between the Honourable East India Company 
and His Highness the Imaum of Muskat, under the date the 
12th of October 1798 
Deed of Agreement from the State of Oman (Muskat), the place
of shelter, under the approbation of the Imaum, the Director,
Syud Sultan, (whose grandeur be eternal!) to the high and potent
English Company, (whose greatness be perpetuated!) as
comprehended in the following articles:
Article I
From the intervention of the Nuwab Etmandood Duola Mirza
Mehdy Ali Khan Bahadoor Hushmunt Jung, never shall there be any
deviation from this Kuolnamah.
Article II
From the recital of the said Nuwab, my heart has become
disposed to an increase of the friendship with that State, and
from this day forth the friend of that Sirkar is the friend of
this, and the friend of this Sirkar is to be the friend of that
Sirkar; and in the same way the enemy of this is to be the enemy
of that.
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Article III
Whereas frequent applications have been made, and are still
making, by the French and Dutch people, for a factory, ie a place
to seat themselves in, either at Muskat or Bunder Abbas, or at
the other ports of this Sirkar, it is therefore written, that
whilst warfare shall continue between the English Company and
them, never shall, from respect to the Company's freindship, be
given to them throughout all my territories a place to fix or
seat themselves in, nor shall they get even ground to stand upon,
within this State.
Article IV
As there is a person of the French nation who has been for
these several years in my service, and who hath now gone in
command of one of my vessels to the Mauritius, I shall,
immediately on his return, dismiss him from my service, and expel
him.
Article V
In the event of any French vessel coming to water at Muskat,
she shall not be allowed to enter the cove into which the English
vessels are admitted, but remain outside the cove; and in case of
hostilities ensuing here between the French and English ships,
the army, and navy, and people of this Government shall take part
in hostility with the English, but on the high seas I am not to
interfere.
Article VI
On the occurrence of any shipwreck of a vessel, or vessels,
appertaining to the English, there shall certainly be aid and
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comfort afforded on the part of this Government, nor shall the
property be seized on.
Article VII
In the port of Bunder Abbas (Gombroon), whenever the English
shall be disposed to establish a factory, making it as a fort, I
have no objection to their fortifying the same, and mounting guns
thereon, as many as they list, and to forty or fifty English
gentelemen residing there, with seven or eight hundred English
sepoys; and for the rest, the rate of duties on goods, on buying
and selling, will be on the same fotting as at Bussora and
Abusheher.
Dated 1st of Jumadee-ool-Awul 1213, Hi'ree (or the 12th of
October 1798 AD).
Source: Bombay Selections XXIV, pp 248-249.
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APPE N DIX
Further treaty between the Honourable East India Company and His 
Highness the Imaum of Muskat, concluded on the 
18th of January 1800 
Agreement entered into by the Imaum of the 'State of Oman, the
place of shelter, with Captain John Malcolm, Bahadoor, Envoy from
the Right Honorable the Governor General, dated the 21st of
Shaban 1214, Hi'ree (or the 18th of January 1800, AD).
Article I
The Kuolnamah entered into on the 1st Jumadee-ool-Awul,
Hi'ree 1213 (12th October 1798) by the Imaum Syud Sultan, through
Nuwab Etmandood Duola Mehdy Ali Khan Bahadoor Hushmunt Jung,
remains fixed and in full force.
Article II
As improper reports of a tendency to interrupt the existing
harmony, and create misunderstanding between the two States, have
gone abroad, and have been communicated to the Right Honorable
the Governor General, the Earl of Mornington, K P, with a view to
prevent such evils in future, we, actuated by sentiments of
reciprocal friendship, agree that an English gentleman of
respectability, on the part of the Honorable Company, shall
always reside at the port of Muskat, and be an Agent through whom
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all intercourse between the States shall be conducted, in order
that the actions of each Government may be fairly and justly
stated, and that no opportunity may be afforded to designing men,
who are ever eager to promote dissensions; and that the
friendship of the two States may remain unshaken till the end of
time, and till the sun and moon have finished their revolving
career.
Sealed in my presence, and delivered to me by the Imaum, on
board the Gun .
 ava, on the 18th January 1800.
(signed)	 John Malcolm,
Envoy.
i
Source: Bombay Selections XXIV, pp 249 -250.
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A PPE N DIX D
General treaty with the Arab tribes of the Persian
Gulf, 1820
In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Praise be
to God, who hath ordained peace to be a blessing to his
creatures. There is established a lasting peace between the
British Government and the Arab tribes, who are parties to this
contract, on the following conditions:
Article 1
There shall be a cessation of plunder and piracy by land and sea
on the part of the Arabs, who are parties to this contract, for
ever.
. Article 2
If any individual of the people of the Arabs contracting shall
attack any that pass by land or sea of any nation whatsoever, in
the way of plunder and piracy and not of acknowledged war, he
shall be accounted an enemy of all mankind and shall be held to
have forfeited both life and goods. And acknowledged war is that
which is proclaimed, avowed, and ordered by government against
government; and the killing of men and taking of goods without
proclamation, avowal, and the order of government, is plunder and
piracy.
17§
Article 3
The friendly (lit, the pacificated) Arabs shall carry by land and
sea a red flag, with or without letters in it, at their option,
and this shall be in a border of white, the breadth of the white
in the border being equal to the breadth of the red, as
represented in the margin (the whole forming the flag known in
the British Navy by the title of white pierced red), this shall
be the flag of the friendly Arabs, and they shall use it and no
other.
Article 4
The pacificated tribes shall all of them continue in their former
relations, with the exception that they shall be at peace with
the British Government, and shall not fight with each other, and
the flag shall be a symbol of this only and of nothing further.
Article 5
The vessels of the friendly Arabs shall all of them have in their
possession a paper (Register) signed with the signature of their
Chief, in which shall be the name of the vessel, its length, its
breadth, and how many Karahs it holds. And they shall also have
in their possession another writing (Port Clearance) signed with
the signature of their Chief, in which shall be the name of the
owner, the name of the Nacodah, the number of the men, the number
of arms, from when sailed, at what time, and to what port bound.
And if a British or other vessel meet them, they shall produce
the Register and the Clearance.
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Article 6
The friendly Arabs, if they choose, shall send an envoy to the
British Residency in the Persian Gulf with the necessary
accompaniments, and he shall remain there for the transaction of
their business with the Residency; and the British Government, if
it chooses, shall send an envoy also to them in like manner; and
the envoy shall add his signature to the signature of the Chief
in the paper (Register) of their vessels, which contains the
length of the vessel, its breadth and tonnage; the signature of
the envoy to be renewed every year. Also all such envoys shall
be at the expense of their own party.
Article 7
If any tribe, or others, shall not desist from plunder and
piracy, the friendly Arabs shall act against them according to
their ability and circumstances, and an arrangement for this
purpose shall take place between the friendly Arabs and the
British at the time when such plunder and piracy shall occur.
Article 8
The putting men to death after they have given up their arms is
an act of piracy and not of acknowledged war; and if any tribe
shall put to death any persons, either Muhammadans or others,
after they have given up their arms, such tribe shall be held to
have broken the peace; and the friendly Arabs shall act against
them in concert with the British, and, God willing, the war
against them shall not cease until the surrender of those who
performed the act and of those who ordered it.
181
Article 9
The carrying off of slaves, men, women, or children from the
coasts of Africa or elsewhere, and the transporting them in
vessels, is plunder and piracy, and the friendly Arabs shall do
nothing of this nature.
Article 10
The vessels of the friendly Arabs, bearing their flag above
described, shall enter into all the British ports and into the
ports of the allies of the British so far as they shall be able
to effect it; and they shall buy and sell therein, and if any
shall attack them the British Government shall take notice of it.
Article 11
These conditions aforesaid shall be common to all tribes and
persons, who shall hereafter adhere thereto in the same manner as
to those who adhere to them at the time present.
(The Treaty was signed by Keir at Ra's Al-Khaimah on 8 January
1820, and then at varying dates thereafter by the pirate sheikhs.
The above is Thompson's translation.)
Source: Bombay Archives, Secret and Political Diary No 315, 1820.
- Bushire Political
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